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As the world’s leading climate scientists tell us in the recent Special Report 
“Global Warming of 1.5 °C” by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), we must act urgently and collectively, now. 
If the reader is not already convinced of the need to act, I recommend 
that they have a careful look at the solid scientific evidence synthesised by 
the IPCC before reading on. The problem of climate change will continue 
to worsen for as long as the concentration of man-made greenhouse gases in 
the atmosphere continues to increase. 
In Europe, we can be proud of what we have achieved so far. We have 
the world’s most ambitious climate and energy objectives for 2030, as well 
as the necessary legislation to achieve them. This shows citizens that climate 
and energy issues are at the top of the European Union’s agenda and that this 
priority is making real progress in Europe. To our international partners, we 
show that the European Union is leading by example and that we turn our 
pledges into action. 
Now is also the moment to look ahead to 2050. We will have to further 
scale up our policies beyond 2030. The crucial thing is that we can only do it 
as part of a deep transformation of our model of economic development, one 
that delivers climate neutrality, prosperity and fairness for European citizens – 
a model that is fair for our citizens and balanced for our industries. 
Far from asserting how things should be done, this book merely out- 
lines how they are currently being done in Europe. It explains the multiple 
measures and instruments that have become part of Europe’s overall policy. 
FOREWORD 
 
Foreword xvii 
 
It also describes how the EU’s climate policy is searching for a new balance 
between public intervention and the role of markets. In this respect, fairness 
and effectiveness are major themes of this book. Some vulnerable communi- 
ties already feel the brunt of changes to their climate, resilience and security, 
whereas others have until now experienced fewer impacts. Some people and 
companies can afford to be early adopters of new technologies, while others 
lack the resources to do things differently. We are all in this together, and poli- 
cies must address questions of fairness as well as effectiveness. 
Climate change is much more than just an environmental problem, and 
climate action is perhaps the defining challenge of our time.We must embark 
on a process of transformation with a much greater sense of urgency than 
I see today.We have a little time left to stabilise climate change and fulfil the 
goals of the Paris Agreement.We have not yet run out of time – but we can- 
not afford to hesitate any longer. 
Words and declarations of intent need reinforcing through actions by 
all countries and at all levels of governance. A transformation on this scale 
requires an open and inclusive debate. We all need to engage widely with 
citizens and civil society across Europe to reach a common understanding 
on the way forward. 
Miguel Arias Cañete 
European Commissioner for Climate Action & Energy 
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HAVE 25 YEARS OF EU CLIMATE 
POLICY DELIVERED? 
Jos Delbeke 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
In line with its multilateral tradition, the European Union (EU) developed 
its climate policies with a view to meeting its commitments in the context 
of the United Nations (UN). The ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by the 
EU triggered the question of how the EU was to deliver the 8% emissions 
reduction it had committed to. It took a decade before the EU succeeded in 
putting a price on carbon. The agreements by the Heads of State and Gov- 
ernment on a common target for the EU to reduce emissions for 2020 and 
later for 2030 were real breakthroughs. It made the elaboration of a compre- 
hensive climate policy at the EU level possible. 
 
1.1 The world is on a most worrying path 
The facts about climate change are not at all promising. An indisputable 
change has been taking place in the climate system since the industrial revo- 
lution, one which has become much more pronounced since the 1970s. The 
concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO
2
) in the atmosphere keep increasing, 
and this has led to a global warming of approximately 1°C increase compared 
to pre-industrial levels. 
Solid scientific evidence has been offered by the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC), based on contributions from the most qualified 
scientists from all over the world. In addition to the thousands of pages of 
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FIGURE 1.1 IPCC data illustrations of effects of global climate change 
Source: IPCC 5th Assessment Report, Synthesis Report, November 20141 (see footnote for full 
citation) 
 
 
scientific literature reviewed by the IPCC’s studies, the IPCC also regularly 
produces “Synthesis Reports” with summaries for policy makers agreed by 
consensus (see Figure 1.1). 
The fifth and latest Assessment Report of the IPCC, published in 2014, 
summarises the scientific insights to date. We now know with a high degree 
of certainty that the planet is warming at an unprecedented speed, measured 
over recent decades and compared to past millennia. Humans are the cause of 
this global warming, mainly due to rising CO
2 
concentrations related to the 
very high consumption of fossil fuels. The impacts of climate change will be 
felt all over the globe in different ways and will lead to adverse impacts for 
humans and the economy, as well as on natural systems. Scientists also tell us 
that it is possible to contain the worst impacts of climate change, provided 
we keep global temperature increase below 2°C, and if possible, to 1.5°C,2 
compared to pre-industrial times. 
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The EU economy, individual citizens and society at large are already feel- 
ing the significant impact of climate change. Floods, rainfall patterns and 
forest fires are already happening more frequently than before, resulting in 
the loss of lives and damage to property and infrastructure. The extent of sea 
level rise may be limited to date, but the forecasts are not good: a complete 
melting of the huge Greenland ice sheet – even if occurring over a very 
long period – would make sea levels rise by around seven metres. The con- 
sequences of an expanded desertification in the Mediterranean and Africa 
will burden economic development, which could further boost migration 
pressures towards Europe. Even if the consequences of climate change will 
be more acute in vulnerable developing countries, the impact is likely to be 
considerable for Europe as well. 
The IPCC also calculated a “carbon budget” related to the 2°C tempera- 
ture increase limit and indicated how much is left for the future. The result 
represents a real policy challenge: roughly two thirds of the carbon budget 
compatible with the 2°C limit has already been used. However, the world 
population is still growing, and a continued increase is forecast for some 
decades.3 The developing world is aspiring to reach income levels compa- 
rable to those of developed countries. As a consequence, in order to limit 
climate impacts, those with the highest per capita greenhouse gas emissions – 
and these are mainly the developed countries – must reduce their emissions 
earlier and very significantly. New technologies and new behavioural pat- 
terns will have to be established everywhere so as to bring down the average 
emissions per person on the globe to less than 2 tonnes of CO
2 
per year 
and eventually to balance the remaining emissions with removals, achieving 
greenhouse gas neutrality. 
All this implies that the goal of respecting the goals of the Paris Agreement 
to remain “well below 2°C by 2050 and pursuing efforts to 1.5°C” becomes 
more challenging by the day. The international community agreed to act 
together in 1992 at the World Summit in Rio de Janeiro through adopting the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Since then, many actions 
have been undertaken, such as the Kyoto Protocol, adopted in 1997, and more 
recently the Paris Agreement of 2015. The world has now agreed to step up 
action in all countries, also in the so-called emerging economies. The Paris 
Agreement has entered swiftly into force and all efforts should now be con- 
centrated on the implementation of the commitments made. These commit- 
ments differ across the globe, and success in honouring them will also vary, but 
most importantly we must intensify action everywhere as a matter of urgency. 
The most worrying development that has occurred since 2015 is that 
US President Donald Trump has announced the intended withdrawal of the 
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Conclusion: Scientific evidence on climate change is unequivocal: man- 
made emissions of greenhouse gases have been accumulating in the 
atmosphere since the Industrial Revolution. Only a small window of 
opportunity is left to avoid significant damage to humans, nature and 
the economy. The international community has decided to act together 
and to develop policies to limit climate change to “well below 2°C, and 
pursuing efforts to 1.5°C”. 
United States from the Paris Agreement.While such a withdrawal cannot be 
fully implemented before November 2020 (four years after the Paris Agree- 
ment came into effect), this signal of disengagement from global efforts by 
the world’s richest country is a major blow. Fortunately, significant climate 
policies continue to be deployed by individual US states and cities, with many 
businesses also committed to contributing to climate action. Similarly, energy 
market developments, such as the falling costs of renewable energy, improve- 
ments in energy efficiency and coal-fired power generation not being com- 
petitive with shale gas, point towards continuous progress being made in 
reducing the greenhouse gas emissions of the power sector in the US. 
 
 
1.2 The EU reduced its greenhouse gas emissions 
by 22% since 1990 
Following adoption of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
the EU decided in 1993 to gather the necessary data on its emissions of 
greenhouse gases. It was the start for the annual publication of a factual and 
impartial report, produced by the European Environment Agency (EEA), 
indicating how Europe’s greenhouse gas emissions evolve and how much 
sectors emit in each of the Member States. 
The good news is that the EU has been reducing its emissions consistently 
since 1990, the base year of the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement (Figure 1.2). In 2017, 
the EU had already achieved a 22% reduction, which is higher than the target 
it set itself of a 20% reduction below 1990 levels by 2020. 
Heads of State and Government decided in 2014, in readiness for what 
was to become the Paris Agreement, that the EU would increase the ambi- 
tion of its greenhouse gas emissions reductions to at least 40% below 1990 
levels by 2030.While this will require more action, the bigger challenge will 
be to prepare the world for net zero emissions in the second half of the 
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FIGURE 1.2 EU greenhouse gas emissions 1990–2050: historical record and 
challenges ahead 
Source: EEA trends and projections report 2018, EEA GHG dataviewer 2018, EEA GHG projec- 
tions dataset 2018 
 
 
 
century, as stated in the Paris Agreement. The recent IPCC Special Report 
on 1.5°C reviews the available scientific literature. It concludes that far- 
reaching and rapid transitions in all sectors around the world will have to 
be made. Subsequently, the European Commission has indicated that it is 
possible with currently known technologies to realise such a deep transition 
towards a climate-neutral Europe by 2050.4 
In the EU, carbon dioxide (CO
2
) represents more than 80% of total green- 
house gas emissions. This release of CO
2 
is connected with the extensive use 
of fossil fuels in power generation, in industry and transport, and these sec- 
tors have therefore been the main targets for policy intervention. The other 
greenhouse gases are methane (CH
4
), nitrous oxide (N
2
O) and fluorinated 
gases (F-gases). They originate mainly from the agricultural, chemical and 
waste sectors. These non-CO
2 
gases are produced in smaller volumes but are 
more potent global warming gases, so they have a correspondingly greater 
impact on the climate system. 
The EU’s emissions trend was significantly curbed between 2005 and 2017 
(see Table 1.1). This represents a step-change and will make more ambitious 
reductions in the future both feasible and affordable. Between 1990 and 2005, 
1990-2017 historic emissions: 
- 46 Mt CO2 eq./year 
2020 target: 
- 20 % 
 
 
2017-2030 target: 
- 80 Mt CO2eq./ year 
2030 target: 
- 40 % 
2030 target-2050 goal (-80%): 
- 114 Mt CO2eq./ year 
2030 target-2050 goal (-95%): 
- 157 Mt CO2eq./ year 
- 80 % 
-95 % 
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TABLE 1.1 EU greenhouse gas emissions by sector, 1990–2030 (in CO
2 
equivalent 
and as percentage of 1990 emissions) 
EU greenhouse gas emissions by sector, 1990–2030 
(2030 projections “with existing measures”) 
 
(in Million tonnes of CO
2 
equivalent) Percentage variations 
since 1990 
 
 
1990 2005 2017 2030 
 
2005 2017 2030 
Energy supply 1869 1713 1276 1053  92 68 56 
Energy use in Manufacturing 841 636 483 459  76 57 55 
Industrial processes and 517 466 379 340  90 73 66 
product use         
Transport 787 976 946 887 124 120 113 
Other energy use 854 794 663 555 93 78 65 
Agriculture 542 434 432 432 80 80 80 
Waste 236 200 136 99 85 58 42 
International aviation 69 131 150 164 190 217 238 
Total 5715 5350 4465 3989 94 78 70 
Source: Author based on EEA data        
 
 
 
annual reductions were limited to less than half a percentage point per year.An 
important change came after 2005, when the EU began its integrated climate 
and energy policy; compared to 1990 the emissions index declined from 94 
to 78 in fewer than 12 years. The annual emission reduction between 2005 
and 2017 jumped from less than 0.5% to 1.5% per year. Continuing towards 
the targets set for 2030 will require a further annual increase of approximately 
2%. In early 2019, Member States presented their draft National Energy and 
Climate Plans for this higher ambition level, as past policies for 2030 only 
lead towards an emissions index 70 instead of 60 (100 = 1990), which would 
correspond with the “at least 40% target” confirmed by the EU’s ratification 
of the Paris Agreement. Covering this emissions reduction gap will require a 
significant strengthening of current policies. 
This curbing of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions trend is primarily the 
result of evolutions in the power and manufacturing sector. The combina- 
tion of policies related to energy efficiency, renewables and carbon pricing 
seemed effective. On the other hand, the transport sector and in particular, 
aviation increased its emissions, thereby neutralising some of the progress 
made elsewhere. Emissions from waste have been considerably reduced even 
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Conclusion: The EU has reduced its emissions in 2017 by 22% com- 
pared to 1990. The major contribution to emissions reduction came 
from the power and manufacturing sectors, while transport emissions 
kept growing. 
if this sector covers only a minor proportion of the EU’s emissions. The next 
phase of political action until 2030 therefore has to focus more on the curb- 
ing of greenhouse gas emissions from transport. The required technologies 
are increasingly available. The EU has adopted ambitious new CO
2 
standards 
for new passenger cars in order to improve their performance by 37.5% over 
a period of nine years from 2021–2030. 
The amount of carbon stored in the EU’s forest, soil and vegetation is not 
included in the previous data. This so-called carbon “sink” has been more 
or less stable and was estimated to be around 230 million tonnes of CO
2
- 
equivalent in 1990 and 304 million tonnes of CO
2
-equivalent in 2015. This 
is primarily the result of sustainable forest management and afforestation. In 
the future, much more policy attention also needs to be given to the fixing of 
carbon in the soil by means of proper incentives provided by the EU’s Com- 
mon Agricultural Policy, for example. Equally, an increased combustion of 
biomass should not lead to additional emissions. For these reasons, a system- 
atic accounting tool has been developed5 (as further explained in Chapter 8). 
Countries and continents have very different emission profiles when it 
comes to greenhouse gases. In Europe, the main contributor is CO
2 
emis- 
sions from fossil fuel use coming primarily from power generation, transport 
and manufacturing. In other countries outside Europe, the major concern 
may be tropical deforestation or methane emissions from cattle. This vari- 
ation pleads in favour of a policy approach allowing for considerable flex- 
ibility. Not only do the emissions differ significantly; income and wealth are 
also unevenly distributed across the globe. The “bottom-up” approach as 
enshrined in the Paris Agreement through the so-called “Nationally Deter- 
mined Contributions” captures the need for such policy flexibility. 
 
 
1.3 The EU decoupled its emissions from economic 
growth 
No “silver bullet” or single technology is able to bring down greenhouse 
gas emissions across the economy. Consequently, multiple measures are 
required, and they should be designed in a way that creates as many syner- 
gies as possible. After the EU’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2002, the 
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EU introduced a number of policies. It began with the adoption of the EU 
Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) Directive in 2003, which established a 
carbon market in Europe from 2005, covering emissions from the power and 
manufacturing sectors. For the sectors of the economy not covered by the 
EU ETS, such as transport, buildings and agriculture, the EU agreed legally 
binding targets per Member State. 
A most notable result of this intensive policy activity is that the EU suc- 
ceeded in bringing down its greenhouse gas emissions without sacrificing 
economic growth. Over the period from 1990–2017, the EU increased its 
GDP by 53% while at the same time reducing its emissions by 22% (Fig- 
ure 1.3). As a result of this successful decoupling, the greenhouse gas emis- 
sions’ intensity per unit of GDP was halved between 1990 and 2017. The 
continuing reduction of greenhouse gas intensity over more than two dec- 
ades demonstrates also that progress in terms of decoupling has been made 
notwithstanding the irregularity of economic cycles. 
It is sometimes claimed that this decoupling is unduly flattered by the 
accounting methodology used. This methodology is based on the “direct” 
emissions approach, as adopted by the UNFCCC and confirmed in the Paris 
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FIGURE 1.3 EU: decoupling economic growth from emissions 1990–2017 
Source: EEA, based on data from EEA (GHG emissions), Eurostat (energy and population) and 
DG ECFIN, European Commission (GDP) 
25 years of EU climate policy 9 
 
Agreement. This approach makes all countries directly responsible for the 
emissions emitted on their territory. The universal participation of Paris 
Agreement reinforces the inclusiveness of this approach. Policies that would 
indirectly address emissions coming from other countries could be perceived 
as a breach to this territoriality principle and to national sovereignty more 
broadly. 
The alternative would be an “indirect” approach whereby emissions are 
accounted for in relation to the consumption of goods within a country, 
whether imported or manufactured. Behind this assertion is the argument 
that the EU is simply importing more carbon-intensive products and is 
thereby “exporting” its carbon emissions to the rest of the world. While 
this may be happening to some extent, the overall result is counterbalanced 
by the fact that the EU’s exports are relatively efficient in terms of carbon 
content and positively contribute to bringing down emissions in the rest of 
the world. Modelling done for the European Commission suggests that the 
EU has contributed to the decarbonisation of third countries by raising the 
energy efficiency of its own economy and exports; EU exports have been 
estimated to reduce global emissions in 2016 by a little more that 200 mil- 
lion tonnes of CO
2
-equivalent compared to a situation where EU exports 
would be produced locally in the importing countries.6 One can very well 
conclude that the decoupling of emissions from economic growth is a fun- 
damental feature of the EU’s economy and should be continued in the 
future. It shows that climate policy is not undermining economic growth; 
rather, what is important is the quality and the embedded technology of 
that growth. 
The two main drivers behind the decoupling of economic growth and 
emissions have been the reduced energy intensity of the economy, and the 
reduced carbon intensity of energy production (Figure 1.4). Since 2000, 
these two factors could compensate for the emissions influence of an increase 
in welfare (GDP per capita) and increased population. It underlines the major 
changes that were happening in the energy sector, not least in power produc- 
tion. Between 2008 and 2015, which includes the worst years of the eco- 
nomic recession following the financial crisis from 2008, CO
2 
emissions from 
fossil fuel combustion fell by 14.4%.7 These reductions were impacted by the 
policies both to curb energy demand and to decarbonise energy supply. 
These developments have obviously had an impact on the position of 
Europe compared to the rest of the world. The EU’s share of global emis- 
sions has been falling continuously, partially because other parts of the 
world, especially the emerging economies, have been emitting much more. 
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FIGURE 1.4 Analysis of key trends and drivers in greenhouse gas emissions in the 
EU, 1990 and 20158 
Source: EEA “Analysis of key trends and drivers in greenhouse gas emissions in the EU between 
1990 and 2015” 
 
The combined G20 countries were responsible for three-quarters of global 
greenhouse gas emissions in 2012, while the EU’s share of global green- 
house emissions was 10% and falling. China’s share was over 26% in 2012, 
followed by the US (13.5%), India (7%) and Russia (5%).9 These compara- 
tive numbers will, of course, have evolved considerably since then. 
In 2015, CO
2 
emissions per capita were 6.9 tonnes CO
2 
in the EU and 
have shown a steady reduction since 1990 (see Figure 1.5). At the same time, 
in China, CO
2  
emissions per capita have risen significantly since 2002. These 
emissions in China reached the EU’s level in 2012, and since then have con- 
tinued to grow, reaching 7.7 tonnes CO
2 
in 2015. Although declining, per 
capita emissions of the US are very high compared to the global average and 
are more than twice those of the EU. Levels per capita in India, for example, 
are still very low but are steadily increasing. 
-2% 
-9% 
-14.4% 
25 years of EU climate policy 11 
 
 
Conclusion: The EU reduced its greenhouse gas emissions while main- 
taining economic growth. This decoupling took place in an incremental 
but steady manner, thanks to the integrated climate and energy policy 
that encouraged low-carbon technology and investment. 
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FIGURE 1.5 Global per capita CO2 emissions from fossil fuel use and industrial 
processes, 1990–2015 
Source: Emission database for global atmospheric research (EDGAR), 2016 update: http://edgar. 
jrc.ec.europa.eu/ 
 
 
1.4 The five cornerstones of EU climate policy 
The EU is a transnational regional organisation composed of 28 sovereign 
Member States with highly diverse characteristics in terms of wealth, 
income, industrial performance and natural endowment. It is therefore 
not surprising that the public debate on climate change differs signifi- 
cantly amongst them, as is the political preparedness to take action. It was 
key to ensure that all Member States became part of the policy solution 
and felt their specific concerns were adequately addressed in the policy 
architecture. 
It was imperative for the EU to embed its emerging climate policy firmly 
into the multilateral context of the UNFCCC. It was necessary to point 
at the global nature of the problem, as much as to the global dimension of 
the policies required. It was also an important way to demonstrate to the 
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emerging economies, now responsible for the bulk of the world’s greenhouse 
gas emissions, that their climate policies can deliver important benefits to 
them as well. 
 
1.4.1 A vision endorsed by the highest political level 
While Europe recognised the magnitude of the climate challenge, a major 
question was to determine its fair share of that global task, both technically 
and politically. Europe recognised its significant historical contribution to the 
greenhouse gases accumulated in the atmosphere. However, it was equally 
important to search for a maximum emission reduction at reasonable cost as 
it would be of utmost importance to preserve the collective “willingness to 
pay.” Even if we all benefit from the long-term results of the policy, there are 
nevertheless short-term additional investments involved. This raises inevita- 
bly political questions, even by those for whom the need to act is absolutely 
accepted. 
In Europe, a clear endorsement at the highest levels of a long-term pol- 
icy vision turned out to be critical. As of 2005, the European Council – 
comprising of the EU’s Heads of State and Government – had discussed the 
issue several times. In 2007, the leaders formally agreed on an “independent 
commitment to achieve at least 20% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions 
by 2020 compared to 1990.”They even offered to increase this commitment 
to 30% by 2020 if other developed countries would commit themselves to 
a comparable emission reduction. This was clearly an invitation to the US 
to join in the overall efforts. The climate commitment was accompanied by 
specific energy objectives, including a binding target to increase renewable 
energy’s share in final energy consumption to 20% by 2020 (from about 8.5% 
in 2005) and an indicative target to reduce energy consumption by 20% in 
2020.10 
On this basis, the Commission developed a package of legislative propos- 
als that was finally agreed one year ahead of the UNFCCC conference in 
Copenhagen in December 2009. While the European Council’s guidance 
was innovative institutionally, by reason of the level of detail it gave in its ori- 
entations, the European Parliament accepted this innovation, knowing that it 
was bound to have a decisive say and opportunity to assert its position when 
deciding upon the individual pieces of the legislation. 
Five years later, in 2014, the first permanent President of the European 
Council11 Mr Herman Van Rompuy continued the role of encouraging cli- 
mate policy through sealing key decisions at the level of Heads of State and 
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Conclusion: Heads of State and Government, acting together in the 
European Council on the basis of consensus, gave clear guidance on EU-
wide targets for greenhouse gas reductions, renewable energy and 
energy efficiency with respect to 2020 and 2030. This practice signifi- 
cantly facilitated the subsequent adoption of specific EU legislation. 
Government. Based on the technical preparation by the Commission, not 
least in its “Roadmap for a competitive low-carbon economy,”12 the Euro- 
pean Council formally decided on the “at least 40% greenhouse gas reduc- 
tion” to be achieved by 2030. This decision constituted the EU’s political 
and diplomatic contribution in the run-up to the Paris Climate Conference 
at the end of 2015, and it had a critical influence on the ambitions set out by 
the US and China a few weeks later. 
These decisions on the long-term vision of its climate policy created 
a precedent on how to deal with important new challenges in the EU. 
According to the Lisbon Treaty, the Council of Ministers and the Euro- 
pean Parliament adopt legislation together based on a proposal prepared by 
the European Commission. An innovative institutional practice was created 
whereby the European Council, which brings together the Heads of State 
and Government of the 28 Member States, adopted a general policy orien- 
tation before specific legislation was prepared. 
This original way of getting the new EU institutions to work out strategic 
policy questions in the evolving context of the Lisbon Treaty hinged on the 
cooperation between key persons. The Heads of Cabinet of the Presidents 
of the Council and the Commission, and their respective Secretary-Generals, 
were working hand in glove to get this new policy area on the rails. It allowed 
for bridging the gap between technical and political knowledge, which is so 
critical to deliver solid and lasting outcomes. 
The heart of the strategic vision adopted by the Heads of State and Gov- 
ernment was the setting of clear and simple targets. Over time, these were 
gradually tightened, from 8% to 20% and later to 40% emissions reductions. 
Now that the objective for 2030 has been translated into legislation, the next 
critical debate is likely to shift to the ones for 2040 and 2050. Further nego- 
tiations at the international level on more climate ambition would benefit 
greatly from sharing this experience of creating a common vision amongst 
28 sovereign States, while finding solutions to overcome their social, eco- 
nomic and political differences. 
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1.4.2 Putting an explicit price on carbon 
In parallel with the decision to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, the EU policy- 
implementation phase started with the creation of the European Climate 
Change Programme. This was an extensive consultation exercise with stake- 
holders from civil society, the business sector and national authorities. As 
greenhouse gases are emitted by so many different economic activities, the 
consultation process ended up with a long list of possible actions, after which 
a process of priority setting was needed. 
The first issue was to focus on policies for which the European Com- 
mission was best placed to propose legislation at the European level. In some 
areas, national action is difficult to put in place because of potential distor- 
tions of competition. Since the 1980s, it has become increasingly clear that 
adopting rules at European level was an effective and practical way to over- 
come such distortions. 
The conclusion of the European Climate Change Programme was that 
several layers of government must endeavour to work together, and that the 
European level was best placed for action where the single market perspective 
created a strong value added. It was decided to act in a harmonised manner 
in the fields of energy-intensive and manufacturing industry, electricity and 
heat production. This enabled the harnessing of economies of scale provided 
by a market of more than 500 million consumers. 
In the 1990s, economists launched a debate on “pricing economic exter- 
nalities” and how to put this into practice. Prices are a very effective way of 
transmitting information through the economy and influencing behaviour, 
right down to the levels of individual producers and consumers. This can be 
achieved through taxes, or alternatively, through the setting of overall lim- 
its to pollution levels (“a cap”). In other words, economic instruments can 
work either directly through setting prices for polluting (e.g., through taxes), 
or through defining quantities of pollution allowed (e.g., through capping 
pollution levels). Businesses expressed a clear preference for carbon pricing 
instead of detailed technical regulations. 
The initial proposals at EU level were for pricing through taxes. In 1992, 
the Commission made a proposal for a combined carbon and energy tax. 
Under the EU Treaty, this required unanimity. After almost a decade of dif- 
ficult negotiations, the tax approach was abandoned, in particular due to the 
reservations some Member States had in allowing the European Union more 
say in taxation policy (notwithstanding that some indirect taxes were already 
regulated at European level, most notablyValue Added Tax and Excise duties). 
Moreover, taxes seemed difficult to handle politically almost everywhere, as 
people easily feel over-taxed. The Minister of Finance may also look more 
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Conclusion: The EU ETS created an explicit price on carbon emissions 
and reduced emissions by 26% between 2005 and 2017. The system      
is cost-effective as it offers considerable flexibility to companies. It cre- 
ates incentives to save energy and to innovate in low-carbon technolo- 
gies, such as renewable energy. 
for fresh revenues, while the climate and/or environment minister looks first 
at curbing pollution. These two interests are not necessarily easy to combine. 
The European debate on economic instruments shifted from taxation to 
cap setting and emissions trading. The US was the first to demonstrate in 
practice the advantages that an instrument such as “cap-and-trade” could offer. 
Led by their policy experience on reducing sulphur and NO
x 
emissions, the 
US pushed successfully for its introduction into an article of the Kyoto Pro- 
tocol, against the wishes of the Europeans and others. Setting a limit on the 
total amount of emissions could ensure emissions reductions, and the trading 
of “permits,” or “allowances,” could offer cost-efficiency. Possible legislation for 
emissions trading at EU level would fall under the Environmental Chapter of 
the Treaty of Rome (as then amended by the Maastricht Treaty), and therefore 
decisions could be made through qualified majority voting in Council. In such 
a manner, the political and institutional stalemate that had blocked progress on 
EU-level carbon and energy taxation could be overcome. 
In 2003, it was decided to start the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), 
covering all major actors in the field of power and manufacturing. More than 
11,000 industrial installations and subsequently airlines across Europe were 
covered by one EU-wide cap on emissions, rather than having distinct national 
targets for EU ETS-covered sectors.13 The EU-wide approach has effectively 
ensured that abatement is achieved where the costs are the lowest, without 
creating distortions of competition between large industrial installations across 
Europe. The EU ETS gradually established a truly internal market for carbon 
emissions, applicable in a harmonised manner from northernmost Sweden or 
Finland to the south of Italy or eastern Romania. It developed in synergy with 
the gradual establishment of the internal market for electricity. 
A debate continues amongst economists whether the incentives created 
by the EU ETS have been solid enough to generate significant emission 
reductions. However, between 2005 and 2016 emissions under the EU ETS 
decreased by 26%, i.e., more than the average reductions made across the EU 
and never exceeding the cap. More than the price of carbon, the real emission 
reductions matter most. 
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1.4.3 The need for a comprehensive policy approach 
Putting a price on carbon is of capital importance but is not sufficient in 
itself. It is most useful in sectors driven by a strong economic rationale, such 
as in private business. Moreover, the market does not take into account dis- 
tributional issues or other political realities that matter. 
Economists have been struggling with the issue of double regulation, 
as alongside carbon prices other regulations, such as on renewable energy 
and energy efficiency, may exist in parallel. The real world is, unlike theo- 
retical models, always subject to multiple regulations, and some of them 
may partially overlap. The important question is whether these regula- 
tions work in the same direction or undermine one another. The EU 
ETS has definitely been a solid instrument to realise low-cost emission 
reductions, working as a complement to legislation on renewable energy 
that worked with much higher implicit carbon prices. To the extent that 
separate renewable energy legislation or energy efficiency standards could 
create a surplus in the carbon market, the newly created Market Stability 
Reserve neutralises that effectively in the future (see Chapter 4). 
While the EU ETS may cover some 45% of emissions, many small 
emitters such as households, transport users and agriculture generate the 
remaining 55%. Dealing satisfactorily with these actors can hardly be 
managed through a harmonised European approach; hence, these emis- 
sions are shared out between the Member States in the form of legally 
binding targets. Based on economic modelling, a cost-effective reduction 
pathway has been calculated for the overall EU target of a 40% reduc- 
tion in greenhouse gases by 2030 compared to 1990 between the sectors 
covered and those not covered by the EU ETS. It was therefore decided 
to reduce the emissions under the EU ETS by 43% in 2030 compared to 
2005, combined with a collective reduction target for the sectors outside 
the EU ETS across all Member States of 30% in 2030 compared to 2005. 
For the first time however, the EU target also accounts for emissions com- 
ing from the agriculture and forestry sectors, often called the “Land Use, 
Land Use Change and Forestry,” or “LULUCF” sectors. The EU’s 2030 tar- 
get of at least a 40% reduction has the particularity, however, that no net 
increase in emissions are to come from these agriculture and forestry sectors, 
which is technically referred to as the “no-debit rule.” 
EU climate policy is comprehensive as the EU ETS, the Effort Sharing 
Regulation defining targets for the Member States for the non-EU ETS sec- 
tors and the LULUCF sector together cover the totality of Europe’s green- 
house gas emissions. There are only very limited gateways allowed between 
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Conclusion: The EU has developed a comprehensive policy approach 
whereby the EU ETS is complemented with targets for the Member 
States covering the emissions of households, transport users and agri- 
culture. A third pillar of LULUCF has been added under the 2030 overall 
target. 
EU commitment: at least −40% domestic 
GHG emissions reductions by 2030 
Non-ETS 
Emission 
Trading 
−30% 
Including: road transport, buildings, waste, agriculture, 
land use, land use change and forestry 
System 
−43% 
Including: Power/Energy Sector 
and Industry, Aviation 
 
Max 100 
MtCO2eq ESR 
−30% 
Including: road 
transport, buildings, 
waste, agriculture 
non CO2 
 
 
 
Full 
flexibility 
 
 
Max 280 
MtCO2eq 
LULUCF 
 
"No-Debit" 
 
 
FIGURE 1.6 EU climate policy design 
Source: European Commission 
 
 
those three pillars: a maximum of 100 million tonnes between the EU ETS 
and Effort Sharing parts and a maximum 280 million tonnes between the 
Effort Sharing and LULUCF parts. In order to make sure the targets are 
delivered, the EU has established a harmonised emissions accounting system. 
 
 
 
1.4.4 Solidarity and fairness: addressing the distributive 
questions 
The EU’s overall policy approach has been guided by the principle of cost- 
effectiveness. However, this approach needed a correction for distribu- 
tive impacts. Economic analysis had indeed shown that there would be 
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considerable differences in overall investment needs if targets were to be 
distributed purely on the basis of cost-effectiveness (i.e., equalisation of 
marginal cost of abatement per Member State). Indeed, that would imply 
that lower-income Member States, notably in Central and Eastern Europe, 
would have to face higher additional investments in relative terms because 
of their higher energy- and carbon-intensity and their lower GDP. Ask- 
ing poorer Member States to do more than richer ones just because it is 
more cost-effective was obviously unacceptable to the poorer States. As the 
per capita income disparity between the EU’s poorest and richest Member 
States is more than 1:10, the EU has been ensuring that fairness is a central 
concept in its climate policy. 
One way of guaranteeing fairness is through the differentiation of 
emissions targets for each Member State in sectors outside the Emissions 
Trading System. The effort was shared out between Member States based 
on national per capita income.14 The result is a set of differentiated targets 
ranging from a 40% reduction compared to 2005 for the highest income 
countries to 0% compared to 2005 for countries with the lowest average 
per capita income. Similarly, on renewable energy for 2020, national targets 
were formulated in such a way as to promote a fair distribution between 
Member States. Overall, Member States with similar economic perfor- 
mances, often neighbouring each other, received similar targets. 
Considering the uncertainties related to future economic development 
and to enhance cost-effective achievement of targets, further flexibility 
allowed Member States to transfer emission rights between themselves. In 
this way, countries with higher national costs could achieve their target more 
cheaply, and countries that overachieve their target could benefit financially. 
There is clearly, therefore, a link between flexibilities and fairness, as the flex- 
ibilities allow for the transfer of obligations in exchange for revenue, and the 
obligations are set in such a way as to give benefit to the relatively poorer 
Member States. 
As part of the EU ETS design, a significant share of allowances has been 
set aside for specific purposes. Ten percent of allowances for auctioning are 
redistributed in favour of lower income Member States. Moreover, a pro- 
portion of allowances are set aside to create a Modernisation Fund that pro- 
vides important financial support for modernisation of the energy sector in 
these Member States. At a price of €20 per tonne, this represents an enve- 
lope of some €6.5 billion to be used for low-carbon and energy efficiency 
purposes. If we take all redistributive provisions of the EU ETS in favour of 
the lower income Member States together, some 1.5 billion allowances are 
available during the period from 2020–2030. At a price of €20 per tonne, 
this adds up to some €30 billion or an average of some €3 billion per year. 
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Conclusion: EU climate policy addresses redistributive concerns; tar- 
gets are differentiated according to GDP per capita and lower-income 
Member States stand to receive some €30 billion of additional revenues 
through the EU ETS over the period from 2020–2030. 
Finally, to facilitate the transformation of specific regions towards the 
low-carbon world of the future, the Commission has put greater focus 
on climate change in the EU’s regional policy instruments. After all, the 
EU’s experience in creating alternative employment in former coal mining 
regions in the Benelux countries, France and Spain has been quite suc- 
cessful. This policy is now being reinforced in the Commission’s Coal and 
Carbon-Intensive Regions in Transition Initiative.15 
 
 
1.4.5 Addressing the competitiveness of EU 
manufacturing industry 
Another major issue that needed to be addressed is the impact of the regu- 
lations on the competitive position of EU companies. From day one of the 
development of EU climate policy, manufacturing industries have been 
worried about the potential impact of policies on their competitive posi- 
tion. Unlike the power sector that basically produces for the European mar- 
ket, these companies are often dependent on world markets and global price 
setting. Even if these industries accepted the need for emissions reduction 
as a medium- and long-term objective, the potential impact on their global 
competitive position needed to be addressed. For that purpose, a system has 
been developed that seeks the right balance between the stick (the price) 
and the carrot (the free allocation of allowances, or support for innovation). 
The “pilot phase” of the EU ETS, namely the years 2005–2008, had 
made one major concession, namely that the decision on the allocation 
of allowances was left to the Member States, with limited oversight. An 
added difficulty at the time was that there was little data on the past CO
2 
emissions of individual operators. Unsurprisingly, Member States did not 
want to take any risk of undermining the competitive position of their 
industry, and the consequence was a significant over-allocation of emission 
allowances and carbon prices falling close to zero. Correction was only pos- 
sible by application of a more restrictive approach to allocation and much 
stronger Commission scrutiny of subsequent national allocation plans. This 
experience showed how difficult it is to make optimal allocation decisions 
when getting a system off the ground, such as in the absence of good data. 
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Conclusion: The competitive position of the EU’s industry is addressed  
in the EU ETS, both through free allocation and through an Innovation 
Fund of some €10 billion. 
Today, free allocation is subject to harmonised rules that apply to all 
industrial operators across the EU. It is based on technological bench- 
marks for different sectors of industry, of which there are 54,16 and on 
considerations of how exposed industry sectors are to global competitive 
pressures. It was decided that up to 43% of the allowances under the EU 
ETS will be handed out for free between 2020 and 2030. On top of that 
an EU Innovation Fund, endowed with the revenues from the sale of 
at least 450 million allowances, has been created to support innovation 
projects for example to finance innovation in renewable energy, Car- 
bon Capture and Storage, energy storage and lower-emitting industrial 
projects. At a price of €20 per tonne, this represents €9 billion over the 
period from 2020–2030, for incentivising innovation in industrial and 
energy companies. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Today, the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions are 22% lower than in 1990. This 
was achieved without sacrifices in terms of economic growth or jobs. On the 
contrary, important new economic activities were created and intensive low- 
carbon innovation and employment can be expected in the future. 
Decisions of the Heads of State and Government combined with the 
adoption of a comprehensive vision and specific targets for 2020 and 2030 
have been of capital importance. They paved the way for realising the ambi- 
tious goals of the Paris Agreement and creating the space to move gradually 
to net-zero emissions in the EU by 2050. Because the EU is comprised of 
28 sovereign Member States with very different economic, social, political 
and geographic conditions, these decisions have also turned the European 
continent into a laboratory for the fair implementation of climate policies, 
useful to the world at large. 
One of the lessons learnt from the EU’s experience is the importance of a 
gradual tightening of its overall and specific policy objectives. The target started 
with reductions based on 1990 numbers of 8% by 2012, 20% by 2020 and 40% 
by 2030. Similarly, the objectives under the EU ETS, the Effort Sharing Regu- 
lation, the renewable energy and energy efficiency Directives were gradually 
25 years of EU climate policy 21 
 
strengthened in the light of experience. Starting slowly gave the chance to both 
public and private actors to learn how to tackle things in practice. It was neces- 
sary to learn from experience, for example, how to handle free allocation better 
under the EU ETS, or how to rely more on wind and solar energy instead of 
food-based biofuels. This learning-by-doing was invaluable and reinforced the 
confidence that more results lie within reach. This experience may help other 
countries go faster in the development of their own policies. 
Another useful lesson is that political debates on climate policy, given their 
complexity, need meticulous technical preparation. The well-established tra- 
dition within the European Commission of undertaking Impact Assessments 
has proven most helpful in this respect. The task of building a portfolio of 
climate policies may appear challenging, but it is worth sharing this practical 
experience to facilitate the implementation of the Nationally Determined 
Contributions by all countries that have joined the Paris Agreement. Having 
a well-informed debate informed by good analysis helps policies forward and 
fosters wider support. 
Addressing potential problems in an open manner serves policy develop- 
ment in a longer-term perspective. In particular, addressing distributional con- 
sequences are important as it enables the design of accompanying policies so 
that those who might otherwise see themselves as potential losers now share in 
the benefits of success. Similarly, competitiveness pressures on manufacturing 
industries that are active on world markets cannot be denied as long as similar 
policies are not put in place by trading partners. Dealing with these issues is not 
easy. Nevertheless, the EU experience has proven that there is no alternative if 
the objective is to develop climate policies in the light of ever more ambitious 
emissions reduction targets. This also places climate policies at the centre of a 
much wider, future-orientated political agenda. 
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equivalent using the GWP-100 metric of AR4). Further details can be found 
in the ESSD publication of Janssens-Maenhout, G., Crippa, M., Guizzardi, D., 
Muntean, M., Schaaf, E., Olivier, J.G.J., Peters, J.A.H.W., and Schure, K.M. (2017). 
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the 2007 baseline scenario of the Impact Assessment for the 2020 climate and 
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pean Energy and transport trends to 2030 – update 2007”. Publications Office 
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13 An “upstream” mechanism whereby fuel imported and produced would be sub- 
ject to a charge based on its carbon content was discarded as amounting to a tax, 
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2020 targets for each Member State. For 2030, EU Member States do not have 
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Introduction 
Since their emergence from the Second World War, the Member States of 
the European Union have consistently preferred a multilateral approach to 
global problems, as is reflected through the EU’s support for the UN and for 
institutions like the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The establishment of 
the European Union is another manifestation of that same commitment to 
multilateralism. 
Since the publications of the Club of Rome1 in the 1970s and more particu- 
larly since the first Earth Summit in Stockholm in 1972, Europeans have been 
calling on the world to act together to halt and reverse environmental degrada- 
tion. Climate change is undoubtedly the most typical of global environmental 
problems, for which there is no solution without international cooperation. For 
these reasons, European countries have worked hard to find coordinated solu- 
tions through the UN, including most recently through the Paris Agreement. 
This chapter describes the origin, content and essential features of the 
Paris Agreement of 2015 and explains why it has commanded near universal 
support and participation from the international community. We describe 
how the Paris Agreement, nonetheless, remains an international pact whose 
ambitious goals can only be achieved through strong and active cooperation 
amongst its Parties. 
In June 2017, US President Donald Trump announced his intent to with- 
draw the US from the Paris Agreement. Losing the world’s largest economy 
The Paris Agreement 25 
 
and the second largest emitter of greenhouse gases, as has happened with 
other global treaties, undoubtedly undermines multilateralism, especially if it 
would turn into a downward spiral, for instance if others were to follow or if 
individual US states, municipalities and other stakeholders would stop their 
efforts to tackle climate change. This challenge adds to the fact that much 
more ambition is necessary to turn the commitments made under the Paris 
Agreement into policies and action on the ground. This is particularly the 
case for emerging economies, as their action on their rapidly growing emis- 
sions will significantly determine the climate change impacts of the future. 
 
2.1 The UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change and the Kyoto Protocol 
The Paris Agreement is the third generation of international treaties designed 
to respond to the challenge of climate change. The first, adopted in 1992 just 
prior to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
in Rio de Janeiro, is the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC).2 The Convention contains an important objective – stabilising 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at safe levels. It established 
the principal institutions necessary for the UN’s climate regime to function, 
including the UNFCCC Secretariat and its governing body – the annual 
Conference of the Parties (COP). 
Most significantly, the UNFCCC established the first international system 
for the national reporting of inventories of greenhouse gases and for com- 
municating policies and measures that Parties have put in place to manage 
their emissions and adapt to the impacts of climate change. In compliance 
with its obligations under the UNFCCC, the European Union developed 
and submitted its first greenhouse gas inventory to the UNFCCC Secretariat 
in June 1996, as part of its first National Communication. 
The Convention also sets out key principles intended to guide interna- 
tional cooperation on climate policy, including an expression of the pre- 
cautionary principle which calls on governments to act when faced with 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, even if there is a lack of full scientific 
certainty about the nature of those threats. The Convention’s principles also 
recognise that measures to address climate change should promote sustain- 
able development, should be appropriate to the conditions of each Party and 
should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or 
a disguised restriction on international trade. 
Importantly, the Convention calls on Parties to address climate change “on 
the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated 
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responsibilities and respective capabilities.” Accordingly, the Convention 
states that developed country Parties (like the EU and its Member States) 
should take the lead in combating climate change and the effects thereof. 
In 1992, when the Convention was adopted, the principle of “com- 
mon but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” was made 
operational through the Annexes of the Convention. Annex I listed those 
industrialised Parties considered “developed.” These countries undertook to 
aim to stabilise their emissions of greenhouse gases at 1990 levels by 2000. 
The richest of these (the then members of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD)) were also included in Annex II 
and were expected to provide finance to support developing countries. Cen- 
tral and Eastern European Countries and those of the former Soviet Union 
were considered to be “economies in transition” and were accorded some 
additional flexibility. The remaining Non-Annex I Parties were considered 
“developing” countries. This division of labour was essential in 1992 to forge 
a global treaty to act on climate change. 
Since 1992, the UNFCCC has achieved near universal participation, 
with 197 Parties. However, the Convention remains a framework instru- 
ment without enforceable targets. Recognising this weakness, in 1997 its 
Parties adopted the Kyoto Protocol. The Protocol entered into force in 2005 
and contains legally binding commitments for developed countries to reduce 
their collective greenhouse gas emissions by 5% over the period of 2008– 
2012, compared to 1990. Individual targets were negotiated and agreed, rang- 
ing from cuts of 8% (including by the EU and its Member States) to growth 
caps of 10% as compared to 1990 levels. 
These targets were agreed through a combination of suggestions by cer- 
tain Parties as to what a common target should be (EU initially suggested 
−15%), and what others offered to commit to individually (the US offered 
−7%). The final, individualised emissions reduction targets were hammered 
through after closed room negotiations. For some Parties these represented 
significant reductions against business as usual emissions trends, for others, 
particularly in Eastern Europe and Russia, the targets, measured against his- 
torically high baseline levels of emissions in 1990, eventually turned out to be 
“surpluses” well above existing emissions levels. These targets were harmo- 
nised internationally to the extent that they constituted broad, quantitative 
emissions limitation or reduction targets set against a common base year3 and 
within a common timeframe. 
In addition to the first internationally agreed and legally binding targets 
and timetables, the Kyoto Protocol and the decisions taken later to imple- 
ment it4 contain detailed and rigorous reporting requirements, as well as the 
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accounting rules and tracking systems necessary to check on Parties’ compli- 
ance with their targets. Developed country Parties’ targets were converted into 
individual carbon budgets (denominated in “Assigned Amount Units” – each 
Unit corresponding to a metric-tonne of CO
2
-equivalent). Assigned Amount 
Units not used by a Party could be traded with another Party for the pur- 
pose of remaining within the latter Party’s individual carbon budget. The US 
insisted on this arrangement much to the displeasure of the EU at the time, 
as countries could simply comply by buying part of the surplus of the Econ- 
omies in Transition. The Protocol also established the Clean Development 
Mechanism, the first international mechanism for certifying carbon offsets 
generated by projects in developing countries that could be used by developed 
country Parties to remain within their budgets. 
Compliance with the Kyoto targets and its carbon market rules is over- 
seen by the Enforcement Branch of its Compliance Committee, which 
has the authority to suspend the right to trade and to penalise Parties 
for failing to remain within their budgets. As designed, under the Kyoto 
compliance system, a Party found to have exceeded its carbon budget, 
or “assigned amount,” during the first commitment period of the Kyoto 
Protocol must deduct that excess emissions from its “assigned amount” in 
the subsequent commitment period at a penalty rate of 1.3. 
The EU and its Member States ratified the Kyoto Protocol in April 2002. 
By that time, however, the US had decided not to follow up its signature of 
the Protocol by ratification, which was a considerable blow to the newly 
emerging multilateral approach. In the absence of the US, the ratification 
by Russia was necessary to trigger the emissions-based threshold for entry 
into force. This new situation required an intensive diplomatic initiative by 
the EU.Within weeks after the declaration by US President George W. Bush 
and EU Commissioner for the Environment Margot Wallström undertook 
a world tour to garner support for the survival of the Kyoto Protocol that 
brought her to Tehran,5 Moscow, Beijing and Tokyo, as well as other cit- 
ies. Several additional visits were paid to Moscow. On 18 November 2004, 
Russia finally submitted its ratification instrument and the Kyoto Protocol 
entered into force 90 days later on 16 February 2005. 
The entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol was important for the world’s 
efforts on climate action but also for Europe. Preparing for and implementing 
the Kyoto Protocol directly shaped the design of the EU’s targets, its rules 
for monitoring, reporting and verifying emissions and, significantly, the EU’s 
Emissions Trading System. These policies contributed to the EU overachiev- 
ing its target of an 8% reduction below 1990 levels by three percentage points 
by the end of the Protocol’s first commitment period in 2012. 
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2.2 From the failure of Copenhagen (2009) to the 
success of the Paris Agreement (2015) 
Since 1992, the world has changed considerably. Back then, it was somewhat 
easier to describe the world as divided between “developed” and “develop- 
ing” nations, and this was reflected both in the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. Today, more than 25 years later, 
the EU, the US and Japan represent a lower share of world economic activity, 
due to the impressive rise of new emerging economies, most dramatically in 
South-East Asia.While nearly 1.1 billion people have moved out of extreme 
poverty since 1990, in 2013, 767 million people in the developing world still 
lived on less than $1.90 a day. At the same time, more than 20 Parties consid- 
ered to be “developing” under the UNFCCC have per capita incomes higher 
than that of the EU’s poorest Member State. 
These profound economic changes were reflected, as one would expect, 
in the emissions pattern of the countries concerned. In Figure 2.1 the dra- 
matic increase of China’s greenhouse gas emissions is striking and represents 
more than a doubling in less than a decade. It starts around the years 2002/3, 
i.e., shortly before the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol. 
This rapidly changing context led to an intense debate on the kind of 
international climate change regime that should be in place after the Kyoto 
Protocol’s first commitment period ended, in 2012. The Europeans pre- 
ferred to extend the Kyoto Protocol and were prepared to continue taking 
the lead by signing up to a second commitment period of legally binding 
emissions reduction targets, with the understanding that appropriate criteria 
and parameters should be agreed so as to include emerging economies in 
taking on quantitative obligations over time. The US, always sceptical about 
legally binding commitments and increasingly concerned about its competi- 
tive relationship with China, was interested in a more voluntary,“bottom up” 
approach that would treat all countries in the same manner.While the views 
of developing countries were increasingly divided, the major economies 
within the G77 were unwilling to contemplate binding commitments under 
 
Conclusion: The EU has consistently pursued the goal of tackling global 
environmental problems through UN institutions. EU climate policy has 
both shaped and been shaped by the Kyoto Protocol, which entered 
into force following considerable diplomatic efforts by the EU. 
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FIGURE 2.1 Global CO2 emissions from fossil fuel use and cement production, 1990–
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the Kyoto Protocol but still wanted to capture as many developed countries 
as possible in a second commitment period. 
In 2005, at COP11 in Montreal, it was decided that negotiations on the 
second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol should start. In 2007, 
at COP13 in Bali it was then decided that a two-track approach would be 
pursued. Developed countries under the Kyoto Protocol (with the likely 
exception of the United States and others) would by 2009 negotiate new, 
binding commitments under the Protocol. The other track would, within 
the same timeframe, negotiate an “outcome” of an undefined legal char- 
acter that would represent “long-term cooperative action” and that would 
include the identification of “nationally appropriate mitigation actions” for 
all countries. 
This vague, lopsided mandate and the tensions between the different 
groups of countries came to a head at COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009. By 
then it was clear that despite its strong rules and innovative market and com- 
pliance mechanisms, the Kyoto Protocol and its exclusive focus on developed 
country targets would not prove to be a long-term model for a more inclu- 
sive future UN climate regime. No alternative model for a legally binding 
agreement to replace the Kyoto Protocol gained consensus. In its place, the 
US vision for a more “bottom up,” less binding approach received the support 
of the emerging economies and the Europeans found themselves isolated, 
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despite huge support from the NGO community. In the final days of the 
COP, the formal negotiating tracks broke down and were overtaken by an ad 
hoc group of 28 government leaders that produced the “Copenhagen Accord.” 
The Accord proposed a system of “pledge and review” whereby all 
Annex I (developed) Parties would commit to implement individu- 
ally or jointly the quantified economy wide emissions targets for 2020, 
whereas Non-Annex I (developing country) Parties to the Convention 
would implement “mitigation actions.” These pledges of developed and 
developing countries would be compiled by the UNFCCC Secretariat in 
separate documents and be subject to distinct review processes. Under the 
Accord, developed countries would commit to a goal of jointly mobilis- 
ing US$100 billion dollars a year by 2020 to address the needs of develop- 
ing countries, and that a significant portion of such funding should flow 
through a newly established Green Climate Fund. The unorthodox way 
in which the Accord was negotiated and presented led to opposition from 
many countries and the COP ended in confusion and acrimony. 
Nevertheless, in order to rescue the situation, by the end of January 2010 
more than 90 countries, including the EU, its Member States and all major 
economies, had submitted voluntary 2020 emission reduction pledges. This 
allowed negotiations to get back on track at COP16 in Cancun. In fact, Par- 
ties agreed to the essential elements of the Copenhagen Accord, namely a 
common but differentiated system of “pledge and review,” which called on 
all Parties to participate in emission reductions but retained the “bifurcated,” 
or differentiated, categories of Convention Annexes. The pledges were dif- 
ferentiated between the “targets” of Annex I countries and “actions” by non- 
Annex I countries and were to be measured, reviewed and verified by two 
similar but differentiated systems. This, along with the US$100 billion pledge 
from developed countries, became the backbone of the international climate 
regime for the eight years between 2013–2020. 
In this context, to demonstrate both a willingness to lead and support for 
strong multilateral rules, the EU and its Member States agreed to take on a 
new and ambitious set of targets under the “Doha Amendment.” This was 
possible in large part because, by 2012, the EU had already put in place all the 
key elements of its regional and national climate policies up to 2020 in the 
course of implementing the Protocol’s first commitment period. The EU’s 
Doha Amendment target is therefore a reflection of the targets set regionally 
and nationally through the evolution of what had become EU climate pol- 
icy. Meanwhile, Canada formally withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol while 
Japan, Russia and a number of other industrialised countries declared their 
intention not to enter into a second commitment period under the Kyoto 
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Protocol. As of early 2019, the Doha Amendment has not yet met the thresh- 
old of ratifications necessary to bring it into force.7 As the end of the Doha 
Amendment’s commitment period approaches in 2020 and the Paris Agree- 
ment becomes operational, the Kyoto Protocol itself will become irrelevant. 
For the period after Copenhagen, the EU and its closest negotiating part- 
ners, including an increasingly engaged US Administration under President 
Barack Obama, recognised that neither an extension of the Kyoto Protocol 
nor a purely voluntary system of pledge and review that continued to dif- 
ferentiate responsibilities between developed and emerging economies was a 
sufficient response to the urgency of climate change. In 2011, at COP17 in 
Durban, the EU together with the most vulnerable developing countries led 
a “progressive alliance” of developed and developing countries to win accept- 
ance of a new mandate to negotiate “a Protocol, another legal instrument or 
an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all 
Parties, which is to be completed no later than 2015.” 
In November 2015, 23 years after the adoption of the Convention in 
1992, the text of the Paris Agreement was adopted by “acclamation.”8 The 
EU and a progressive alliance of developed and developing countries, now 
together with the US, supported an ambitious text put forward by the French 
Presidency of the Conference. Drawing on lessons from experience of the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement combines ambi- 
tious, science-driven goals, nationally determined emissions reduction con- 
tributions by all Parties and robust systems of transparency and accountability 
that is applicable to all Parties. While it provides important flexibilities for 
developing countries, these are provided for on the grounds of constraints in 
their national capacities rather than their categorisation under the UNFCCC. 
Developed countries, which are also not defined under the Paris Agreement, 
are expected to continue to provide support to developing countries both for 
cutting emissions and preparing for the impacts of climate change, includ- 
ing by continuing to follow through on the US$100 billion a year collective 
pledge made in Copenhagen beyond 2020. 
More than 150 Heads of State and Government attended the Paris 
Conference to express their support for global action on climate change. 
When the Agreement was opened for signature six months later at the 
United Nations Headquarters in New York on 22 April 2016, it was 
signed by 174 countries and by the European Union. It entered into force 
less than a year after it was adopted, on 4 November 2016, when 55 Par- 
ties to the Convention representing more than 55% of global emissions 
had deposited their instruments of ratification. At the time of writing it 
has 184 Parties. 
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Conclusion: The Paris Agreement is the new multilateral structure for 
global action on climate change. It requires action by all countries and   
is currently endorsed by the whole world except the US. 
President Trump’s announcement, in June 2017, of his intention to with- 
draw from the Paris Agreement was a great disappointment. That was a second 
significant attack by the US on the multilateral approach to climate change, 
following President Bush’s rejection of the Kyoto Protocol in 2001. The 
announcement was received coldly, but rather than derailing the Paris Agree- 
ment this action has led to the international isolation of the US Administra- 
tion with regard to climate diplomacy and the mobilisation within the US 
of more climate action by non-federal government actors. It even prompted 
the two remaining countries not yet to have signed the Agreement, Syria and 
Nicaragua, to do so. The earliest that a country can leave the Paris Agree- 
ment is 4 November 2020, and the earliest the US can give official notice of 
its intention to leave is one year before that, on 4 November 2019. 
 
 
2.3 Essential features of the Paris Agreement 
The Paris Agreement is one of the first of a new generation of multilateral 
environmental agreements in that it combines a number of “top-down” and 
“bottom-up” elements. In this way, it allows for much more differentiation of 
policy action by its Parties. 
 
2.3.1 Applicable to all Parties 
The speed and near universality of the Paris Agreement ratifications demon- 
strates broad political support for its essential characteristics: it sets ambitious 
collective goals, allows each Party to determine its own targets and timetables 
and demands transparency and accountability from its Parties. It is the first 
international climate agreement that is “applicable to all” Parties. It provides 
flexibility for developing countries on the basis of differences in national 
capacity rather than the defined categories set under the UNFCCC and 
perpetuated under the Kyoto Protocol. 
From 2020 onwards, the Paris Agreement will in effect replace the twin 
track approach of the Kyoto Protocol and voluntary pledges. It is a landmark 
agreement that will continue to have effect for decades to come. In princi- 
ple, all Parties are now being dealt with in the same manner as regards their 
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obligations on emissions reductions, but these reductions are defined through 
plans (“Nationally Determined Contributions” or “NDCs”) that each Party 
draws up for itself. The flexibility provided through this “bottom-up” ele- 
ment is an expression of the UNFCCC core principle of “common but dif- 
ferentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities,” taking account of each 
Party’s national circumstances and capacities. 
While for Europeans the Paris Agreement is a firm expression of the mul- 
tilateral approach they strongly prefer, a significant concession is made in 
accepting the major bottom-up element of Parties determining their own 
contributions and level of ambition. However, the Paris Agreement will allow 
for strong peer pressure on Parties through increased transparency and regular 
reviews. 
The Paris “rulebook,” adopted in 2018 at COP24 in Katowice, Poland, 
set out detailed guidance on how the Agreement’s transparency and account- 
ability framework and ambition cycle will operate. The outcome respected 
the careful balance struck in Paris, but by providing greater clarity and detail 
will enhance the “top-down” nature of the regime. 
 
2.3.2 Ambitious collective goals 
Building on the guidance offered by the International Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) and the Convention’s objective of limiting concentrations of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere to levels that would prevent dangerous 
climate change, the Paris Agreement clarifies that global average temperature 
rises as compared to pre-industrial levels must stay “well below 2°C” while 
“pursuing efforts to limit such a rise to 1.5°C.” These “temperature goals” 
help to define what the international community considers to be dangerous 
climate change and set an overall ambitious direction for the development of 
Parties’ individual and collective efforts. 
The Paris Agreement also wants to achieve a balance between sources 
and sinks of emissions in the second half of this century. In other words, it 
describes as its purpose a profound and global transformation over the next 
decades from an economy primarily dependent on fossil fuels to one that 
has reached a steady state in which global emissions are at “net zero” and 
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases have balanced out at levels 
consistent with the temperature goals. 
The Paris Agreement goals address global emissions and thus have the 
potential to cover all sources of emissions that contribute to anthropogenic 
climate change, including those originating from international aviation and 
maritime operations.9 Both international transport sectors show rapidly 
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increasing emissions and these will have to be addressed respectively in the 
context of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and the 
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) if the ambitious goals of the Paris 
Agreement are to be achieved. 
 
2.3.3 Dynamic, five-year ambition cycles 
Under the Paris Agreement, each Party commits to “prepare, communi- 
cate and maintain successive Nationally Determined Contributions that it 
intends to achieve”10 every five years. Each successive contribution will rep- 
resent a progression over the previous one and shall be informed by a global 
stock take of Parties’ collective progress towards the Agreement’s long-term 
goals. In 2018, an initial Facilitative “Talanoa” Dialogue was held, taking into 
account the results of the IPCC Special Report on 1.5°C. It also prepared 
for 2020 when Parties with a 2025 commitment, such as the US,11 Brazil and 
South Africa are expected to communicate their post-2025 targets. 
Formally, the first of these five-year ambition cycles will begin with a 
global stock take in 2023, with an expectation that Parties will communicate 
their post-2030 targets by 2025. This and future cycles will be essential to 
closing the gap between current and announced emissions targets and contri- 
butions. These reviews will also be necessary to reach the Paris Agreement’s 
goals of limiting temperature rise, peaking global emissions and achieving 
“net zero” emissions. 
Although the ambition, form and content of Parties’ targets and con- 
tributions will remain nationally determined, the Paris Agreement puts in 
place rules and processes that will encourage their harmonisation, quantifica- 
tion and comparability over time. Parties agreed to continue negotiations on 
common features that will be applicable to future rounds of targets. Devel- 
oped country Parties are expected to have and maintain the most robust form 
of target, namely economy-wide absolute emissions reduction targets like the 
EU’s. Developing countries are expected to move towards economy-wide 
emissions reduction or limitation targets over time, and future rounds of tar- 
gets and contributions will be subject to common accounting rules that may 
also be applied to the first round of targets on a voluntary basis. 
 
2.3.4 Transparency and accountability 
The Paris Agreement establishes a robust, legally binding transparency and 
accountability framework that is applicable to all Parties. Together with the 
“rulebook,” the Agreement sets out rules, institutions and procedures for the 
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measurement, reporting and verification of information provided by Par- 
ties through national inventories of emissions and the policies they have put 
in place to achieve their targets. This will enable the tracking of progress of 
each Party towards its target, as well as an understanding of collective progress 
towards the Agreement’s goals. The previous split approach between developed 
and developing countries operating under the Convention and the Kyoto Pro- 
tocol, which required very little of Parties classified as developing countries, will 
be phased out after the submission of reports regarding data for the year 2020. 
The transparency framework makes it clear that all Parties must report, at 
least bi-annually, greenhouse gas inventories and information necessary to 
track progress with the mitigation contributions in accordance with agreed 
methodologies and common metrics. Only the Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs) and the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) enjoy flexibility with 
regard to the frequency of reporting. 
The Agreement also includes an obligation on each Party to account 
for anthropogenic emissions and removals relating to their targets in a way 
that promotes environmental integrity, transparency, accuracy, completeness, 
comparability and consistency and to ensure that any double counting aris- 
ing from the use of carbon markets is avoided. These common rules, known 
as the “rulebook,” are essential to ensure that targets are implemented and to 
promote trust in the international process. Each Party’s report shall undergo a 
technical expert review, and each Party shall participate in a facilitative mul- 
tilateral consideration of its performance. 
The rulebook elaborates on how the transparency system will provide 
flexibility for those developing countries that need it in light of their capac- 
ity. These flexibilities were negotiated on a case-by-case basis to allow, for 
example, developing countries to report their national inventories less fre- 
quently or with regard to fewer greenhouse gases. These countries must con- 
cisely clarify the capacity constraints they are facing and indicate estimated 
timeframes for overcoming these constraints. 
The transparency system will be supported by a Committee on Imple- 
mentation and Compliance, designed to both help and hold accountable 
countries experiencing challenges with the implementation of and compli- 
ance with the mandatory provisions of the Agreement and the rulebook. 
While this committee is facilitative, non-adversarial and non-punitive in 
nature, it can engage individual Parties regarding their performance and pro- 
vide advice, recommendations to the Agreement’s finance institutions, assist 
in the development of implementation plans and in certain circumstances 
issue findings of fact. This will bring public and political attention to the 
challenge of implementation. 
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The EU’s new Energy Union Governance Regulation12 meets the require- 
ments of this transparency and accountability framework and a number of 
features were updated in light of the Paris outcome, namely the alignment 
with the overall Paris ambition cycle. While a work programme has been 
launched to develop common accounting rules, including for land, these will 
not apply to Parties’ first mitigation target under the Paris Agreement. The 
EU will work closely with other Parties to ensure any internationally agreed 
approaches including the accounting for emissions from land are consistent 
with EU approaches. 
The framework will also provide for the transparency of the Agreement’s 
provisions on adaptation and on climate finance, capacity building and tech- 
nology transfer, as discussed later. 
 
2.3.5 Increasing resilience to and responding to the 
adverse effects of climate change 
The Paris Agreement establishes, for the first time, a global goal on adapta- 
tion with the aim to enhance capacity, climate resilience and reduce climate 
vulnerability. Internationally, it encourages greater cooperation amongst Par- 
ties to share scientific knowledge on adaptation as well as information on 
practices and policies. As part of this international cooperation, developed 
country Parties must also continue to provide, as part of their commitments 
on climate finance, resources to developing country Parties to support their 
adaptation efforts. 
All Parties’ efforts to promote adaptation must “represent a progression 
over time” and the five-year global stocktaking described earlier as part of 
the Agreement’s “ambition cycle” additionally applies to adaptation. It will 
review overall progress in achieving the Agreement’s adaptation goal includ- 
ing by reviewing the adequacy and effectiveness of the support provided for 
adaptation. 
The Paris Agreement acknowledges that addressing “loss and damage” 
resulting from climate change is a specific aspect of increasing resilience to 
the adverse effects of climate change. Many vulnerable developing countries, 
especially low-lying and Small Island Developing States, are struggling with 
how to prepare for and manage loss and damage associated with extreme 
weather and the slow onset impacts associated with climate change. Never- 
theless, the decisions taken in Paris clarify that the Paris Agreement provi- 
sions on loss and damage do not involve or provide a basis for any liability 
or compensation. 
The Paris Agreement 37 
 
 
Conclusion: The Paris Agreement is applicable to all Parties in a similar 
fashion: each Party determines its own target or contribution, and all 
Parties are ultimately subject to a common, transparent governance sys- 
tem. Flexibilities are provided for those developing countries that need 
it but based on gaps in their capacity. 
2.3.6 Fostering cooperation and financial flows 
The Paris Agreement also fosters cooperation amongst Parties by encourag- 
ing the responsible use of international carbon markets and the mobilisation 
of support to developing countries. Implementing the emissions targets will 
require very substantial policy action and investments in clean technologies 
in the coming years in all countries. The Paris Agreement includes the aim 
of “making financial flows consistent with a pathway towards low green- 
house gas emissions and climate resilient development.” Shifting and rapidly 
scaling up private investment is essential to the transition to a low-emission 
and climate resilient economy and to avoid “locking-in” high emission 
infrastructure. 
In Paris, the EU, its Member States and other developed country Parties 
committed to continuing, in the period from 2020 until 2025, the goal set 
in Copenhagen to mobilise US$100 billion annually from public and private 
sources by developing countries. Before 2025, the Parties to the Paris Agree- 
ment will set a new collective quantified goal from a floor of US$100 billion 
per year. This will provide an opportunity to broaden the donor base to 
include countries previously considered only as recipients of assistance. 
 
 
2.4 Are global emissions slowing down? 
The Paris Agreement is ambitious in its objectives and calls on Parties to 
reach global peaking “as soon as possible” and to “undertake rapid reductions 
thereafter.” It assumes that global emissions have not yet reached the maxi- 
mum level and will keep increasing year on year. Since Paris, emissions first 
stabilised and then went up again in 2017. However, it is encouraging that 
in many countries, emissions have either gone down over time in absolute 
terms or the rate of increase is slowing down and that a gradual decoupling 
from economic growth is happening. 
Developing countries in general, but emerging economies in particular are 
allowed to increase their emissions temporarily under the Paris Agreement. 
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The fact is that their economic development leads to an increase in emissions. 
However, they are also well aware that they are contributing to climate change 
that will be experienced in the future and are therefore willing to invest in 
low-carbon technology. China announced in its NDC that its emissions would 
peak no later than in 2030. This means that its historical emissions – although 
much more recent than those of UNFCCC Annex 1 countries – will con- 
tinue to rapidly accumulate. Recent analysis seems to indicate that that the 
date of peaking of China’s emissions could be before 2025.13 
Before coming to Paris, Parties were asked to submit their plans for their 
NDCs in order to confirm their good faith and show their readiness to 
act within the new bottom-up approach. Several analyses have been made 
since then trying to summarise the overall result of the pledges and policy 
intentions, despite the many different definitions of targets and pathways 
that were advanced. The Climate Action Tracker regularly assesses projec- 
tions on the basis of existing pledges and policy declaration. The most 
recent of these shows that without the NDCs or any other policy effort, the 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.2 Expected global temperature increase by the end of the century 
compared to pre-industrial levels implied by global emissions path- 
ways in six scenarios14 
Source: Climate Action Tracker Warming Projections Global Update, December 201815 
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world would enter a scenario of global warming ranging between 4.1° and 
4.8°C. If fully implemented, existing policy declarations, including those 
of NDCs, would bring this down to a range of 2.7°-3.0°C. In short, the 
2°C goal of the Paris Agreement is not yet within reach, and a significant 
tightening of the NDCs will be required when new pledges are due in 
2020 and 2025. 
While the overall result of the first round of NDCs is insufficient, the 
exercise of the NDCs remains most valuable. It requires all Parties to go into 
a systematic screening of the emissions impact of their economy. Moreover, 
all Parties are different. For some, as is the case for the EU, the emphasis is 
on carbon emissions from industry and power, while in some others, such as 
New Zealand, the bulk of emissions come from agriculture. In the case of 
Brazil or the Democratic Republic of Congo, most emissions are linked to 
tropical deforestation. 
The NDC policy plans also allow countries to reflect on their emissions 
per person, where there are major differences. As already illustrated in Fig- 
ure 1.5 in the previous chapter, in 2015, CO
2 
emissions per capita were 6.9 
tonnes CO
2 
in the EU and have shown a steady reduction since 1990. Chi- 
nese emissions reached EU levels in 2012 and have since then continued 
growing to reach 7.7 tonnes CO
2 
per capita. Although falling slowly, the per 
capita emissions of the US (at 16 tonnes per capita in 2015) are very high 
compared to the global average and are more than twice those of the EU. 
Levels per capita in India at 1.85 tonnes in 2015, for example, remain low but 
are steadily increasing. 
Finally, the NDCs also include valuable information for policy research. 
While some NDCs are clear, transparent and comprehensive, others require 
improvement and the exchange of “good practice” in policy making terms 
has considerable potential. Taking account of the commitments of the Paris 
Agreement, the IEA has looked into the future to see the amount of world- 
wide energy investments planned each year in the period from 2018–2040 
(see Figure 2.3). It is estimated that, on the basis of policies and targets 
announced by governments, investment during the period from 2026–2040 
will amount to US$2821 billion, of which US$1559 billion, representing 
over 55%, will be invested in renewable energy, transmission and distribution, 
energy efficiency and biofuels. Even then, the IEA warns,“While the picture 
brightens, there is still no peak in global energy-related CO
2 
emissions.”This 
analysis, combined with other information from the NDCs, provides useful 
insights into future investment opportunities and where these investments 
will be located. 
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Conclusion: The NDC instrument is a most useful tool for policy mak- 
ing. NDC policy plans submitted under the  Paris  Agreement  are not 
yet aligned with delivering the 2°C goal. They first need swift and solid 
implementation and then an ambitious review, which started with the 
Facilitative Dialogue in 2018 and leads to the global stock take in 2023. 
 
 
World New policies scenario 
 
Yearly average investment (billion, $2017) 2018–25 2026–40 
Fossil fuel supply 852 992 
Biofuels supply 9 18 
Power sector 810 899 
Coal 56 43 
Gas 55 46 
Oil 4 2 
Nuclear 51 45 
Utility-scale batteries 9 15 
Renewables 322 361 
Hydro 70 75 
Wind 98 119 
Solar PV 127 116 
Transmission and distribution 313 387 
Total final consumption 545 912 
Efficiency 397 666 
Renewables 116 127 
Other 32 119 
FIGURE 2.3 Global yearly average investment (billion US$, 2017) 
Source: International Energy Agency (2018),World Energy Outlook 2018, OECD/IEA, Paris 
 
 
 
2.5 EU’s international cooperation focuses on the 
implementation of low-carbon policies 
 
2.5.1 Focus on implementation in major economies 
and developing countries 
The EU plans to increase its efforts in sharing its own experiences on design- 
ing and implementing climate and energy policies, in particular with other 
major economies. This includes countries like China and South Korea that 
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are setting up emissions trading systems as well as a broader range of coun- 
tries, including all major economies that are deploying renewable energy 
technologies, improving their energy efficiency policies and their clean 
mobility policies. Harmonising reporting on efficiency standards amongst 
G20 countries is another means of encouraging economies of scale and 
the lowering of technology costs. Supporting densely forested developing 
countries to reduce the emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, 
particularly when it comes to the monitoring through its COPERNICUS 
earth observation programme from space, will continue to play a role in EU 
development cooperation.Where the EU has established special relationships 
with “candidate countries” (that have applied to join the European Union) 
and in the EU neighbourhood region, particular emphasis will be placed on 
practical policy dialogue and technical assistance. 
Many developing countries are, for the first time, committing to reduc- 
ing or limiting their emissions and/or to increasing their efforts to adapt to 
climate change. In addition, they have subscribed to implementing a new 
transparency regime. The Paris Agreement recognises that these efforts need 
to be supported, especially in those developing countries that are most vul- 
nerable to climate change and/or that lack capacity. In this context the syn- 
ergies between climate action, financing for development under the Addis 
Ababa Action Agenda and the Agenda 2030 associated with the Sustainable 
Development Goals need to be fully exploited. 
The close coordination of trade rules and climate policies, wherever pos- 
sible, will be increasingly important to align international markets, national 
standards and climate-related policies. For example, EU policies on renew- 
able energy are designed to ensure that domestic and imported biofuels and 
biomass are sustainably produced if they are to count towards EU emissions 
reduction efforts. EU bilateral and regional trade agreements increasingly 
include commitments from Parties to fully implement the Paris Agreement, 
and not to lower their climate ambitions as a means of attracting trade or 
investment. 
 
2.5.2 Mobilising finance domestically and 
internationally 
Mobilising the necessary finance for the transition to low-carbon economies 
will be a major challenge for all, both developed and developing countries. 
For the EU to achieve the targets of the Paris Agreement, including the 
“at least 40%” cut in greenhouse gas emissions by the EU in 2030, around 
€180 billion of additional investments a year are needed. The scale of this 
42 Jos Delbeke, et al. 
 
 
Conclusion: The EU is shifting its international cooperation and financial 
support, both public and private, towards implementation of the Paris 
Agreement. 
investment challenge is beyond the capacity of the public sector alone. The 
financial sector has a key role to play in reaching those goals, as large amounts 
of private capital should be redirected towards sustainable investments.Various 
domestic initiatives have been taken in the EU in order to intensify private 
finance in the coming years that could serve as an example internationally: 
 
• A key priority of the EU’s Capital Markets Union’s (CMU) is the fostering 
of more sustainable private investments. In 2018, the Commission launched 
an Action Plan on Financing Sustainable Growth containing a roadmap and 
seeking a lead on global work in this area, with legal proposals.16 
• Public sector finance should leverage private finance into strategic areas. 
In this respect, the EU extended and reinforced the European Fund for 
Strategic Investments (EFSI 2.0). 
• For the period between 2021–2027, the European Commission has pro- 
posed that the EU increases its target from 20% to 25% of its entire 
budget spending to be climate relevant.17 This would further mainstream 
climate issues into funding for regional development, research and inno- 
vation, the common agricultural policy and international cooperation. 
• Revenues from the auctioning of more than 800 million emission allow- 
ances under the EU Emissions Trading System between 2021 and 2030 
will be directed into an Innovation Fund and a Modernisation Fund. At 
a price of €20 per tonne, this would represent some €16 billion to assist 
in funding renewable energy, energy efficiency and industrial innovation. 
 
Internationally, the EU is also supporting discussions that aim to ensure an effec- 
tive and coherent approach to green finance globally. At the international level, 
the Green Climate Fund, international financial institutions such as the World 
Bank, the European Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development and national development banks active in developing coun- 
tries increasingly engage in the implementation of the Paris Agreement. 
Since Paris, the EU and its Member States have continued to contribute 
the lion’s share of global public climate finance. In 2016 and 2017, the EU’s 
contribution rose to more than €20 billion, a significant increase compared 
to earlier years. 
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Conclusion 
The Paris Agreement that entered into force in 2016 is the new solid base for 
the global effort on climate change for the coming years. It has secured global 
participation in record time. The Paris Agreement has made the UN Frame- 
work Convention on Climate Change operational and more comprehensive. 
This is a major achievement given the political context, in which multilateral 
efforts are coming under increasing pressure. 
One of the main characteristics of the Paris Agreement is that the distinc- 
tion between “developed” and “developing” countries is far more nuanced 
than under the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, placing greater emphasis 
on national circumstances. The Convention principle of“common but differ- 
entiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” has been secured through 
the bottom-up approach of the Agreement. The policy plans (NDCs) that 
each Party submitted, and which have been made official by virtue of the 
ratification process do not yet add up to meet the “well below 2°C” objec- 
tive.Achieving this will require a tight management of the five-year ambition 
cycle. Another main challenge is to ensure that all Parties follow the detailed 
rules on transparency and accountability agreed at COP24. This will require 
a combination of capacity building support, technical expert review and peer 
pressure to create the right combination of incentives for implementation 
and compliance. 
The Paris Agreement has also some weaknesses. It does not foresee nego- 
tiation around the Nationally Determined Contributions according to an 
agreed set of precise parameters. There is also no strong guidance from the 
multilateral level on which policies need to be implemented nationally. Simi- 
larly, the compliance regime does not foresee sanctions but is based on peer 
pressure. As a consequence, all key implementation issues are left to the indi- 
vidual Parties. That means a great deal of political effort will have to be put 
into difficult implementation issues in every single country for years to come. 
It will require a tremendous amount of political goodwill, internationally but 
even more so at the national level, within individual governments and with 
their respective stakeholders. 
In addition, the Paris Agreement does not explicitly “organise” the devel- 
opment of common policies or standards, as the Kyoto Protocol did, for 
example, with respect to international carbon markets.18 It is therefore key 
that groups of like-minded countries come together to foster common pol- 
icy plans, to share their experiences and knowledge of policy making to 
facilitate implementation. There is much scope for action, for example by 
international financial institutions such as the World Bank and its regional 
sisters, to foster such cooperation. 
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In this respect, the EU has already agreed legally binding targets for its 28 
Member States until 2030. These targets are differentiated according to their 
relative prosperity and, based on economic analysis, incorporate the principle 
of cost-efficiency. The EU also developed common policy instruments such 
as the EU Emissions Trading System in the field of renewable energy, energy 
efficiency and CO
2 
standards for cars and appliances.At the same time, a con- 
siderable effort is being undertaken to mainstream climate action into other 
policies such as research, industry, finance, trade, agriculture and development 
cooperation. 
The EU is ready to deploy extensive efforts in the field of international 
cooperation and financial support both with emerging economies and devel- 
oping countries for the solid implementation of the Paris Agreement. The 
involvement of all stakeholders from the private sector, NGOs and local 
authorities will be key to a successful outcome. The blunt attack of US Presi- 
dent Trump on the Paris Agreement has so far not shaken support for the 
Agreement within the EU and around the world. Fortunately, the economics 
of the low-carbon economy are improving rapidly with clean and sustainable 
technologies becoming cheaper by the day, and momentum is building across 
the globe, meaning that the actions of one country ought not to destabilise 
the efforts of rest of the world. 
It must be recognised that recently the number of global problems con- 
fronting politicians has dramatically increased: wars and political instability 
causing an upsurge of poverty and refugees, respect for democratic institu- 
tions and for expert evidence and the continued undermining of rules-based 
multilateral institutions, even established ones such as the WTO. This leaves 
climate change as only one of many global challenges to deal with. Today’s 
politicians may mistakenly think that their work on climate change is over 
now that the Paris Agreement has entered into force. The sobering reality is 
that all implementation issues relating to the Nationally Determined Contri- 
butions remain squarely on the table and require increasing political attention 
given the seriousness and the urgency of the climate problem. 
 
Notes 
1 The Club of Rome, founded in 1968, is an organisation of individuals who share 
a common concern for the future of humanity and strive to make a difference. 
Members include notable scientists, economists, businessmen and businesswomen, 
high-level civil servants and former Heads of State from around the world. 
2 The UNFCCC was adopted on 9 May 1992 and opened for signature at the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development that took place 
from 3 to 14 June 1992. 
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3 Given their particular circumstances, “economies in transition” were allowed to 
choose one among a limited number of base-years. 
4 These decisions were mostly taken in the Marrakech Accords at the 7th Confer- 
ence of Parties (COP-7) in 2001. 
5 Iran being the chair of the G77 and China grouping at the time. 
6 Janssens-Maenhout et al. (2017). 
7 As of 21 February 2019, 126 Parties have ratified the Doha Amendment, whereas 
144 ratifications are needed for it to come into effect. https://unfccc.int/process/ 
the-kyoto-protocol/the-doha-amendment. 
8 “By acclamation” means with no state objecting in the plenary session of the 
Conference of Parties. 
9 Outgoing aviation emissions are included in the EU 2020 targets, and in the EU 
2030 legislation and countries can decide to include these in their Nationally 
Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement. 
10 Article 4 of the Paris Agreement. 
11 However, the US has announced its intention to withdraw from the Paris 
Agreement. 
12 Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
11 December 2018 on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action. 
Official Journal L328, pp. 1–77 published on 21.12.2018. 
13 See: “China’s “new normal”: structural change, better growth, and peak emis- 
sions”, by Fergus Green and Nicholas Stern, Policy brief by the Centre for Cli- 
mate Change Economics and Policy (CCCEP) and the Grantham Research 
Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, June 2015. www.lse.ac.uk/ 
GranthamInstitute/publication/chinas-new-normal-structural-change-better- 
growth-and-peak-emissions/. 
14 Baseline emissions, emissions compatible with warming of 1.5°C and 2°C, 
respectively, and the three scenarios resulting from aggregation 32 country assess- 
ments: pledges and targets, current policies and an optimistic scenario. Ranges 
indicated uncertainty in emissions projections; dotted lines indicate median (50%) 
levels within these ranges. For further details. https://climateanalytics.org/media/ 
cat_temp_upadate_dec2018.pdf. 
15 The Climate Action Tracker (CAT) is an independent scientific analysis produced 
by three research organisations tracking climate action since 2009: Climate Ana- 
lytics, Ecofys and NewClimate Institute. 
16 Legal proposals have been made to regulate benchmarks for low-carbon invest- 
ment strategies (provisionally agreed), a proposal to establish a unified EU classi- 
fication system (“taxonomy”) of sustainable economic activities and a proposal to 
improve disclosure requirements related to sustainability risks and opportunities. 
See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-1418_en.htm. 
17 The Multi-annual Financial Framework 2021 to 2027 is still being negotiated 
with the Member States and European Parliament. 
18 However, the rules relating to the implementation of Article 6 of the Paris Agree- 
ment will include rules relating to carbon markets. 
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3 
HOW ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
SHAPED EU 2020 AND 2030 
TARGET SETTING 
Tom Van Ierland and Stefaan Vergote 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The preparatory economic analysis for setting climate and energy targets 
has become increasingly sophisticated over the years. Numerous think tanks, 
universities and foundations from all over the world have become involved 
in this debate. Research teams from the European Commission and several 
university institutes have begun the laborious work of integrating economic, 
energy and climate models both for Europe and for the world. 
 
3.1 The potential of integrated economic and 
climate modelling 
For the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period (2008–2012), the target 
setting was subject to less economic analysis than has been the case for the 
2020 and 2030 targets. Kyoto’s target of an 8% reduction targets for European 
countries was more the outcome of the international negotiations. Prior to 
Kyoto, the then 15 EU Member States had declared their willingness to 
assume a 15% reduction target compared to 1990, even though the Mem- 
ber States were unable to agree on a “burden sharing” of all of this 15% in 
advance. This rather detracted from the credibility of the proposal by making 
it look as if the EU did not really expect such a figure to be agreed. The 15% 
target proposed by the Europeans was conditional. At the time, Europeans 
wanted minimum differentiation between the Kyoto targets, and some even 
hoped that all developed countries would adopt the same target. 
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Some Member States did some economic modelling at the time, in par- 
ticular the Netherlands and the UK, but the European Commission did not 
take a leading role in fixing these targets for the Kyoto Protocol’s first com- 
mitment period. The most important issue at European level was the “bub- 
ble” arrangement of Article 4 of the Kyoto Protocol, which allowed EU 
Member States to differentiate targets between themselves on the condition 
that the EU collectively met the 8% reduction target that it finally assumed 
in Kyoto. Such differentiation was negotiated within the Council in 1998, 
without a specific proposal from the Commission and without the involve- 
ment of the European Parliament. 
By contrast, the preparation of the targets for the period from 2012–2020 
was subject to much more extensive economic analysis. The Commission 
took the lead and was relied upon by the Member States as a whole. The 
increase in the number of Member States by 2008 from 15 to 27 made the 
task much more complicated. Furthermore, in the context of 2020 targets, 
the EU had to prepare for a political scenario in which it had to continue 
its climate action policies without any guarantee that the rest of the world 
would follow. Under the Kyoto Protocol, the emerging economies had no 
obligations to reduce their emissions, and in 2001, the US disengaged alto- 
gether. The second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol – called the 
“Doha Amendment” – was only agreed to in 2012, with several large indus- 
trialised countries not supporting a second commitment period – for exam- 
ple Canada, Japan, Russia and the US. 
The fact that the Europeans were formulating a commitment that might 
not be matched by others made it imperative for Europe to proceed carefully. 
Thorough economic analysis for 2020 focused not only on the formulation 
of a unilateral target for the EU but was also accompanied by a more ambi- 
tious target in case the rest of the world would follow. The result was that 
the EU eventually agreed to a 20% unilateral greenhouse gas reduction target 
for 2020 compared to 1990, but declared its willingness to increase its ambi- 
tion to 30%,“provided that other developed countries commit themselves to 
comparable emission reductions and economically more advanced develop- 
ing countries to contributing adequately according to their responsibilities 
and respective capabilities.”1 What Europe was willing to do depended on 
what others committed to undertake. Subsequently, as the international nego- 
tiations endeavoured to include most countries of the world in any future 
agreement, in particular the US and the emerging economies, it became clear 
that a much wider differentiation of effort would have to be allowed interna- 
tionally to take account of the wide variety of circumstances across the globe. 
It is in this context that the analysis of the EU targets for the phase 
2020–2030 was undertaken. A raft of policy scenarios was compared, each of 
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Conclusion: Contrary to the  approach  followed  by  the  EU  for  the  
first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, extensive model- 
ling showed the likely economic  impact  of  different  climate  targets 
for 2020. It allowed for informed choices to ensure both fairness and 
cost-effectiveness. 
them accompanied by quantitative estimates of the climate result, the over- 
all economic impact, the expected sectoral developments and the associated 
economic costs and benefits – including in terms of competitiveness. It is 
important to note that it was never the intention to predict or forecast the 
future.What these quantitative analyses did, however, was to give insights on 
what would be technically and economically realistic within a set time frame, 
analyse interactions between different policy instruments and provide an out- 
line of the key political parameters. 
The economic analysis allowed for the formulation of a reliable order of 
magnitude of the overall economic impact, of the likely technologies that 
would have to be brought to the market, and on the accompanying measures 
that would have to be considered. In this context, the modelling was also capa- 
ble of providing a good insight into the distributional issues that the transition 
would bring about, both in relative shifts between economic sectors but also 
between different regions and Member States within the EU. In sum, it pro- 
vided a solid analytical base for proposals that imply substantial economic trans- 
formation, through which it additionally created a negotiation space between 
Member States and with the European Parliament. 
 
 
3.2 The Low-Carbon Roadmap towards 2050 
After the considerable disappointment of the Copenhagen COP in 2009, the 
EU realised that the rest of the world would not join a Kyoto Protocol-type 
of agreement and that a review of its unilateral target for 2020 would be 
politically difficult. The EU had repeatedly confirmed its full commitment 
to the “below 2°C objective,” but many pertinent questions remained on the 
reduction pathways and on the technological, behavioural and energy and 
transport-system changes that such a major transition to a low-carbon econ- 
omy would imply over time. The plan was therefore to focus more on these 
strategic questions and to look beyond 2020. In 2011, the European Com- 
mission produced a Low-Carbon Roadmap,2 accompanied by an Energy 
Roadmap3 to flesh out the perspective through to 2050. 
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3.2.1 Domestic emission reductions of at least 
80% by 2050 
The first conclusion of the analysis was that, as part of a global effort to meet 
2°C, it would be necessary for the EU to achieve domestic4 emission reduc- 
tions of at least 80% compared to 1990 in 2050. By focusing on the domestic 
effort consistent with 2°C,5 the Roadmap concentrated on the technological, 
energy and economic transition required. The analysis demonstrated that 
international offsets can at best fulfil only a temporary role in the short- and 
medium-term by spreading low carbon technologies quicker to more coun- 
tries and keeping transition costs manageable. 
What is more, the modelling projections showed that such reductions 
within the EU were both technologically possible and economically feasi- 
ble. The Roadmap therefore successfully focused the debate on the required 
domestic low-carbon transition in energy, transport and industry. 
A wide range of “what if ” scenarios were assessed, with different assump- 
tions regarding technological advances and different fossil fuel prices. The 
analysis showed that a sufficiently strong carbon price needed to be applied 
across all sectors to trigger the required shift from carbon-intensive to low- 
carbon investments and the changes needed in energy use. An 80% reduc- 
tion in greenhouse gas emissions would be possible through the large-scale 
deployment of innovative, existing technologies, without the need to rely 
on non-proven “break-through” technologies, such as nuclear fusion, or 
without major lifestyle changes for example dietary changes, strong upheav- 
als in mobility patterns or the development of a hydrogen-based economy. 
Such promising developments could further facilitate a low-carbon economy 
but were not included in the analysis, given the uncertainties around their 
technical, societal and economic feasibility and because of the difficulties of 
including them in the modelling tools. 
 
3.2.2 Milestones 
The second major conclusion of the economic analysis underlying the 
Roadmap was that it advanced an indicative time frame for the required 
emissions reduction. It refrained from using the word “targets,” as this word 
was reserved for the political debate that it was supposed to inform. Instead, 
the Roadmap suggested “milestones,” calling for interim reductions such as 
25% by 2020, 40% by 2030 and 60% by 2040, all compared to 1990 levels. 
The analysis showed that these milestones were the minimum reductions to 
be achieved over this period if the long-term target was to be realised in a 
cost-effective way. The milestones created a good understanding amongst 
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TABLE 3.1 Average yearly total investments and fuel expenses1 
 
Total average yearly 
investments (B€) 
2011–20 2021–30 2031–40 2041–50 Average 
Reference 816 916 969 1014 929 
Effective technologies 863 1040 1299 1589 1198 
Delayed Action 845 1011 1392 1689 1234 
Total average yearly fuel 
expenses (B€) 
2011–20 2021–30 2031–40 2041–50 Average 
Reference 930 1170 1259 1376 1184 
Effective technologies 911 1067 1034 1019 1008 
Delayed Action 922 1118 1061 993 1023 
Source: PRIMES results, Impact Assessment accompanying the European Commission’s 2050 
Low-Carbon Roadmap; SEC(2011) 289 final of 08.03.2011 
1 SEC(2011) 289 final of 8.3.2011 Impact Assessment accompanying the 2050 Low-Carbon 
Roadmap COM(2011) 112 final; the figures include all energy and transport related invest- 
ments in all sectors (supply, demand and network). 
 
 
policy makers about the level of ambition that would at least be required to 
respect the “below 2°C” temperature goal. They influenced and shaped the 
future policy discussions. 
The milestone analysis also demonstrated that a so-called “delayed action” 
scenario, in which lower ambition in 2030 (i.e., lower than 40%) was achieved 
but that eventual reductions would be made that were still consistent with 2°C, 
was substantially more expensive than a scenario representing a cost-effective 
achievement of long-term targets. Table 3.1 indicates that “delayed action” 
until after 2030 would lower investment needs in the shorter-term but would 
increase overall investment costs and fuel expenses. In this way, the Roadmap 
prepared the ground for the emerging political debate on the 2030 target and 
provided further analytical grounds to aim for a greenhouse gas reduction tar- 
get of at least – 40% in 2030 compared to 1990. 
 
3.2.3 Sectoral analysis 
The third outcome of the Roadmap was a detailed sectoral analysis. This 
elaborated how the main economic sectors of power generation, industry, 
transport, buildings and agriculture could cost-effectively make the transi- 
tion to a low-carbon economy and which technologies would need to be 
deployed over time. 
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Current Policy 
Power sector 
Residential & Tertiary 
Non CO2 Other Sectors 
Industry 
Transport 
Non CO2 Agriculture 
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40% 
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0% 
 
 
FIGURE 3.1 A cost-effective transition scenario to a low-carbon EU economy 
in 2050 (greenhouse gas emissions by sector over time as % of 1990 
levels)6 
Source: PRIMES-Gain modelling results, the European Commission’s 2050 Low-Carbon Road- 
map COM(2011) 112 final 
 
 
Despite significant variations in the assumptions on technologies and fos- 
sil fuel prices, the results turned out to be robust in terms of the overall speed 
and magnitude of emission reductions. However, more significant variations 
did show up at sectoral level, depending on the assumptions, for instance in 
terms of public acceptance of nuclear energy, Carbon Capture and Storage 
(CCS), projected fuel prices and technological costs over time. 
As regards fossil fuel prices, the global analysis showed that these are not 
just an independent parameter, irrespective of the speed of global climate 
action. Specifically, it projected a substantial reduction of fossil fuel prices 
(notably coal and oil) compared to “business-as-usual” projections in the case 
of global climate action as a result of reduced energy demand and a shift 
towards low carbon fuels. Global action in a world with relatively lower fos- 
sil fuel prices implies that the additional policy efforts such as the required 
level of (implicit or explicit) carbon prices would have to be stronger. In 
the case of fragmented action to address climate change, with limited efforts 
being made by other countries, fossil fuel prices were projected to increase 
over time, hence making EU action relatively cheaper with larger benefits in 
terms of fossil fuel imports and energy security. This also demonstrated that 
for regions such as the EU, which import large amounts of fossil fuels, it does 
make sense, from a purely economic perspective, to take unilateral action. 
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The cost-effectiveness analysis as summarised in Table 3.2 shows that the 
pace of the transition was the fastest in the power generation sector. A much 
higher penetration of renewable energy, most notably in the power sector, 
was recognised as an essential building block for decarbonisation. At the 
same time, the fact that intermittent renewables were projected to massively 
increase showed the need to consider the implications on market functioning 
of the power sector, namely the need for more flexible generation and on the 
network infrastructure required for this transition. 
It also showed that the “residential and services” sector would keep up 
with the general trend, thanks to sustained efforts to build new low-energy 
housing, deep renovation of existing buildings and increased efficiency of 
heating and cooling systems, including heat pumps. Industry would do less 
than average until 2030, mostly through efficiency improvements. How- 
ever, after 2030, innovative technologies, such as hydrogen or the large-scale 
deployment of CCS would be needed. 
The biggest challenge turned out to be transport, where an increase in 
emissions of 20% by 2030 could not be excluded, while all other sectors 
were on a downward path. The analysis suggested that the electrification 
of the sector was bound to be a crucial element of its decarbonisation. If 
that were not to happen, a much greater use of biofuels would be needed to 
achieve the same level of reductions. However, such significant increases in 
biofuel use, assuming that land-based biofuels would be used, could lead to 
increased emissions from land use, greater pressures on biodiversity and water 
management. Today, with the advent of much lower costs for solar, wind and 
 
 
TABLE 3.2 Sectoral development in the EU for 2050 
 
GHG reductions compared to 1990 2005 2030 2050 
Total −7% −40 to −44% −79 to −82% 
Sectors    
Power (CO
2
) −7% −54 to −68% −93 to −99% 
Industry (CO
2
) −20% −34 to −40% −83 to −87% 
Transport (incl. aviation CO
2
, 
excl. maritime CO
2 
and 
aviation non-CO
2
) 
Residential and services (CO
2
) 
+30% 
 
 
−12% 
+20 to −9% 
 
 
−37 to −53% 
−54 to −67% 
 
 
−88 to −91% 
Agriculture (non-CO
2
) −20% −36 to −37% −42 to −49% 
Other emissions (non-CO
2
) −30% −71.5 to −72.5% −70 to −78% 
Source: PRIMES-GAINS results, Impact Assessment accompanying the European Commission’s 
2050 Low-Carbon Roadmap; SEC(2011) 289 final of 08.03.2011 
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especially batteries, the electrification of the transport sector is happening at 
a much faster pace than originally envisaged eight years ago and is part of a 
global trend. 
Finally, agricultural emissions are the ones that are reduced the least. This 
is in large part due to the fact that most of these emissions are intrinsically 
linked to meat consumption; hence, further reductions would require behav- 
ioural changes of diet that were not assumed in the modelling. 
 
3.2.4 Investments 
The fourth important finding of the Roadmap related to investment needs. 
In all decarbonisation scenarios, a massive shift from fuel expenses (operat- 
ing costs) to investment expenditure (capital expenditure) is observed. This 
is very important from an economy-wide perspective as investments are to 
a large extent expenditures in the domestic European economy, requiring 
increased output and added value from a wide range of manufacturing indus- 
tries such as automotive, power generation, industrial and grid equipment, 
energy efficient building materials, etc. Fuel expenditure, on the other hand, 
is largely flowing to third countries in view of the EU’s strong reliance on 
fossil fuel imports. 
To make this low-carbon transition happen, it was estimated that the EU 
would need to invest an additional €270 billion or 1.5% of its GDP, annu- 
ally, on average, over the period from 2010–2050 beyond the investment that 
would be needed anyway. These are largely investments in capital goods, such 
as low-carbon generation technologies such as solar, onshore and offshore 
wind, nuclear, CCS, extended grid connections, including smart grids, new 
automotive and other transport technologies, low-energy houses, more effi- 
cient appliances and so on. 
The size and composition of low-carbon capital expenditure over the 
coming decades raised the important question how the increased need for 
finance could be overcome, in particular for end users of transport and build- 
ings. Innovative finance and fiscal instruments would be required, such as 
preferential loans, grants and tax rebates, in order to unlock private invest- 
ment in low carbon technologies. Additionally, a larger share of regional 
funding within the EU budget would need to go to policy instruments that 
leverage private sector resources. 
These observations led the European Commission to start mainstreaming 
climate change much more prominently in the European budget, in pro- 
grammes such as Horizon 2020, the European Structural and Investments 
Funds (ESIF) and the Connecting Europe Facility. This helped achieve 
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Conclusion: The Commission’s low-carbon 2050 Roadmap of 2011 
showed that a 40% domestic emission reduction by 2030 would be 
technologically possible and economically feasible. It would require 
strong carbon pricing, considerable investments and low-carbon inno- 
vation in the energy, industry and transport sectors, but it would gener- 
ate important savings in terms of reduced imports of fossil fuels. 
the political decision to “mainstream” climate action in the EU budget 
from 2014–2020 by setting a target that 20% of all spending should be 
climate-related. 
 
3.2.5 Innovation 
Finally, the Roadmap also made a solid case for a much stronger push for inno- 
vation. The development and production of the required low-carbon products 
provides a major opportunity for Europe’s manufacturing industry, provided 
it succeeds in maintaining and enhancing its technological edge. Europe is no 
longer blessed with cheap domestic natural resources and has high labour costs, 
so more innovation is clearly one of the major industrial policy goals needed if 
the EU is to generate more economic growth and new jobs. 
In addition, the EU would become less dependent on expensive imports 
of oil and gas and less vulnerable to increases in oil prices. On average, and 
subject to the uncertainties of future oil prices, the EU could save between 
€175–320 billion annually in fuel costs over the next 40 years. In short, this 
could free up a tremendous amount of resources for investments in new 
innovative low-carbon technologies. 
Furthermore, greater use of clean technologies and electric transporta- 
tion such as cars, buses and two-wheelers is expected to substantially reduce 
air pollution in European cities. Considerably less money would need to be 
spent on equipment to control air pollution and significant benefits would 
accrue from reduced mortality, for example. By 2050, the EU could save up 
to €88 billion a year from air quality benefits. 
 
 
3.3 Towards a Commission proposal for a 2030 
climate and energy framework 
Despite the analytical quality of the Low-Carbon 2050 Roadmap, the Envi- 
ronment Council failed to agree on Council Conclusions in 2011. Such 
conclusions are normally agreed by consensus, but Poland was unable to 
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agree to them, essentially because of the fast decarbonisation envisaged in the 
power sector. 
Nevertheless, the 2050 Roadmap was successful in providing guidance 
on the way forward and in steering the political debate towards a 2030 per- 
spective. Most importantly, the milestone of a 40% domestic reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions in 2030 compared to 1990 seemed to bring most 
Member States together around a potential EU target for the international 
negotiations leading up to the Paris Agreement. Furthermore, in March 2012, 
the European Parliament adopted a Resolution7 endorsing the Commission’s 
Low-Carbon 2050 Roadmap: 
 
together with its trajectory, the specific milestones for domestic emis- 
sion reductions of 40 %, 60 % and 80 % for 2030, 2040 and 2050 
respectively, and the ranges for sector-specific milestones, as the basis 
for proposing legislative and other initiatives on economic and climate 
policy. 
 
The lack of consensus amongst EU Member States on the essential ele- 
ments of the 2050 Roadmap created a serious political problem. Therefore, 
the European Commission launched a new process to continue the discus- 
sion in two steps, first through a broad consultation exercise and only there- 
after through the formulation of an encompassing strategy for 2030. 
 
3.3.1 Green Paper consulting on the possible 
2030 framework 
In 2013, a consultative “Green Paper” was launched on a potential 2030 
climate and energy policy framework,8 building largely on the main con- 
clusions of the Roadmap and adding some new emerging elements. There 
was, for example, an increasing recognition that investment in network 
infrastructure and a flexible electricity market were necessary elements 
of the low-carbon energy transition. In addition, a number of important 
changes in the overall global and economic context had taken place that 
needed to be taken into account. First, there was the fallout of the finan- 
cial crisis followed by a crisis in the banking sector, leading eventually to 
budgetary problems in several Member States and to a worsening invest- 
ment climate. There were also some new emerging trends in global energy 
markets such as the rapid deployment of renewable energy across the world, 
increasing competition in low-carbon technologies and the shale gas revo- 
lution in the US resulting in increasingly divergent gas prices between the 
EU and the US. 
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The Green Paper did not draw conclusions but set out a number of strate- 
gic questions, regarding targets, policy instruments, distributional issues, com- 
petitiveness, innovation and security of energy supply. While there was wide 
support for the messages contained earlier in the Low-Carbon 2050 Road- 
map, some new elements were also raised such as the advantages and draw- 
backs of additional targets for renewables and energy efficiency. In light of 
the substantial response to the consultation, the Commission concluded that 
there was, “an almost universal support for the development of a common 
European framework for climate and energy policies.”9 One of the most tell- 
ing reactions was that of Poland, which suggested that the decision to adopt 
an objective for 2030 should be taken no earlier than in 2015. Such a message 
implied that Poland was ready to discuss a climate and energy framework for 
2030, but the timing of commitments made should be carefully chosen. 
In 2014, a year after the Green Paper, the Commission formulated its 
strategy in a Communication entitled, “A policy framework for climate and 
energy policies in the period from 2020 to 2030.”10 Of major importance 
was a full-fledged economic analysis contained in the accompanying Impact 
Assessment.11 It built further on the 2050 Roadmap analysis but added much 
more specific elements to it. 
 
 
3.3.2 The Impact Assessment 
The Commission analysed different greenhouse gas targets, notably reduc- 
tions of 35%, 37%, 40% and 45%, in relation to the base year of 1990 and 
compared these to a reference scenario of there being no new target post- 
2020. In addition to the 40% scenario, three variants were analysed. First, no 
extra targets for renewable energy and energy efficiency; second, adding a 
30% energy efficiency target; and third, adding a 30% energy efficiency target 
and a 30% renewable energy target. The 45% greenhouse gas target scenario 
also included a 35% renewable energy target. 
The question whether to have multiple targets for renewable energy and 
energy efficiency as well as for greenhouse gases received a great deal of 
attention. If the predominant policy objective were to reduce greenhouse 
gases, then part of that would be done also through more use of renewable 
energy or through improvements in energy efficiency, if these avenues proved 
to be cost-effective. So the political question was whether other energy- 
related policy objectives would be reached with the definition of one single 
target for greenhouse gases. If not, what additional costs and benefits would 
be incurred by setting additional targets? 
The results of this analysis are summarised in Table 3.3. A target level of 40% 
for greenhouse gases would be consistent with an increase of renewables of at 
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TABLE 3.3 Different levels of greenhouse gases, renewable energy and energy 
efficiency and their impact on the energy system 
Ref. GHG35/ GHG40 GHG40/ GHG40/ GHG45/ 
EE EE EE/RES30 EE/RES35 
 
Main features of the scenarios 
GHG reductions −32.4% −35.4% −40.6% −40.3% −40.7% −45.1% 
from 1990     
Renewables share1 24.4% 25.5% 26.5% 26.4% 30.3% 35.4% 
Energy savings2 −21.0% −24.4% −25.1% −29.3% −30.1% −33.7% 
Energy system impacts indicators 
Net Energy Imports 
(2010 = 100) 
Energy Intensity3 
(2010 = 100) 
Renewables share4 in 
electricity, heating 
and cooling 
Source: PRIMES-GAINS modelling results from the European Commission’s Staff Working Docu- 
ment: Impact Assessment accompanying the Communication from the Commission: A policy framework 
for climate and energy in the period from 2020 up to 2030 (reference: SWD/2014/015 final of 22.1.2014, 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014SC0015&from=EN5 
1 Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption according to the 2009 Renew- 
able Energy Sources (RES) Directive. 
2 Energy Savings evaluated against the 2007 Baseline projections for 2030. 
3 Primary energy to GDP. 
4 Contribution of Renewable Energy Sources (RES) in gross final energy consumption of elec- 
tricity and heating and cooling, based on the individual calculations according to 2009 Renew- 
able Energy Sources (RES) Directive. 
5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52014SC0015. 
 
least 26.5% and of energy efficiency of at least 25.1%. Similarly, the actually 
adopted renewable energy and energy efficiency targets for 2030 of 32% and 
32.5% respectively imply that, if fully implemented, the greenhouse gas reduction 
target of 40% would be exceeded and reach a reduction of at least 45% by 2030. 
The next issue was to assess the overall economic impacts of such significant 
change. Table 3.4 shows in different ways that more investments in the energy 
system would be required and that this figure could sharply increase with the 
setting of energy targets. However, the reward would be that energy purchases 
would fall and, in particular, the net imports of fossil fuels. Importantly, no 
significant impact was expected on average electricity prices unless the green- 
house gas target exceeded 45%. However, a major impact of all this would be 
reflected in the carbon price. Defining a greenhouse gas target only would 
result in a carbon price of €40 in 2030, whereas this would fall significantly if 
binding targets were also set for renewable energy and energy efficiency. 
96 90 89 83 81 78 
67 64 64 60 60 57 
31.0% 32.6% 34.2% 34.1% 39.7% 47.3% 
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TABLE 3.4 Economic impacts of different scenarios for greenhouse gases, renewable 
energy and energy efficiency 
Ref. GHG35/ GHG40 GHG40/ GHG40/ GHG45/ 
EE ® 
Economic and social impacts 
EE EE/RES30 EE/RES35 
Total System Costs, 2,067 2,064 2,069 2,089 2,089 2,102 
avg annual 2011–30       
(bn €)       
Total System Cost as n.a. +0.03 +0.15 +0.54 +0.54 +0.84 
% of GDP increase       
compared to       
Reference in 2030 in       
% points       
Investment Expenditure1 816 +17 +38 +59 +63 +93 
in reference and       
changes compared to       
reference (avg 2011–       
30, bn €)       
Energy Purchases 1,454 −26 −18 −34 −31 −23 
in reference and       
changes compared to       
reference (avg 2011–       
30, bn €)       
Fossil Fuel Net Imports 461 −10 −9 −20 −22 −27 
in reference and       
changes compared       
to ref. (avg 2011–30,       
bn €)       
Average price of 176 174 179 174 178 196 
electricity2 (€/MWh)       
in 2030       
ETS price (€/t of CO
2
) 
in 2030 
35 27 40 22 11 14 
Source: PRIMES-GAINS results, Impact Assessment accompanying the European Commission’s 2030 
Climate and Energy strategy; SWD/2014/015 final 
1 Investment expenditure includes total purchases of transport equipment for households and busi- 
nesses (including road and non-road transport) but not transport infrastructure costs. 
2 Average price of electricity in final demand sectors (€/MWh) constant 2010 Euros. For the refer- 
ence scenario, the corresponding value was 134 €/MWh in 2010. 
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3.3.3 The 2014 Commission Communication on 
the 2030 framework 
On the basis of this analysis, the Commission reconfirmed that a greenhouse 
gas target of at least 40% compared to 1990 was both realistic and economi- 
cally achievable domestically. It also proposed a “binding” renewable energy 
target of at least 27%, the level that was projected to be fully consistent with 
the achievement of the 40% greenhouse gas target. In this way, it aimed 
to strike a balance between cost-efficiency considerations and the need to 
continue to provide more policy certainty for investors, as well as give a 
continued push to the deployment of renewable technologies. Importantly, 
while this level of “at least 27%” was considered “unambitious” by some, the 
underlying analysis demonstrated that it would require a share of 45% to 50% 
renewable electricity in 2030, compared to 30% today. 
The Commission refrained from proposing national renewables targets 
that would be binding on the Member States individually. At this stage, it also 
refrained from proposing a sub-target for transport12 and indicated that first 
generation land-based biofuels made from food and feed should not receive 
support post-2020. On support instruments for renewables, the need for a 
more market-driven approach was highlighted. Support schemes needed to 
be rationalised to become more cost-effective and coherent with the inter- 
nal market and provide greater legal certainty for investors.13 These princi- 
ples were the inspiration for a subsequent revision of the guidelines on state 
aid for environmental protection and energy 2014–2020,14 which has led to 
tendering systems becoming the standard approach for renewable electricity 
support. 
The Commission at the time refrained from proposing a target for energy 
efficiency in view of a pending review of the Energy Efficiency Directive. 
However, later in 2014 it proposed a 30% improvement in energy efficiency 
by 2030, which has since been increased to 32.5%. This recognised the 
higher costs that would result but sought important benefits in terms of 
security of supply, notably gas imports in light of the annexation of Crimea 
and the continued troubles between Ukraine and Russia. 
The overall target of 40% greenhouse gas reduction still needed to be 
distributed in terms of the policy effort between the sectors covered by the 
harmonised EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) and those sectors for 
which Member States were responsible through the Effort Sharing Regu- 
lation15 (see Chapter 5). The results in Table 3.5 show that, based on cost- 
effectiveness considerations, the EU ETS sectors would have to deliver a 
reduction of 43% in greenhouse gas emissions (implying a change in the cap 
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TABLE 3.5 Cost-effective distribution of 2030 effort between EU ETS and non-ETS 
sectors 
Ref. GHG35/ GHG40 GHG40/ GHG40/ GHG45/ 
EE ® 
Environmental impact indicators 
EE EE/RES30 EE/RES35 
GHG emissions 
reduction in ETS 
sectors vs 2005 
GHG emissions 
reduction in 
non-ETS sectors 
vs 2005 
Reduced pollution 
control & health 
damage costs 
(€bn/year)1 
−36% −37% −43% −38% −41% −49% 
 
 
−20% −26% −30% −35% −33% −34% 
 
 
 
3.8–7.6 7.2–13.5 17.4–34.8 16.7–33.2 21.9–41.5 
 
 
Source: PRIMES-GAINS results, Impact Assessment accompanying the European Commission’s 
2030 Climate and Energy strategy; SWD/2014/015 final 
1 Reduction of health damage costs due to reduced air pollution compared to the reference 
(€bn/yr).Valuation uses value of life year lost used for the Thematic Strategy on Air Pollution, 
ranging from €57,000 to €133,000 per life year lost. 
 
 
by adjusting the Linear Reduction Factor from 1.74% annual reduction to 
2.2% from 2021) and the non-ETS sectors a reduction of 30%, both com- 
pared to 2005. The environmental analysis also reconfirmed the important 
secondary benefits that could be attained through an improvement of air 
quality. 
As regards the EU ETS, the Communication was accompanied by a spe- 
cific legislative proposal to introduce a so-called “Market Stability Reserve” 
to remove the structural surplus that had been accumulating in the EU ETS. 
This is explained more fully in Chapter 4. In this way, the Commission 
maintained that the EU ETS could be restored as a central, EU-wide and 
cost-effective driver for low-carbon investment for larger emitters. Notable 
is that the definition of the “surplus” would be done regardless of its cause, 
which could be the result of slowing or declining economic activity, through 
more production of renewable energy or higher improvements in energy 
efficiency. With such a Market Stability Reserve, the risk for potential nega- 
tive spillovers from national sectoral policies on the functioning of the EU 
ETS could be largely neutralised. 
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As regards the other non-ETS sectors, the Commission proposed to con- 
tinue the 2020 approach to share the effort between Member States based on 
GDP per capita, with more wealthy countries taking on more ambitious tar- 
gets. This was based on analytical evidence in the Impact Assessment that less 
wealthy, less efficient and more carbon intensive countries were facing rela- 
tively higher investment requirements. At the same time, flexibility between 
Member States in these sectors would help to ensure that efforts were made 
where they would be most cost-effective. 
By specifying not only the headline climate target but also the accompa- 
nying architecture with EU-level targets for renewable energy and energy 
efficiency, the Commission wished to facilitate the reaching of consensus on 
the key elements of the 2030 climate and energy framework before making 
the specific legislative proposals. It was expected that such agreement reached 
before the end of 2014 would later on facilitate the future legislative process, 
with respect to both the EU ETS and the Effort Sharing legislation for 2030. 
 
3.3.4 The European Council Conclusions of 
October 2014 
With the gradual development of EU climate policy it was becoming clear 
that policy making was not becoming simpler, even if most other countries 
across the world were giving strong signals that they were ready to come 
together to act. It was remarkable that the Environment Council – bringing 
together all Ministers for the Environment of the 28 EU Member States – 
had, in 2011, failed to agree on the way forward in a 2030 perspective. In 
contrast, by 2014, sufficient political momentum had been created in antici- 
pation of COP20 in Warsaw and COP21 to be held in Paris in 2015. 
The normal institutional way of proceeding would have been for the 
Commission first to make a set of policy proposals. However, without a 
strong political mandate endorsed by the highest levels of government, these 
could have taken a long time to be agreed upon, or, worse, could have been 
rejected. The first European Council President, H. Van Rompuy chose a 
much more astute way. He decided to bring the essential elements of the 
Commission’s 2030 energy and climate framework to the Heads of State 
and Government. On 23–24 October 2014, the European Council unani- 
mously adopted a set of conclusions regarding the 2030 climate and energy 
framework, including the proposed binding domestic target of at least 40% 
greenhouse gas reductions compared to 1990.16 This provided clear political 
guidance for the further legislative proposals the Commission would have to 
propose later. 
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This result in October 2014 was of key importance for the international 
negotiations because it allowed the EU to submit its “Intended Nationally 
Determined Contribution,” in line with the timeline agreed by the Parties to 
the UNFCCC, at COP20 in Warsaw for the conclusion of an international 
agreement (later to become the Paris Agreement). The EU’s early submis- 
sion had its effect on other Parties too, serving as an incentive to make their 
contributions. Less than a month later, on 12 November 2014, US President 
Obama and Chinese President Xi jointly announced, 
 
their respective post-2020 actions on climate change The United 
States intends to achieve an economy-wide target of reducing its emis- 
sions by 26%-28% below its 2005 level in 2025 and to make best efforts 
to reduce its emissions by 28%. China intends to achieve the peaking 
of CO
2 
emissions around 2030 and to make best efforts to peak early 
and intends to increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy 
consumption to around 20% by 2030. 
 
Apart from the headline 40% reduction target, the European Council had 
to agree on a range of other issues in order to find a political consensus. It was 
agreed that the Linear Reduction Factor of the EU ETS would be increased 
from 1.74% per year to 2.2% per year from 2021. This would equate to a 
reduction of emissions from the EU ETS sectors of 43% compared to their 
level in 2005. In exchange for this significant strengthening of the ambition, 
the existing system of free allocation would be continued in order to avoid 
potential risks related to a relocation of energy intensive industry outside 
Europe. This was an important decision as the EU ETS legislation at the 
time foresaw a phasing out of free allocation as of 2021. For the sectors not 
covered by the EU ETS, a reduction of emissions of 30% compared to 2005 
was agreed upon for the EU as a whole and that differentiated reduction 
targets amongst Member States would vary within a range between 0% and 
−40% compared to 2005. 
This was all consistent with the Commission’s Communication “A policy 
framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020 to 2030” of Janu- 
ary 2014. However, it was clearly necessary to forge additional compromises 
on key issues in order to reach consensus. These compromises outlined spe- 
cific conditions for the ensuing climate legislation. In contrast to the 2020 
package, these elements were now tackled head-on before the Commission 
tabled its specific legislative proposals. It must be admitted that this limited 
the room for manoeuvre for the Commission in presenting its legal proposals, 
as well as excluded the European Parliament from this early stage of policy 
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design. However, even though the rules of the ordinary legislative procedure 
applied in full to the specific legislative proposals, this did unquestionably 
facilitate adoption of the legislation and avoided the need for the European 
Council to become directly involved in the legislative process later on. 
As regards the distribution of effort, it outlined a delicate balance regard- 
ing the contribution mostly between less wealthy and wealthier countries, or 
in other words, how a cost-effective implementation should be reconciled 
with elements of fairness and solidarity, including the following elements: 
 
1 The creation of a Modernisation Fund for lower-income Member States 
(below 60% of average GDP per capita) from auctioning revenues; 
2 The distribution of 10% of auctioning revenues to countries with GDP 
per capita below 90% of the EU average; 
3 Effort for the non-EU ETS sectors to be based on GDP per capita rang- 
ing between 0% (for the least wealthy) and −40% (for the wealthiest) as 
compared to emission levels in 2005; 
4 Targets for the Member States with a GDP per capita above the EU 
average to be adjusted to reflect cost-effectiveness in a fair and balanced 
manner; 
5 A limited “one-off ” transfer of EU ETS allowances to the non-ETS sec- 
tors providing flexibility for the Member States with targets both above 
the EU average and above their cost-effective potential. 
 
The European Council further endorsed a target of “at least 27%” for renew- 
able energy “binding at EU level” and an “indicative target” of “at least 27%” 
for energy efficiency, to be reviewed by 2020,“having in mind an EU level of 
30%.” For renewable energy and energy efficiency, the European Council did 
not endorse the idea of setting nationally differentiated binding targets, once 
again in line with the Commission’s initial Communication.17 
For renewable energy it was indicated in the European Council con- 
clusions of October 2014 that Member States can set more ambitious tar- 
gets “and support them in line with State aid guidelines,” thereby reassuring 
Member States, such as Germany, that wished to continue strong national 
policies and support systems. No sub-target was set for transport, unlike for 
2020, reflecting at that time the wish of Member States for greater flexibility. 
An additional objective of “arriving at a 15% target by 2030” with respect 
to interconnectivity in electricity networks between Member States was 
also agreed upon. This reflected the crucial role of electricity connectors to 
strengthen the EU internal market for electricity, to enable greater penetra- 
tion of renewable energy and to improve security of supply. The crucial role 
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Conclusion: The Commission  formulated  a  comprehensive  strategy  
for 2030, based on the Low-Carbon 2050 Roadmap. The European 
Council, bringing together the EU’s Heads of State and Government, 
endorsed this strategy and adopted the “at least 40%” target for 2030. 
This injected a welcome impetus into the international preparation of 
the Paris Agreement. 
of infrastructure to the proper functioning of the internal energy market 
was understood, including the important contribution to be made by co- 
financing projects with contributions from the EU budget. 
Finally, the European Council endorsed the idea of an Energy Union gov- 
ernance system to bring together existing national climate, energy efficiency 
and renewable plans into one integrated national plan, to enable a systematic 
monitoring of key indicators and to facilitate regional cooperation. 
 
 
Conclusion 
It was a long and complicated journey to obtain a consensual agreement 
between Member States on a long-term strategy for EU climate policy and 
even more so to agree on a specific EU-wide reduction target for 2030. The 
European Council, as mandated by the Lisbon Treaty, turned out to be a 
necessary and helpful facilitator in reaching an agreement. 
This new institutional dynamic enabled the European Union to maintain 
its international leadership in the UN negotiations on climate change by 
assuming an ambitious quantitative emissions cap. As such, it set an example 
for other countries and maintained the momentum behind submissions of 
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions in the run-up to COP21 
in Paris. 
The Commission put thorough economic analysis at the heart of its 
approach to maintaining fairness between Member States. The economic 
modelling work informed the Heads of State and Government and facili- 
tated the subsequent legislative work of the Council and European Parlia- 
ment relating to climate change and the energy transition. Nevertheless, it 
took seven years of continuous effort between the formulation of the Low- 
Carbon 2050 Roadmap in 2011 and adoption in 2018 of the legislation 
implementing the EU’s climate and energy targets for 2030, in particular 
the Effort Sharing Regulation, the amendments to the EU ETS, the Energy 
Efficiency and the Renewable Energy Directives. 
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4 
THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING 
SYSTEM 
Damien Meadows, Peter Vis and Peter Zapfel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The development of the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) up to 2014 
is comprehensively elaborated in EU Climate Policy Explained,1 while EU 
Energy Law: The EU Emissions Trading Scheme2 dealt with the origins of the 
EU ETS and its early years of operation. This chapter reviews what the EU 
ETS has achieved so far in terms of emission reductions. It further focuses 
on recent developments, relating in particular to the legislation covering the 
period from 2021–2030. This legislation implements a significant share of the 
EU’s target to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by “at least 40%” by 2030. 
 
4.1 How does the EU Emissions Trading 
System work? 
The EU ETS is a “cap-and-trade” system that guarantees an environmental 
outcome by setting a cap on the total amount of carbon emissions. The 
quantity of allowances issued serves as the quantitative cap on emissions, and 
these allowances are then either auctioned or allocated for free to compa- 
nies. Companies have an obligation to regularly hand over to governments 
sufficient allowances to cover their actual emissions. Companies may trade 
these allowances. Progressively, the total number of allowances in the system 
is reduced at a steady and predictable rate. This secures an improved environ- 
mental outcome over time. This is a “cap” on emissions, and certainly not a 
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“cap on growth,” as is sometimes wrongly claimed by critics. Historical data 
shows that economic activity covered by the system has grown collectively 
even while emissions have been coming down. 
The advantage of a market-based system is that it incentivises reductions in 
emissions across all entities covered by the system in a cost-effective manner. 
Companies have an economic interest to cut emissions and sell allowances 
when the market price for allowances is higher than the cost of reducing its 
own emissions. Conversely, companies with reduction costs above the market 
price are able to buy allowances. This means that, across the system, there is 
an incentive for reductions to take place where the costs of abatement are 
lower, while the environmental outcome remains guaranteed by the overall 
emissions cap. By covering a variety of sectors, the EU ETS allows continued 
growth in emissions from individual sectors by buying allowances from other 
sectors where emission reductions are cheaper. 
By putting a price on carbon, a market failure is corrected, and companies 
and economic actors are incentivised to take account of this in their opera- 
tional decision-making and long-term investment planning. Carbon prices 
strengthen the business case for making investments in low-carbon technol- 
ogy: the rate of return is improved, and the payback period reduced com- 
pared to more carbon-intensive alternative investments. Putting a price on 
carbon is therefore an important signal for the economy. Moreover, it must be 
made very clear to all, particularly higher emitting sectors, that carbon allow- 
ances will continue to reduce significantly over time. 
Emissions trading systems, as well as other market-based measures like car- 
bon taxes, have the potential to generate money that can be used for climate 
change mitigation and adaptation. Polluters then not only have to pay to pol- 
lute, but the revenues generated can then be redeployed to further stimulate 
innovation and deployment, or to address societal effects of climate constraint 
such as retraining employees in carbon-intensive industries like coal mining. 
The EU ETS works with the economic cycle: for example, a recession 
leads to lower emissions, affecting the supply/demand balance in the carbon 
market and causing a lower carbon price, while an economic recovery could 
have the reverse effect. A fluctuating carbon price is a normal feature that 
does not undermine the overall predictability of the EU ETS. Companies 
can save emission allowances until they need them or sell allowances they 
do not need. This flexibility gives an incentive to reduce emissions earlier 
in time and for individual companies to overachieve. Other companies have 
the flexibility to buy additional allowances if they find making investments 
themselves is too expensive. 
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Conclusion: The EU ETS puts a price on carbon. It provides incentives    
to companies to reduce emissions and ensures that the cap set on their 
collective emissions is met in a cost-effective manner. 
A well-functioning market requires the trust and confidence that actors 
will comply with the rules. The EU ETS therefore developed a solid system 
of monitoring, reporting, verification (MRV) and compliance. This is essen- 
tial for a market-based measure to work. Since 2008, in the EU ETS, in the 
case of failure to comply, there has been an inflation-linked penalty of €100 
per tonne of excess emissions plus the obligation to make up the shortfall.3 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Emission reductions of 26% under the EU ETS 
from 2005–2017 
Today, the EU ETS covers 40% of the EU’s CO
2 
emissions and is therefore 
critical to the delivery of the overall climate targets. It regulates, in a harmo- 
nised way, emissions from some 11,000 installations, mainly from electricity 
and heat generation, manufacturing industry and around 500 airlines for their 
intra-European flights. 
Between 2005 and 2017, the emissions covered by the EU ETS fell by 
26%, which is more than the average for the EU as a whole (Figure 4.1). 
In other words, the EU ETS sectors are doing more than other sectors are 
doing. Emissions covered by the EU ETS have reduced from over 2 billion 
tonnes per year in 2008 to less than 1.7 billion tonnes per year in 2017.4 The 
EU ETS has continuously ensured reductions in emissions while maintaining 
a very high level of compliance. 
Due to the lack of monitoring at installation level and independent veri- 
fication, no comparable figures exist for the years prior to the introduction 
of the EU ETS in 2005. However, several studies5 point to the fact that the 
carbon price signal has resulted in real emission reductions since the very 
beginning of the EU ETS. The largest drop in emissions happened, however, 
between 2008 and 2009, which was to a considerable extent influenced by 
the onset of the economic crisis in late 2008. 
Since 2013, taking into account extensions of scope, there has been an 
average yearly reduction in the EU ETS sectors of around 2.6%. The power 
sector delivered the highest reduction by an average reduction of more than 
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FIGURE 4.1 Verified emissions under the EU ETS, 2005–2017 
Source: European Environment Agency (EEA),“Trends and projections in the EU ETS in 2018” 
(page 21). Note that the estimate to reflect current scope takes in account additional emissions 
(not split by activity) for the period from 2005–2012 to provide a consistent time series for the 
coverage of emissions in the third trading period. 
 
 
4% per year since 2013, reflecting fuel switching away from coal and an 
increased use of renewable energy sources. Emissions from industrial sectors 
reduced as well, but to a much more limited extent of around 0.5% per year. 
Unfortunately, no robust empirical studies are yet available indicating the 
impact of specific policy instruments in driving these emission reductions. 
Contrary to the significant reduction in stationary sources, the emissions 
from intra EU aviation have been growing by some 5% per year,6 up to some 
67 million tonnes per year in 2018.7 The annual free allocation is around 
30.5 million allowances, based on airlines’ efficiency in transporting passen- 
gers and cargo, while around five million allowances were auctioned. Airlines 
are therefore buying more than 30 million allowances from other sectors 
every year to offset the growth in their emissions, alongside a small propor- 
tion of offset credits from the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mecha- 
nism (CDM) that continue to be allowed up to the year 2020. 
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4.3 Addressing the low carbon price since 2013 
The EU ETS operates in phases, as for each phase significant modifications 
were made to the legislation. Phase-1 from 2005–2007 was considered to 
be a pilot phase, as all institutional infrastructure needed to be created, even 
before the Kyoto Protocol started. Phase-2 covered the years 2008–2012 and 
corresponded with the first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol. 
Phase-3 covered 2013–2020, which is currently running and was intended 
to become Kyoto’s second commitment period. Finally, Phase-4 covers the 
period from 2021–2030 that corresponds to the European Union’s first com- 
mitment under the Paris Agreement. In Figure 4.2, the prices of allowances 
issued in each phase are shown in different colours. 
In the first phase, the value of EU allowances for that phase dropped 
steeply in 2006, when the first verified emissions figures were reported. 
This reflects the fact that the EU ETS began in 2005 without a detailed 
database of actual emissions per installation, and it became clear that the 
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FIGURE 4.2 Price trends for allowances under the EU ETS and EU ETS-eligible 
international credits (CER) under the Kyoto Protocol (€/tonne) 
Source: ICE (for EUA prices), Refinitiv (for CER prices, based on EEX and ICE price data 
reports 2013–2018) 
 
Conclusion: The EU ETS covers 40% of EU’s greenhouse gas emissions, 
creating a clear and predictable reduction of the emissions cap over 
time. Since 2005, emissions covered by the EU ETS decreased by 26%. 
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Member States were issuing a number of allowances in excess of expected 
total emissions. As these allowances could not be banked into subsequent 
phases, this excess resulted in a price of nearly zero in 2007. At the same 
time, the market price in 2007 for allowances valid for 2008–2012 was 
much higher in view of expectations that the system would be more con- 
strained in the future. 
A second major price drop came at the end of 2008, as the scale of the 
global economic and financial crisis became clear. It is important to note that 
sectors covered by the EU ETS in aggregate were subject to much stronger 
swings in output than the economy as a whole. Individual sectors covered by 
the EU ETS had output drops between 2008 and 2009 of over 30%, and the 
supply of allowances started to exceed demand. 
By 2012, the market had built up a supply overhang of almost two billion 
allowances. This over-supply was significantly aggravated by a sizeable inflow 
of international credits in 2011 and 2012 especially (see Figure 4.3). Indeed, 
the EU ETS allowed for the use of over 1.5 billion tonnes of international 
credits created under the Kyoto Protocol. At the same time, the EU was 
deliberately promoting energy efficiency improvement and the increased use 
of renewable energy, but no correction of the cap for these policies was fore- 
seen. All these factors, including the economic recession, the international 
credits and the effects of energy policies, led to a growing market imbalance 
weighing heavily on the price that fell to single digits. 
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FIGURE 4.3 Surplus of EU ETS allowances with cumulative number of CERs 
used in EU ETS 
Source: European Commission 
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While emissions under the EU ETS kept falling, the carbon price of 
around €5 per tonne prompted a policy debate on how to restore mar- 
ket confidence and rejuvenate the European carbon market as a driver for 
low-carbon investments. As the political environment did not allow for a 
tightening of the cap, a short-term legislative response was developed. It was 
decided to reduce the quantity of allowances for auctioning in 2014–2016 by 
900 million allowances8 but to bring them back to the market at the end of 
Phase-3 (a mechanism referred to as “back-loading”). This made the surplus 
shrink in the short-term by more than 40%, but this was only a temporary 
solution. 
In the meantime, a longer-term response was developed through the crea- 
tion of a “Market Stability Reserve,” adopted in 2015.9 This Market Stability 
Reserve provides for an automatic lowering of the auction volume when the 
cumulative surplus of allowances in the market exceeds 833 million allow- 
ances, with the consequence that a pre-determined number of allowances 
would be put into the Reserve. Allowances will be released automatically 
from the Reserve at a pre-determined rate once the cumulative surplus of 
allowances in the market falls below 400 million allowances. The Market 
Stability Reserve is intended to act like a dry sponge that absorbs surplus 
allowances in times of over-supply and releases allowances in times of under- 
supply as if the sponge is being squeezed. The purpose is to maintain levels of 
liquidity needed for the carbon market to function properly, estimated to be 
between 400 and 833 million allowances, to cover both “spot” and “futures” 
transactions. 
The rules of functioning of the Market Stability Reserve are automatic 
and pre-determined. The aim is to avoid discretionary interventions and to 
be as predictable as possible, hence creating market stability. The thresholds 
and the rate managing the inflows and outflows to and from the Reserve 
are set in the Directive. The principle is that as the supply and demand bal- 
ance are automatically adjusted, the market is left to determine the price – as 
is generally intended with market-based instruments. The Market Stability 
Reserve is operating from 2019. The 900 million back-loaded allowances 
taken out of the market between 2014 and 2016 will be put directly into 
the reserve, together with a proportion of the EU ETS surplus allowances in 
accordance with the operating rules of the Reserve. 
It is important to note that the definition of the surplus is defined irre- 
spective of how such a surplus originates, whether due to a business cycle 
downturn or because of energy policy measures such as on coal plant shut- 
downs, renewable energy expansion or energy efficiency measures. In this 
way, the Market Stability Reserve puts an end to questions related to the 
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Conclusion: Between 2010 and 2017 the European carbon price was 
low, largely as a result of the economic recession, a large influx of inter- 
national credits and developments in energy markets. The Market Sta- 
bility Reserve makes the EU ETS more resilient to future major changes 
in the economy or in energy policy. 
compatibility of the EU ETS and other policies, in particular in the energy 
sector. The synergy between the EU ETS and other policy measures has 
been improved considerably through the creation of the Market Stability 
Reserve; this is of critical importance for the coming decade where the role 
of renewable energy is expected to grow considerably. 
The Market Stability Reserve provides the EU ETS with an instrument 
that introduces a volume-based adjustment mechanism. The European legis- 
lator opted not to set minimum and maximum prices for allowances, which 
would constitute a “price collar.” This could have resulted in mixing price 
and volume determination simultaneously and could have led to unpredict- 
able results. 
The experience of the carbon market in the exceptional turbulent 
economic times did require more corrections than originally foreseen, 
but these were necessary to safeguard the proper functioning of the sys- 
tem. This was just another expression of what happened in the financial 
markets more generally following the deepest financial and economic 
crisis since the Second World War. These corrections were made through 
the normal decision-making process and therefore required time. The 
result is that the EU ETS is now more predictable and shock-resilient 
than it has ever been, and the likelihood of any need for future correc- 
tions is now considerably reduced. 
 
 
4.4 A fundamental review for the period 
from 2021–2030 
Extensive economic analysis performed in the context of the EU’s overall 
40% reduction commitment by 2030 has shown that an emissions reduction 
of 43% below 2005 represents a cost-effective contribution from the EU 
ETS sectors. This corresponds to an increase of the Linear Reduction Factor 
of the EU ETS from 1.74% to 2.2% per year from 2021 onwards. This is an 
essential component of the EU’s long-term strategy, and this annual linear 
reduction continues to apply by default after 2030. 
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During the Phase-4 negotiations, the question arose of whether the increase 
in the linear reduction to 2.2% and the creation of the Market Stability Reserve 
would be sufficient to address the oversupply on the carbon market. In the end, 
it was agreed to double the rate at which allowances are placed into the Market 
Stability Reserve from 12% to 24% between 2019 and 2023. In addition, unless 
decided otherwise in the first review of the Market Stability Reserve in 2021, 
a time limit was introduced on the validity of any allowances in the Market 
Stability Reserve in excess of the level of allowances auctioned during the pre- 
vious year. From 2023, any allowances in the Market Stability Reserve above 
this level will no longer be valid and this limitation will continue to apply on an 
annual basis if the surplus exceeds the level of allowances auctioned during the 
preceding year. As a result, from 2023 the size of the Market Stability Reserve 
will be limited to the amount of allowances auctioned in the previous year. 
There is now also a specific provision that recognises Member States may 
cancel allowances that would otherwise have been auctioned, in the event 
that a Member State phases-out the use of coal or lignite fuel in the power 
sector. Such phase-out policies in electricity generation have the potential to 
cause substantial surpluses of allowances in the market, thereby weakening 
the incentive to reduce emissions elsewhere. 
After the formal agreement of the EU ETS reforms for Phase-4, the car- 
bon price returned to its pre-2010 level (see Figure 4.2). This happened 
quicker than expected. 
All these changes combined have fundamentally influenced the outlook 
on the supply and demand of allowances until 2030 (see Figure 4.4). The 
surplus in the market, built up in the years following the financial crisis of 
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FIGURE 4.4 Outlook on the supply and demand of allowances until 2030 
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Conclusion: The adoption of legislation on Phase-4 of EU ETS led to the 
return of the price to its pre-recession levels. Along with a reinforced 
role of the Market Stability Reserve, the total amount of allowances will 
further reduce by 2.2% annually from 2021, an increase of the previous 
applicable rate of 1.74% in the period from 2013–20. 
2008, will first be absorbed in the Market Stability Reserve and after 2023 be 
neutralised. Consequently, the normal scarcity for a well-functioning market 
mechanism is gradually reappearing. 
 
 
4.5 Carbon leakage and free allocation: having 
industry on board 
Economists usually advocate that all allowances should be auctioned in 
accordance with the polluter-pays principle, a principle explicitly mentioned 
in the EU Treaty. However, this could lead to negative impacts on the com- 
petitiveness of European companies if done while other major economies are 
not putting a similar price on the external costs of emissions or taking other 
comparably stringent actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
Emission trading is very transparent in terms of its price signal and, while 
recognising that there are many factors involved in investment and opera- 
tional decisions, an important political issue is not to risk losing industrial 
production from Europe to other countries. Relocation from Europe could 
theoretically lead to an increase in global emissions if the technology used 
in these economic activities would not be as carbon-efficient as in Europe 
(referred to as “carbon leakage”). 
In this context, free allocation allows for the avoidance of adverse impacts 
on competitiveness. Under the current Phase-3, over 40% of allowances 
under the EU ETS are therefore given out for free. Since 2013, the rules for 
free allocations have been harmonised across the EU ETS to make sure that 
companies are treated the same way irrespective of the Member State they 
are established in. 
The Heads of State and Government decided in 2014 to continue the 
current approach, contrary to the foreseen complete discontinuation of free 
allocation from 2027. Consequently, it was decided that in principle 43% of 
allowances would be handed out for free between 2021 and 2030, but in cer- 
tain circumstances this amount could increase to 46%. It would be important, 
however, to make sure that these free allowances are given to those sectors 
and economic activities where the risk of carbon leakage is real. 
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4.5.1 Benchmarks 
In total, 54 technological benchmarks have been adopted. Given the diversity in 
the manufacturing sector, it is not possible for every product to have a specific 
benchmark, but 52 key product benchmarks have been established and cover the 
major part of industrial emissions. The remainder are covered either by the appli- 
cation of the heat-based energy benchmark, or to a minor extent by a fuel-based 
energy benchmark. Finally, a very small percentage of allowances are allocated 
in relation to a process emissions rule based on past emissions levels.10 There is a 
separate benchmark for aviation activities, described in Chapter 7. Table 4.1 gives 
 
TABLE 4.1 Examples of initial benchmark values for 2013–2020 (tonne CO
2 
per 
1000 tonnes of output produced)1 
Product Benchmark Product Benchmark Product Benchmark 
 
Coke 286 Sintered ore 171 Hot metal 1328 
Pre-bake anode 324 Aluminium 1514 Grey cement 766 
White cement 987 Lime 954 Dolime 1072 
clinker      
Sintered dolime 1449 Floatglass 453 Bottles & jars 382 
    colourless  
Bottles & jars 306 Continuous 406 Facing bricks 139 
coloured  filament    
  glass fibre    
Pavers 192 Roof tiles 144 Spray dried 76 
    powder  
Plaster 48 Dried 17 Short fibre 120 
  secondary  kraftpulp  
  gypsum    
Long fibre 60 Sulphite pulp 20 Recovered 39 
kraftpulp    paper pulp  
Newsprint 298 Uncoated fine 318 Coated fine 318 
  paper  paper  
Tissue 334 Testliner and 248 Uncoated 237 
  fluting  carbon board  
Coated carbon 273 Nitric acid 302 Adipic acid 2790 
board      
Vinyl chloride 204 Phenol/ 266 S-PVC 85 
monomere  acetone    
E-PVC 238 Soda ash 843   
Source: Annex I of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/331 of 19 December 2018, 
determining transitional Union-wide rules for harmonised free allocation of emission allowances 
pursuant to Article 10a of Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council. 
1 For benchmarks defined without consideration of exchangeability of fuel and electricity. 
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the benchmark values that formed the initial reference point for free allocation 
for 2013–2020, and which are the starting points for calculating the trajectories 
for benchmark value improvements for Phase-4. 
These benchmark values took account of the most efficient techniques, 
substitutes and alternative production processes. All allocations were decided 
prior to the period in question, and benchmarks are calculated on the basis 
of past production quantities rather than inputs to the production process,11 
in view of maximising incentives for emissions reductions and energy effi- 
ciency savings. Most product benchmark values were derived from the average 
performance of the 10% most efficient installations in a sector in the EU in 
2007–2008, based on data from all EU Member States. 
The initial setting of the benchmark values was a complicated process, 
partly because of different industrial strategies followed by different com- 
panies in the same sector. Therefore, it is not entirely surprising that the 
benchmarking decision and the free allocation process led to a number of 
legal challenges, although the judgements upheld the validity of the bench- 
mark values in all cases.12 
 
4.5.2 Carbon leakage list 
A wide range of industries are included on a list of sectors “deemed to be 
exposed to carbon leakage,” and they receive allocation at the level of 100% 
of the harmonised benchmarks. Industrial facilities not covered by this sta- 
tus are allocated 80% of the benchmark in 2013, declining annually and in a 
linear manner to a level of 30% from 2020–2026, and they will then reduce 
to zero between the years 2027–2030. 
The list of industries “deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of car- 
bon leakage” was first adopted in 200913 for five years, and a second list was 
adopted for 2015–2020.14 A sector was “deemed to be exposed to a signifi- 
cant risk of carbon leakage” if the sum of additional costs related to both the 
direct emissions and the indirect impacts from the use of electricity would 
lead to an increase of production costs of 5% or more and the sector’s inten- 
sity of trade with third countries was above 10%. Sectors were also included if 
either EU ETS direct and indirect additional costs would lead to an increase 
of production costs of at least 30%, or the sector’s intensity of trade with third 
countries exceeds 30%. Most of the sectors and sub-sectors were included on 
the 2009 list because their intensity of trade with third countries exceeded 
30%.15 Other sectors were included on the list based on a qualitative assess- 
ment, taking into account the extent to which it is possible for installations 
to reduce emission levels or electricity consumption, current and projected 
market characteristics and profit margins. 
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FIGURE 4.5 Share of free allocation (%) based on carbon leakage list, 2013–2020 
Source: European Commission, based on Figure 11 in Impact Assessment for EU ETS amend- 
ment proposal 2015, reference SWD(2015)135 final of 15.07.201516 
 
 
Based on the harmonised benchmarks and the carbon leakage list, Mem- 
ber States calculate in advance the number of free allowances for each instal- 
lation based on the EU-wide rules. So far, the predominant part of the free 
allocation goes to only a limited number of sectors such as cement, steel and 
chemicals as shown in Figure 4.5. Over the period from 2021–2030, some 
6.3 billion allowances will be given out for free out of a total of 15.5 billion 
allowances. 
 
4.5.3 Update of the carbon leakage list and benchmark 
values for Phase 4 
For Phase-4, differentiation is maintained between sectors that are exposed 
to a significant risk of carbon leakage, on the one hand, and other industry 
sectors on the other hand.Whether a sector is included on the carbon leakage 
list is determined in general based on a single criterion17 that reflects both the 
mathematical outcomes of carbon intensity and trade intensity of the sector.18 
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This limits the number of sectors included on the list to 50 sectors and 12 
sub-sectors. This list will be applicable for the whole period from 2021–2030. 
For the period from 2021–2030, a combined data collection from thou- 
sands of industrial installations will provide the basis for the update of the 
benchmark values and the determination of the production levels needed for 
free allocation purposes. As from 2021, the existing benchmark values will be 
updated to reflect technological progress within a range of 0.2% and 1.6% 
per year, applicable between 2008 and the middle of each five-year period in 
Phase-4. This ensures that financial incentives for those sectors experiencing 
more rapid technological progress and emission reductions are maintained. 
By way of exception, the benchmark value for hot steel is only to be updated 
by the lower rate of 0.2% for allocations in 2021–2025. The reductions for 
each benchmark value will therefore range between 3–24% of the initial 
benchmark value for allocations during 2008–2023, and between 4–32% of 
the initial benchmark value for allocations during 2026–2030. 
On the manner of adjusting the 54 benchmark values, the revised Directive 
empowered the Commission to adopt a “delegated act” concerning the union- 
wide and fully harmonised rules for the allocation of free allowances, which has 
been done through the Free Allocation Regulation.19 This regulation deter- 
mines detailed implementation rules including on definitions, modifications 
to the monitoring rules regarding the data collected by Member States, the 
production level data and the determination of historical activity levels. 
Allocations will also be adjusted if installations’ operations increase or 
decrease by more than 15%, in order to align free allocations more closely 
with actual production levels.20 An implementing act on allocation adjust- 
ments is being prepared for adoption in 2019. 
These updated benchmarking rules are important, as they introduce a 
pioneering step to have a rule-based process to update the benchmarks 
periodically. 
 
4.5.4 The correction factor 
Since 2013, a safeguard clause ensures that the amount of allowances given 
out for free on the basis of benchmarks does not exceed the amount of 
allowances available for free within the overall cap.21 In respect of 2013–2020, 
this maximum share of free allocation was defined as the historic share22 of 
emissions of those installations in the overall EU ETS cap.23 A cross-sectoral 
correction factor was therefore foreseen between 2013 and 2020 to ratchet 
down free allocations to all operators to the same extent to ensure that the 
pre-determined limit of free allocation is not exceeded. 
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The legislation foresaw that the benchmark values were to be multiplied 
by production values. Operators had a choice of base year for production 
values, which resulted in a significant inflation of allocation and triggered 
the application of a significant cross-sectoral correction factor for the period 
from 2013–2020. In 2013, the cross-sectoral correction factor was around 
6% increasing to around 18% by 2020, some 12% on average. This ratchet 
applied equally to the free allocations of all operators, regardless of the differ- 
ing extent of exposure to global competition. 
The application of the correction factor generated support for a more tar- 
geted carbon leakage system for the post-2020 period.As a result, the updates 
of the carbon leakage list and of the benchmark values should reduce the 
need, if not completely avoid, the application of the cross-sectoral correction 
factor. However, in case the correction factor would still be applied, up to 3% 
of the total quantity of allowances by 2030 will be used to give additional free 
allocation rather than be auctioned by Member States.24 
 
4.5.5 The New Entrants Reserve 
For new entrants in the period from 2013–2020, 5% of the total quantity 
of allowances25 has been set aside for new investments, either in terms of 
entirely new installations or significant capacity extensions of existing instal- 
lations. Harmonised benchmarking rules are set out for allocations to new 
entrants and the allocations are reduced by the Linear Reduction Factor. 
The New Entrants Reserve for the period from 2021–2030 is drawn from 
some 325 million unallocated allowances from the period from 2013–2020, 
including 200 million allowances that would otherwise have been placed in 
the Market Stability Reserve. 
A large proportion of the new entrants reserve in the period from 
2013–2020 was used for the “NER300” fund that provided specific support 
for demonstration activities for innovative renewable energy technologies. 
Regarding installations that close, the legislation provides that no free alloca- 
tion is given any longer to an installation that has ceased its operations unless 
the operator shows that production will be resumed within a reasonable time. 
The same rule applies for the partial closure of installations or significant 
reductions of capacity. 
 
4.5.6 State aid to compensate for the cost of carbon 
passed through in electricity prices 
The Directive’s general rule that no free allocation is given to electricity gen- 
eration is based on the premise that generators are expected to pass through 
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Conclusion: Free allocation shields the manufacturing industry from 
possible negative impacts on its international competitiveness. From 
2021, 43% of allowances issued within the EU ETS are given out for free 
to manufacturing industry according to objective criteria. 
the costs of carbon in electricity prices. As a result, industry sectors have an 
increased “indirect” cost of electricity prices. In view of this, the Directive 
states that Member States may grant State aid, i.e., national subsidies, for 
the benefit of sectors exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage due to 
higher electricity prices. Ten Member States grant such State aid,26 which 
must nevertheless comply with the EU’s State aid guidelines (requiring, in 
particular, that it does not give rise to distortions of competition within the 
EU’s internal market). This system will continue until 2030, but with much 
improved transparency. 
 
 
4.6 Fairness and aspects of solidarity 
The EU ETS creates a level-playing field for greenhouse gas reductions 
between EU companies within the EU’s internal market, leading to a cost- 
effective and efficient policy. However, it has had to be designed against the 
background of a wide per capita income disparity of more than a ratio of 
1:10 between the EU’s Member States. Striking the right balance between 
efficiency on the one hand and solidarity on the other has been of capital 
importance. 
The EU ETS has a general principle that auction revenues accrue to the 
Member States where the corresponding emissions are generated. However, 
a redistributive element has also been created. More precisely, 88% of allow- 
ances to be auctioned are distributed amongst Member States on the basis of 
their historical share of verified emissions, while 10% is distributed amongst 
certain Member States for the purpose of solidarity and growth. Up to 2020, 
a further 2% was distributed amongst Member States whose emissions were 
at least 20% below their Kyoto Protocol base-year emissions in 2005.27 This 
provision was specifically designed to benefit those Member States that had 
undergone substantial economic restructuring after the collapse of Commu- 
nism in Central and Eastern Europe. 
This distributional element was instrumental in mobilising political sup- 
port from all Member States and has proven to be a valuable tool very simi- 
lar to the system of free allowances for companies. Distributional elements 
have also been inserted in the revision of the legislation for the period from 
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Conclusion: The  EU  ETS  takes  into  account  fairness  considerations:  
a redistribution of auctioned allowances reflects income disparities 
between Member States; modernisation of the energy sector in lower- 
income Member States is encouraged through financial support; and 
lower-income Member States can opt for partial free allocation to the 
power sector in exchange for low-carbon investments. 
2021–2030. The 10% distribution was kept, but instead of the “Kyoto bonus” 
of 2%, a Modernisation Fund has been established. 
The Modernisation Fund benefits ten EU Member States with lower 
GDP.28 It consists of approximately 310 million allowances, which could 
increase by the mid-2020s by up to 75 million allowances if these are not 
used for free allocation to industry. The financial resources in the Mod- 
ernisation Fund will be distributed amongst lower-income Member States 
according to a key defined in Annex IIa to the EU ETS Directive.29 At least 
70% of the Fund’s resources will be used for priority projects in renewable 
electricity generation, improving energy efficiency (including in transport), 
buildings, agriculture and waste, energy storage and modernising energy 
networks. The Modernisation Fund will provide no support to energy 
generation facilities using solid fossil fuels (subject to a narrow exception 
for district heating systems in Romania and Bulgaria). Priority projects 
also include support for a “just transition” in “carbon-dependent” regions 
towards a low-carbon economy including redeployment, reskilling, educa- 
tion or job-seeking initiatives. 
The EU ETS also allows for national derogations from the general rule 
of auctioning in order to support the modernisation of the electricity sector 
in certain EU Member States. Eight Member States have made use of the 
derogation30 to allocate to electricity generators a number of allowances for 
free, provided corresponding investments are carried out. The total value 
of reported investment support during the years 2009–2016 is estimated to 
have been some €11 billion. About 80% of this was dedicated to upgrading 
and retrofitting infrastructure, while the rest of the investments were in clean 
technologies or diversification of supply. From 2021–2030, this possibility has 
been extended, and up to 700 million allowances are available to be used by 
Member States for this purpose. Investments carried out under this mecha- 
nism will generally be subject to competitive bidding, except for small-scale 
projects of a value below €12.5 million. 
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4.7 The use of auction revenues for low-carbon 
innovation and climate policies 
Economists start from the assumption that it is best to auction all allowances 
brought to the market. In reality, however, this is not as easy as assumed and 
therefore most emissions trading systems start with low levels of auctioning 
that are then gradually expanded. The EU ETS started in 2005 with a politi- 
cal decision that the large majority of allowances should be given out for 
free. However, from 2013, over half of all allowances have been auctioned – 
primarily to the power sector – that as a rule were no longer eligible for free 
allocation. From 2021 onwards, 57% of allowances will be auctioned. 
Emissions trading systems are intended to have price effects that flow 
through supply chains to the final consumer. There have been several studies 
on when and to what extent these signals are passed through.31 There has also 
been much discussion on whether companies were making additional profits 
by passing through to consumers the price of allowances that they received 
for free (so-called “windfall profits”). This was particularly highlighted in 
relation to the power sector, which explains why, from 2013, no free alloca- 
tion is given to power generators, except for some investment support in 
eight Member States, as explained earlier. 
An Auctioning Regulation fixes the rules for auctioning in detail.32 It is 
based on the principles that operators have full, fair and equitable market access, 
that the same information is available to everybody at the same time and that 
the organisation and participation in auctions is cost-efficient. An evolution 
took place from limited auctions by individual Member States to an EU-wide 
auctioning process using a common auction platform. The European Energy 
Exchange (EEX) based in Leipzig has been carrying out the role of the EU 
ETS common auction platform on behalf of 25 Member States. Germany, the 
UK and Poland have opted out of the common platform and have parallel 
auction platforms or arrangements. The common auction platform is the most 
significant auction process for environmental assets ever designed and imple- 
mented. So far, over 1000 auctions have been undertaken. 
The EU itself, with the help of the European Investment Bank, has also 
been involved in the sale of allowances through a provision of the Directive 
that allowed the market value of up to 300 million allowances to be used 
for investment in innovative renewable energy technologies and commercial 
demonstration plants of carbon capture and storage (CCS). This so-called 
“NER300” fund (referring to the New Entrant Reserve from which the 
300 million allowances came) resulted in around €2 billion being raised from 
the selling of these allowances.33 
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Conclusion: More than half of the allowances issued are auctioned 
according to harmonised market rules. Member States use some 80%  
of these revenues for climate action. An Innovation Fund has been set 
up with up to 500 million allowances to promote low-carbon innova- 
tion in the private sector. 
For 2021–2030, an Innovation Fund replaces the NER300 instrument 
and receives at least 450 million allowances. The proceeds will be used for 
promoting innovation in CCS technology in renewable energy and in indus- 
trial low-carbon processes and technologies. This could increase by a further 
50 million allowances by the mid-2020s if these are not used for free alloca- 
tion to industry. Overall, around €10 billion is expected to be available for 
the Innovation Fund.34 
Aside from the de facto “earmarking” of revenues at EU level under the 
NER300 and Innovation Fund, it is important to highlight that most of the 
money generated from auctions goes to Member States. European legislation 
states that at least half of auction revenues should be used by Member States 
to tackle climate change and a Declaration by Heads of State and Government 
from 2008 emphasises the willingness of Member States to do this.35 Between 
2012 and 2017, Member States received total auction revenue of €20.1 billion 
and approximately 80% of these revenues were used for specified climate- and 
energy-related purposes.36 Germany, for example, uses all its EU ETS revenues 
for its international and national climate funds, Spain for paying for renewable 
energy incentives, and France earmarks these revenues for improving the insula- 
tion of social housing. In 2018, total auction revenue amounted to €14.1 billion, 
although future revenues will be impacted by the reduction of volumes to be 
auctioned as the Market Stability Reserve begins to operate. 
 
 
 
4.8 The use of international credits 
In addition to establishing a price for greenhouse gas emissions in Europe, 
the EU ETS has also been the main driver for emission reduction projects37 
around the world. It has indeed been the main market for, or importer of, 
credits from the Kyoto Protocol’s project-based mechanisms, the Clean Devel- 
opment Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) and is estimated 
to be responsible for the use of approximately 1.6 billion international credits 
up to 2018.38 Billions of euros of investments took place through the CDM 
in sustainable development projects in developing countries, including, for 
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Conclusion: The EU ETS absorbed some 1.5 billion tonnes of international 
credits (CDM and JI). The EU was the main source of demand for such 
offset credits, which stimulated interest in market-based approaches in 
many countries. The EU decided on a reductions target for 2030 to be 
achieved domestically. 
example, in renewable energy investments. The sale of credits to operators 
with compliance obligations under the EU ETS has significantly facilitated 
the financing of such offset projects around the world. 
The EU initially relied solely upon the UNFCCC to generate and validate 
the offset credits. Exclusions were made, however, for credits based on projects 
where the emission reductions were not permanent, as is the case for forestry- 
based credits or for projects that were considered politically unacceptable, such 
as for new nuclear power stations. In the light of experience, the EU realised 
that it needed to improve its qualitative and quantitative conditions39 for the 
use of international credits. 
First, the experience showed that the UNFCCC structure was unable 
to enforce high environmental standards, and the EU always had qualitative 
conditions for credits to be used under the EU ETS.40 Additional quality 
standards were put in place in 2011 for projects involving HFC-23 destruc- 
tion and Adipic acid production.41 In the end, it was found necessary to pre- 
vent Joint Implementation credits that lacked credibility from being used for 
compliance purposes in the EU ETS.42 
Second, the influx of international credits also had a downside from a quan- 
titative perspective. Exactly at the moment that the economic crisis was creat- 
ing a surplus of allowances, a large amount of international credits entered the 
EU ETS. As is explained in Section 4.3, this influx of international credits fur- 
ther inflated the recession-induced surplus and led to the lower-than-expected 
carbon price in Europe for several years. It was vital that there was a quantita- 
tive limit on the overall quantity of credits that could enter the EU ETS. 
In 2014, the EU decided to define its 2030 target only in terms of a 40% 
domestic reduction commitment. This was consistent with the set-up of the 
Paris Agreement. The approach of the Kyoto Protocol has not been contin- 
ued and any new market for international credits will come from Article 6 of 
the Paris Agreement. Article 6 still needs to be operationalised in a way that 
rewards action going beyond national commitments and “business as usual.” 
The EU ETS will no longer be a source of demand for credits as long as the 
current legislation is not modified. 
 
86 Damien Meadows, et al. 
 
4.9 The prospect for international cooperation on 
carbon markets 
At the time of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, the international carbon market 
was conceived as something that would happen between the Parties in a 
“top-down” fashion. In the intervening 20 years it became clear that interna- 
tional carbon pricing was rather the result of choices by national and regional 
Governments to put obligations on certain economic actors in their jurisdic- 
tions rather than being driven by developments at the UN level. Businesses 
are more optimal actors in a carbon market than governments, as businesses 
know much better the real costs of abatement measures and technologies. 
The EU has led the way in developing actual carbon pricing through its 
emissions trading system. The EU ETS started in 2005, prior to the first com- 
mitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, although its design was completely 
compatible with UN requirements. While the UNFCCC process remains 
important in a general climate policy context, there has never been a serious 
attempt to establish a company-based emission trading system through UN 
institutions. The Paris Agreement does not even mention carbon pricing 
explicitly,43 despite its importance for tackling climate change. 
Over time, more countries have put in place carbon pricing. Romania 
and Bulgaria joined the EU ETS upon their accession to the EU in 2007, 
and Croatia joined from 2013 when it too became an EU Member State. 
The first formal linking of the EU ETS with States that were not Mem- 
ber States of the European Union was the extension to the neighbour- 
ing countries of the European Economic Area – Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein – in 2008. Furthermore, the EU is also linking its emissions 
trading system with Switzerland’s system, following agreement that was 
reached in the margins of the Paris Conference in December 2015. This 
is the first formal Treaty for linking carbon markets, and the adoption 
of the ratification Decision by the EU took place in 2017. The linking 
agreement will enter into force following ratification by both sides. 
This broader action, strongly encouraged by the Paris Agreement, is essen- 
tial. There is a growing recognition that the magnitude of the climate change 
challenge requires that a price be put on carbon, to create incentives for 
companies to invest in low-carbon activities. Many developed and develop- 
ing countries are developing plans to establish their own emissions trading 
systems. 
This is not to underestimate the political challenges to develop legislation 
to put a price on emissions, whether in the form of emissions trading or 
taxes on emissions. This has been amply experienced, for example through 
The EU Emissions Trading System 87 
 
 
 
 
 
 
British Columbia 
 
Oregon 
CANADA 
Alberta 
Saskatchewan 
Quebec 
 
Nova Scotia 
EU ETS 
 
 
SWITZERLAND 
 
 
UKRAINE 
 
 
 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
 
Tianjin 
Beijing 
 
 
 
 
SOUTH KOREA 
US 
California 
RGGI 
New Jersey 
TURKEY 
CHINA 
Chongqing 
Hubei  
Tokyo & Saitama 
Virginia  
Shenzhen 
 
Taiwan 
Shanghai 
MEXICO    
 
 
 
COLOMBIA 
 
TRINIDAD 
AND TOBAGO 
 
 
THAILAND 
Guangdong 
 
 
VIETNAM 
 
 
 
ETS in place 
 
ETS Being Designed 
 
 
CHILE 
 
 
 
SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
 
AUSTRALIA 
Carbon Tax with Offsets Being 
designed or in place 
Hybrid Carbon Pricing 
Linkages 
FIGURE 4.6 Carbon pricing initiatives in place or in development (February 2019). 
Source: International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) and International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP)45 
 
 
NEW ZEALAND 
88 Damien Meadows, et al. 
 
the United States’ inability to pass federal legislation to put a price on emis- 
sions over the last 20 years, despite a number of near successes.44 Australia 
established a national emissions trading system that would have been linked 
with the EU ETS, but a change in government halted their national system. 
Some of the most promising policy developments outside Europe today 
are happening in Asia. South Korea has a national greenhouse gas emis- 
sion trading system that was up and running as of January 2015. China has 
established seven pilot emissions trading systems, to be expanded into a 
nation-wide system by 2020.46 Experience of the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean 
Development Mechanism played an important role in enhancing under- 
standing of market-based approaches. 
New Zealand also has an emissions trading system that has been in opera- 
tion since 2008. In the United States, despite the failures at federal level, the 
northeastern states have been operating the Regional Greenhouse Gas Ini- 
tiative (RGGI) since 2009,47 and California has an emissions trading system 
operating since January 2013. Canada is developing a national carbon pricing 
system, building on the actions by Quebec, Nova Scotia and other provinces 
and complementing it with carbon taxes elsewhere. 
These national and sub-national experiences offer prospects for develop- 
ing an international carbon market. In the future, allowances could be traded 
across jurisdictions and a common carbon price could emerge within a wider 
geographical area. Just as the EU ETS has provisions for international credits, 
it also explicitly allows for the linking of carbon markets by means of “mutual 
recognition” of carbon allowances,48 through bilateral agreements between 
the EU and third countries or regions. The possibility of linking also extends 
to sub-national systems if this were considered desirable. 
The “bottom-up” development of an international carbon market via 
national legislation, as well as the linking agreements between them, inevita- 
bly takes time. Rules for monitoring, reporting and verification of emissions 
are a key infrastructure requirement for a carbon market to function properly. 
Similar to contemporary financial systems underpinned by robust accounting 
systems, carbon markets need a solid underpinning by an emissions account- 
ing system. The EU ETS installed a system of self-reporting by companies 
that is verified by independent third-party verifiers and this approach is being 
widely followed. One of the main lessons learnt from the EU ETS’s pilot- 
phase was the need for reliable industry-wide and plant-specific emissions 
data. There needs to be confidence that emissions are reliably measured with 
high accuracy, which comes from a well-developed set of rules enforced by 
competent authorities. 
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Conclusion: The EU and other countries such as China and Korea are 
putting carbon pricing in place. The EU ETS can be linked with other 
comparable systems, subject to adequate standards and safeguards. 
Such linking would facilitate the emergence of an international  
carbon price. 
In order to facilitate such a process, bilateral cooperation as well as pro- 
grammes such as the World Bank’s Partnership for Market Readiness and the 
International Carbon Action Partnership has proven to be very valuable.49 
The potential for working together and for more cost-effectiveness is there, 
but linking systems first needs robust and functioning cap-and-trade systems. 
With the launch of its national emissions trading system, China has become, 
along with the EU, a source of inspiration for other economies.50 They use 
the carbon market as an instrument to move from making commitments to 
delivering actual emission reductions, and their “learning by doing” will be 
invaluable to others. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The EU Emissions Trading System is of strategic importance to the EU 
because international commitments can be achieved cost-effectively and 
without adverse impacts on the competitiveness of European businesses. 
During the first 12 years of its existence, emissions covered by the system 
decreased by 26%. The EU ETS also demonstrated that it was able to pro- 
mote new jobs, expanding sectors concerned with the energy transition 
while preparing the EU economy for greater carbon constraint in the future. 
The EU ETS has been innovative but is also constantly evolving, as 
“learning-by-doing” and external economic conditions have developed rap- 
idly. In this respect, two key elements were of major importance: the nature 
and strictness of the overall emissions cap and the extent of the auctioning 
of allowances. 
The EU has an absolute cap determining the overall environmental ambi- 
tion of the system. The cap and a declining trajectory of emissions from 2013 
was set in a transparent manner before the start of every period. The political 
climate surrounding the cap decision has always been characterised by a gen- 
eral fear from industry that the cap would be set in too strict a manner. The 
EU experience illustrated how initially the cap-setting and free allocation has 
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a tendency to be overly generous. Once familiarity with the trading system 
and trust in the monitoring of emissions is established, the conditions are 
then set for a gradual tightening of the allocation conditions. The EU did 
not make the mistake of choosing an output-based cap, based on production 
levels, that gives no guaranteed environmental outcome while making the 
system overly complicated in its functioning. 
The other interesting evolution is the extent to which the EU ETS started 
as a system where allocations were almost all made for free, to one where over 
half of allocation is by auctioning. This transition, coupled with other reforms 
of the EU ETS, have resulted in the raising of significant amounts of revenue, 
as mentioned in Section 4.7 earlier. This has not only been an implementa- 
tion of the “polluter pays” principle but has also created a “double-dividend” 
whereby revenues generated are deployed to help innovation and deploy- 
ment of new technologies, for example, or to modernise energy systems and 
infrastructure, as well as finance capacity building in developing countries. 
Not only is pollution discouraged by the price of carbon, but the revenues 
generated by the EU ETS have also been used by Member States and the 
European Union for further enhancing climate action. Other than environ- 
mental taxes, few other policy tools have this “double-dividend” potential by 
virtue of the successful application of the instrument. 
The economic recession in Europe from 2009–2013 served to “road-test” 
the EU ETS more robustly than expected at the beginning of Phase-2 in 
2008. It demonstrated very clearly the way the EU ETS adjusted to the 
economic cycle, effectively lessening the cost burden on businesses during 
economically hard times. At the same time, the system was adapted in sev- 
eral ways: through adding the Market Stability Reserve, the strengthening 
of the Linear Reduction Factor, the continuation of free allocation to parts 
of industry on the basis of ambitious benchmarks or the extension of the 
Innovation Fund to industrial processes. Subtle redistributive elements have 
also ensured the support of stakeholders and governments in less wealthy 
Member States, who also understand that if the costs of abatement are lower 
in these countries then revenue flows will tend to gravitate towards them. 
To summarise, the last ten years and particularly the recent changes made 
in readiness for Phase-4 of the EU ETS (2021–2030) have seen a robust 
adaptation of the EU ETS that won wide support, including in the Coun- 
cil and European Parliament. Adjustments have enhanced the impact of the 
“double-dividend” in such a way as to strengthen fairness elements and the 
safeguards to maintain the competitiveness of European businesses, while 
maintaining the effectiveness of the environmental instrument itself. 
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5 
THE EFFORT SHARING 
REGULATION 
Artur Runge-Metzger and Tom Van Ierland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Despite the wide support for climate action in Europe, there is also a genuine 
concern about the socioeconomic impacts of the transition to a low-carbon 
economy. For that reason, avoiding higher transition costs than necessary for 
European businesses and consumers is of importance. Economists have always 
underlined the importance of reaching climate objectives at the lowest cost 
possible. 
In addition to cost-effectiveness comes fairness, which has many dimen- 
sions too. The EU accepts its responsibility as a group of developed countries, 
whose high level of development puts the onus on it to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions at a faster pace than other countries. Furthermore, there is also 
the dimension to address a fair distribution of effort between the EU’s Mem- 
ber States. Political decisions on the EU’s overall climate ambition, as well as 
on the individual greenhouse gas emission reduction targets of each Member 
State, have always been agreed unanimously. This requires great attention to 
the political, economic and industrial differences between Member States 
and the distributive impacts of the EU’s overall climate policy. 
This chapter looks more closely at the details of this differentiation of 
effort between Member States, more specifically in the sectors of the econ- 
omy not covered by the EU ETS. Through an equitable sharing of effort, 
over the past 20 years the EU has been able to demonstrate its continued 
commitment to global leadership on climate change. 
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5.1 Emissions from the non-ETS sectors 
While the EU ETS regulates the greenhouse gas emissions from large fixed 
installations, the Effort Sharing Decision1 and its successor, the Effort Shar- 
ing Regulation,2 regulates emissions of the sectors outside the scope of the 
EU ETS, the so-called “non-ETS sectors.” These emissions currently cover 
around 60% of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions. They typically come from 
a set of diffuse sources such as from road vehicles, the heating of private 
households and business premises, small- and medium-sized industry, agricul- 
ture, waste management facilities and products containing fluorinated gases 
(which are often powerful greenhouse gases). Their diffuse nature makes 
them less suitable to be readily incorporated into the EU ETS. 
Road transport is the largest source of these, representing more than a 
third of the emissions in the non-ETS sectors, followed by the heating of 
buildings and agriculture. The non-ETS sectors reduced their emissions 
 
 
Non ETS emissions in 2017 
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FIGURE 5.1 Main greenhouse gas emitting sectors of the non-ETS in 2017 
Source: EEA Trends and Projections report 2018, EEA GHG projections dataset 2018 
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more slowly than the EU ETS sectors. In the period from 2005–2017, road 
transport, heating, agriculture, waste and fluorinated gases achieved emission 
reductions of 11% in contrast to the 26% reduction realised by sectors cov- 
ered by the EU ETS. 
The EU’s emissions in the non-ETS sectors were stable during the period 
from 1990–2005, and they only started reducing significantly from 2007. 
The main reason for this lack of progress was the road transport emissions, 
which by 2007 had risen by 30% compared to their level in 1990. Emissions 
of fluorinated gases have grown by 60% since 1990, though this remains in 
absolute amounts much smaller than road transport’s CO
2  
emissions. As for 
the other non-ETS sectors, they have all managed to reduce their emissions, 
with waste, heating of buildings and agriculture reducing emissions by 42%, 
22% and 20% respectively by 2017, compared to 1990. After 2014, though, 
there has been a rebound in total non-ETS emissions, driven foremost by a 
reversal in transport emissions. 
There are important policies applicable to the non-ETS sectors, such as 
on road vehicles, buildings and agriculture. However, most of the policies that 
affect the emissions of these non-ETS sectors are determined by the Mem- 
ber States, such as national taxation policies, urban planning, transport and 
mobility policies, as well as the granting of environmental permits. Crucial 
for success in reducing greenhouse gas emissions is ensuring the coherence 
of policies at the respective levels of public intervention, from the European 
to the national or local level. If all pull together in the same direction, impres- 
sive results can be achieved. If there are inconsistencies, on the other hand, 
such as where company-car taxation favours cars and creates disincentives to 
use public transport, the combination of policies will be much less efficient. 
Mobilising policy levers at the right level of governance in a way consistent 
between different levels of governance is absolutely key to reduce emissions 
in these non-ETS sectors. 
Of course, all EU Member States have signed up to and ratified the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol and 
the Paris Agreement. It is for the Member States to take action themselves 
and to ensure the consistency of actions at different levels of governance. 
The European Union, for its part, endeavours to concentrate its efforts and 
regulate on those areas where there is a clear added value. Apart from the 
EU ETS, an important example in this respect is vehicle efficiency legisla- 
tion: not all Member States manufacture cars, yet cars are widely sold and 
used across the EU. As a consequence, there is strong logic for the EU to 
regulate the emissions performance of cars, whereas the promotion of pub- 
lic transport or of cycling in urban areas, for example, is more coherently 
managed at the local level. 
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5.2 Effort Sharing 2013–2020 
In view of a coherent policy framework at European level, Member States 
adopted in 2002 a so-called “Burden Sharing Agreement”3 for the period 
from 2008–2012. It shared their joint commitment taken under the Kyoto 
Protocol, covering all emissions of the economy. Furthermore, these “Burden 
Sharing” targets for Member States could also be met through offset credits 
from the Clean Development Mechanism.4 However, in view of the creation 
of the EU ETS and its uniform carbon price applicable across a large share of 
the emissions of each Member State, it was not straightforward to continue 
this method of sharing national targets for all emissions, including those of 
the EU ETS, beyond the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
5.2.1 Setting differentiated targets 
That is why in 2008 the Commission proposed the EU’s “Effort Sharing 
Decision,”5 which “extracted” the EU ETS from targets set for Member 
States, leaving the differentiated national targets only covering the non-ETS 
sectors for the period from 2013–2020. Targets in 2013 were determined as 
being what a Member State’s average emissions were in the years 2008, 2009 
and 2010, while 2020 targets were expressed as a percentage change com- 
pared to 2005.6 Finally, intermediate targets were defined as a linear extrapo- 
lation between the 2013 and 2020 targets. 
The concern to ensure fairness was at the heart of the 2020 target-setting 
exercise. Member States with high income levels, expressed through their relative 
ranking above the EU average in GDP per capita terms in 2005,7 were required to 
reduce emissions compared to 2005 by a maximum of 20%. Conversely, Member 
States with lower per capita GDP where allowed to reduce emissions by less than 
the EU average, i.e., almost 10% below 2005 levels. Thirteen Member States 
were allowed to increase their emissions by 2020 compared to 2005, up to a 
maximum of plus 20%. That maximum applied for Bulgaria, which had, and still 
has, the lowest per capita income of any EU Member State. 
 
Conclusion: Non-ETS sectors give rise to emissions from a variety of 
sectors unsuitable for inclusion into EU ETS. Action at EU level must be 
accompanied by national and municipal policies and measures. Reduc- 
tions in emissions have proven more difficult to realise, and a significant 
reinforcement of these will be required in the future. 
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FIGURE 5.2 2020 national Effort Sharing targets compared to 2005, resulting 
from the methodology in relation to 2005 GDP per capita 
Source: European Commission calculations based on Eurostat and reported GHG emissions 
taken from Impact Assessment of Effort Sharing Regulation8 
 
 
For an overview of the distribution of the 2020 non-ETS Member States’ 
targets, see Figure 5.2. 
 
5.2.2 Developing more elements of redistribution 
This differentiation allowed the comparatively lower income Member States 
to increase emissions in sectors where consumption levels and associated 
emission levels were typically still well below the EU average, such as in 
transport. Overall, the 2020 climate and energy package had several of these 
redistributional elements included. Not only were the non-ETS greenhouse 
gas reduction targets differentiated by taking into account different income 
levels, but so were the 2020 renewable energy targets for each Member State. 
However, the lower income Member States, which typically had a more 
carbon inefficient industrial structure, were covered by the EU ETS that 
effectively harmonised effort for all participants irrespective of where they 
were located (see Chapter 4). For example, a steel plant in a lower income 
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Member State was subject to the same free allocation rules and stringency, 
as well as the same carbon price, as its counterparts in higher income Mem- 
ber States. Although the EU ETS created a level playing field for all indus- 
tries, there was provision made for the redistribution of auctioning revenues 
towards lower income Member States, allowing them to compensate for the 
costs of modernisation of their economies. 
These redistributional elements were a strong requirement for several 
Member States to be able to accept the overall architecture of 2020 climate 
and energy targets. The Impact Assessment accompanying the 2020 climate 
and energy proposals9 indicated clearly that a target setting exercise within 
the EU based on cost-efficiency only would have, in relative terms, higher 
cost impacts on lower income Member States than higher income ones. By 
applying the redistributional elements of target differentiation and auctioning 
revenue redistribution, cost impacts were projected to be distributed much 
more equally between Member States as a share of GDP per capita, as is shown 
in Figure 5.3. 
 
5.2.3 Experience to date 
In 2017, emissions in the non-ETS sectors were around 11% below 2005 
levels. This makes the non-ETS sectors already in line with their 2020 target 
of minus 10% compared to 2005 levels. The non-ETS sectors are expected 
to maintain this over-compliance through to 2020, but there is no reason 
to be complacent. Emissions went as low as −14% in 2014, but rebounded 
in 2015, 2016 and 2017. With significantly lower oil prices and higher eco- 
nomic growth, emissions in the road transport resumed; weather conditions 
also resulted in increased emissions. 
This underlines that solid implementation of existing policies remains of 
the greatest importance. Transport is a good example. Legislation at the EU 
level, notably those related to CO
2 
standards for passenger cars, improves the 
efficiency of the car fleet over time. However, Member States have a critical 
task to complement these efforts with other policies, such as fuel and road 
pricing policies to manage transport demand. Similarly restructuring of the 
Common Agricultural Policy, such as tackling the overproduction of certain 
agriculture produce and productivity gains, have led to reductions in green- 
house gas emissions. Nevertheless, further focused mitigation actions will be 
needed and in this context Member States have resources available for rural 
development programmes under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural 
Development (EAFRD). Finally, EU measures in the context of the Energy 
Performance for Buildings Directive10 and Ecodesign measures11 have signifi- 
cantly improved the insulation of new buildings and the efficiency of newly 
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installed boilers. With the relatively low replacement rates of the building 
stock, however, Member States still have a strong role to play in incentivising 
energy efficiency improvements and reductions in greenhouse gas emissions 
for existing buildings. 
Ex post evaluation of climate policies indicates that the strongest driv- 
ers for emission reductions have been driven by innovation in low-carbon 
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Conclusion: In the period from 2013–2020, fairness was primarily 
achieved through the differentiation of targets for Member States on 
the basis of GDP per capita and the partial redistribution of auctioning 
revenues under the EU ETS. Flexible arrangements facilitated the deliv- 
ery of the targets in a cost-effective manner. 
technologies, such as renewable energy, as well as raising productivity and 
efficiency in the economy. Structural change between economic sectors, such 
as away from manufacturing towards services, has so far had only a marginal 
effect on reductions of greenhouse gas emissions across the EU.13 
 
5.2.4 Flexible provisions 
While the EU is in overall compliance with its 2020 targets, not all individual 
Member States are (Figure 5.4). A number of Member States with relatively 
deep reduction targets are expected to have shortfalls for achieving their tar- 
gets domestically by 2020. Malta, which has a target that allows it to increase 
emissions by 5% compared to 2005, is expected to have a shortfall. 
The Effort Sharing Decision recognises that it may be difficult for all 
Member States to achieve their targets domestically every single year, due to 
the inherent variability of emissions, for instance related to heating. There- 
fore, a number of flexibilities are explicitly allowed. There is flexibility within 
the period, notably the possibility of “banking” over-compliance in one year 
to the next and limited “borrowing” from the emission allocations of future 
years, both within the period until 2020. 
In case these “banking” and “borrowing” flexibilities would not be suf- 
ficient, “trade” is also allowed, whereby a Member State in shortage can buy 
part of the over-delivery of another one. This trade is also potentially an 
incentive to invest in overachieving targets in Member States where reduc- 
tions can be achieved at lower costs. 
For the period from 2012–2020 however, this incentive is not expected 
to be significant as the EU as a whole is expected to deliver its target. Only 
a few Member States are expected to miss their target domestically over 
the whole period. For the three-year 2013–2015 period, 27 Member States 
achieved their targets. Only Malta’s emissions exceeded the target for each of 
these three years. Malta has therefore already used the flexibility provisions 
under the Effort Sharing Decision, including the acquisition of tonnes of 
overachievement from other Member States that were in over-compliance. 
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FIGURE 5.4 Projected 2020 relative gap between emissions and Effort Sharing targets (in % of 2005 base year emissions); 
negative and positive values respectively indicate over-delivery and shortfall 
Source: 2018 Progress Report, European Commission14 
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5.3 Differentiation and flexibilities allowed for 
2021–2030 
As part of its overall strategy, the 2014 European Council endorsed the 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction target for 2030 of 30% for the non- 
ETS sectors and the continuation of the approach to differentiate targets 
between Member States. However, a number of additional elements were 
added. A correction was suggested for the target differentiation within the 
group of higher income Member States. Additional flexibility was added 
related to the EU ETS and the so-called “Land Use, Land Use Change and 
Forestry” sector, covering emissions and absorption of CO
2 
from the differ- 
ent land use sectors, mainly the agriculture and forestry sectors. 
 
5.3.1 Continuation of the differentiated target approach 
The methodology of target setting based on GDP per capita as followed for 
2020 would be continued. Given that the target was increased by 20% from 
2020 to 2030, the target range also had to be increased by 20%, resulting in 
a range for 2030 between 0% to −40% compared to 2005 emission levels. 
The target setting for 2030 required an update of the 2005 GDP per 
capita data as some Member States suffered significantly during the eco- 
nomic recession that started from 2008. Therefore, GDP per capita data 
from 2013 were used, and this resulted in a differentiation as represented 
in the blue (lower) line in Figure 5.5. 
For some Member States, this clearly shows the impact of the economic 
downturn. For instance, using 2005 GDP per capita, Spain was very close to 
the EU average GDP per capita, resulting in a target similar to the overall EU 
ambition level for 2020. However, when setting the 2030 targets, using 2013 
GDP per capita, the impact of the economic recession resulted in Spain having 
a GDP per capita below the EU average. This therefore resulted in a lower 
2030 target for Spain compared to the EU’s overall ambition level for 2030. 
A contrasting example is Germany, which for 2020 received a target equal to 
France, but which, based on 2013 GDP per capita, received a target 1% more 
ambitious than France for 2030, underlining the stronger economic perfor- 
mance of Germany compared to France over the period from 2005–2013. 
 
5.3.2 More differentiation amongst higher income 
Member States 
The European Council also asked that, within the group of higher 
income Member States, the targets would reflect relative differences in the 
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FIGURE 5.5 Comparison between 2020 targets and 2030 targets applying 
updated methodology 
Source: European Commission calculations based on Eurostat and reported GHG emissions, 
taken from Impact Assessment of Effort Sharing Regulation15 
 
 
cost-effectiveness of achieving reductions. Some higher income Member 
States did have concerns arising from particularly high marginal abatement 
costs within their Member State. 
To operationalise this request, different scenarios were constructed compar- 
ing projections of potential emission reductions under “cost-efficient and with 
existing policies” situations with the proposed targets based on GDP per capita. 
Figure 5.6 shows the results. A positive number indicates that cost-effective, cur- 
rent policy baseline projections show a gap between emissions and the proposed 
targets, while negative numbers indicate that there would be an overachievement 
of the respective target by 2030. 
What clearly emerged from this analysis was that two higher income Mem- 
ber States, Ireland and Luxembourg, showed a particularly large gap of 15% 
or more in all scenarios of what they were likely to achieve cost-effectively 
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FIGURE 5.6 Gap between GDP-based 2030 targets and cost-efficient emis- 
sion reductions for high income Member States (as a % of 2005 
emissions) 
Source: Commission calculations based on PRIMES, GAINS, Eurostat and EEA 2015 
 
and with existing policies. A second group of higher income Member States, 
namely Austria, Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands also tended to have 
a large gap, although below 15%. Three Member States, UK, Germany and 
France showed no gap or a small gap of around 5% or less. Finally, two higher 
income Member States, Sweden and Finland, had a gap that varied depend- 
ing on which set of scenarios was used. 
These significant differences were acknowledged and targets where therefore 
adjusted for Ireland and Luxembourg, reducing them by 9%. Targets for Austria, 
Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands where also reduced, albeit by a much 
smaller amount of 3%. For Sweden and Finland, no target adjustment was made, 
while for the UK, Germany and France the target was increased by 1%. Overall, 
this resulted in a basically unchanged target in terms of overall ambition level 
within this group of higher income Member States. However, the refined differ- 
entiation recognised that some Member States had a bigger challenge than others 
to achieve a target based purely on a GDP per capita basis. 
 
5.3.3 Towards the convergence of per capita 
emissions by 2030 
The negotiation on the precise differentiation of the targets resulted in a bal- 
anced outcome leading to the 30% target compared to 2005 for the EU as a 
whole. These 2030 targets take into account the differences in capacity to act 
between the diverse EU Member States. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SE DE FI FR AT DK BE NL IE LU UK 
The Effort Sharing Regulation 107 
 
TABLE 5.1 2030 targets compared to 2005 emission levels for non-ETS sectors per 
Member State 
 
LU −40% NL −36% MT −19% LT −9% 
SE −40% AT −36% PT −17% PL −7% 
DK −39% BE −35% EL −16% HR −7% 
FI −39% IT −33% SI −15% HU −7% 
DE −38% IE −30% CZ −14% LV −6% 
FR −37% ES −26% EE −13% RO −2% 
UK −37% CY −24% SK −12% BG 0% 
Source: Annex 1 of Effort Sharing Regulation (EU) 2018/842 
 
 
 
Table 5.1 gives an overview of what was finally adopted in the Effort 
Sharing Regulation.16 
Crucial to note is that analysis shows the final outcome also leads to a 
stronger convergence between the levels of allowed per capita emissions by 
2030 compared to 2020. By 2030, 21 Member States are projected to have 
an allocated emissions level per capita within a range of one tonne above or 
below the EU average (see lower part in Figure 5.7). Of course, the eventual 
emissions per capita in 2030 will depend on effective reductions achieved and 
the extent to which Member States employ the flexibilities that are allowed 
(e.g., transfers, as explained earlier). 
One can nevertheless conclude that the discussion on differentiated target 
setting was most worthwhile as it delivered not only a political agreement but 
also fairness over time by opening a path towards significant convergence in 
per capita emissions within the EU. 
 
5.3.4 The starting point 
Compliance targets are actually set for every year, expressed as Annual Emis- 
sions Allocations,17 starting in the year 2021. Annual Emissions Allocations in 
the period between 2021 and 2030 are then defined, by a linear interpolation, 
on a straight line between the starting point and the 2030 end point. The start- 
ing level denominated in quantities of tonnes of CO
2
-equivalent is the average 
of 2016, 2017 and 2018 emissions in the non-ETS, these being the most recent 
emissions known in the year 2020 when the absolute amounts of Annual Emis- 
sions Allocations will be determined. It was decided that the precise starting 
point of the trajectory over time would be between 2019 and 2020.18 
This starting point was a difficult compromise between two positions as 
represented in a stylised fashion in Figure 5.8. 
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FIGURE 5.7 Per capita emissions in the non-ETS sectors in 2005 and projected 
per capita allowed emissions in the non-ETS sectors by 2030 
Source: Commission calculations based on PRIMES, and GAINS.19 For 2005, LU and IE emis- 
sions per capita are 21.5 and 11.6 tonnes per capita respectively. 
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FIGURE 5.8 Stylised representation of possible extreme options to set the starting 
point in 2021 for the Annual Emissions Allocation and the subse- 
quent linear target trajectory to the 2030 target 
Source: Stylised graphic by co-author 
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One school argued that as climate policies take time to have their full 
effect, emissions will continue to decrease below their average level in the 
years 2016–2018. If the starting point would be set in 2020 at the average 
of 2016–2018 emission levels as represented by the red line, then one would 
expect targets in the early years of the decades to be overachieved. Member 
States would then be allowed to build up surpluses in the non-ETS that 
would reduce the incentive to take further action to effectively achieve their 
2030 target. Indeed, through the banking of Annual Emissions Allocations 
they could deviate from their target later in the period from 2021–2030. 
Therefore, they proposed to start the target trajectory earlier, for instance in 
2017 as represented by the green line in the following figure. This would 
guarantee a gradual reduction of emissions and reduce the risk for a build-up 
of surpluses early in the period from 2021–2030. 
However, others pointed out that this approach would be flawed if, for 
some reason, emissions increase or did not decrease sufficiently over the 
period from 2017–2021. In such a case, the non-ETS sectors would imme- 
diately start the period with a deficit in 2021, even in situations where the 
Member State was fully in-line with its non-ETS targets for the period up 
to 2020. 
Although this would not normally be expected to happen to the EU as a 
whole – though note that emissions did rebound in 2015, 2016 and 2017 – 
this situation could arise for a number of Member States individually and 
confront them with a circumstance whereby they would need to acquire 
surplus Annual Emissions Allocations early in the period from other Member 
States. However, these other Member States may either not have been able to 
build up any surpluses or may not feel confident enough to sell any surpluses 
already. This school argued that this formulation of the starting point would 
put unreasonable pressure on the system. 
 
5.3.5 Flexibility with the Emissions Trading System 
The European Council had also suggested introducing flexibility related 
to the EU ETS. This would be available only for higher income Member 
States and specifically those that foresaw difficulty in achieving their targets 
domestically. 
Such Member States would be allowed to transfer a limited amount of 
allowances from the EU ETS, which they would normally auction, into the 
“Effort Sharing” and swap for allocations for the non-ETS sectors. As such, 
the Member States concerned would see their auctioning revenue decrease. 
The total amount of this flexibility is limited to 100 million allowances20 over 
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the period of ten years, which equates to the equivalent of less than 0.5% of 
the expected Annual Emissions Allocations in the non-ETS sectors over the 
period from 2021–2030. 
The distribution of access to this flexibility provision within the group 
of higher income Member States followed the same reasoning as the adjust- 
ments of targets within this group. Ireland and Luxembourg, countries with 
the biggest projected gap with their targets are allowed the highest extent of 
access to this flexibility, equivalent to 4% of 2005 emissions per annum.21 The 
UK, Germany and France have no gap in the projections, or a limited one, 
and get no access to this flexibility. All other higher income Member States 
(Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Sweden) have access 
equivalent to 2% of 2005 emissions per annum. 
Malta is the only lower income Member State that can use this flexibility, 
at a rate of 2% of 2005 emissions per annum. The reason is that Malta is the 
Member State with the lowest per capita emissions in the non-ETS sectors, 
and this would result in emissions of below two tonnes per person in 2030. 
Together with the fact that it is the most densely populated Member State, 
Malta sees its mitigation target as potentially challenging. Allowing access to 
this one-off mechanism takes account of this specific circumstance. 
 
5.3.6 Flexibility to land use change and forestry sectors 
The second innovative flexibility with respect to the non-EU ETS sectors 
is related to “Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry” (LULUCF). This 
establishes a link between the non-ETS sectors and the specific sectors regu- 
lated under the Regulation on the inclusion of greenhouse gas emissions and 
removals from land use, land use change and forestry in the 2030 climate and 
energy framework22 (see also Chapter 8). This LULUCF Regulation foresees 
that Member States should ensure the absorptions and removals of emissions 
in the LULUCF sectors are not deteriorating compared to unchanged policy. 
Overall, it is expected that these sectors will actually absorb carbon, reducing 
atmospheric concentrations. If Member States perform better than expected 
this gives rise to the generation of LULUCF “credits,” for instance due to the 
planting of new forests (afforestation) or due to the adaption of agriculture 
practices that improve the carbon retention of soil. 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, and notably during the period from 2008– 
2012, Member States were allowed to fully use any such credits to com- 
pensate for emissions in other economic sectors. The LULUCF accounting 
rules that defined when credits could be generated were often seen as too lax, 
resulting in significant amounts of credits generated. Subsequently, under EU 
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legislation for the period from 2012–2020, these credits could not be used to 
achieve targets in the EU ETS or non-ETS sectors. Several Member States 
saw this as an undue limitation of their ability to fulfil their climate change 
commitments and as a discouragement for additional action in the land use 
sector. Another group of Member States opposed the use of such credits in 
other sectors, fearing it would undermine the real reduction of emissions due 
to their temporary nature and thereby delay the necessary transition towards 
a low-carbon economy. 
The legislation for 2020–2030 retained flexibility while addressing both 
concerns. First, the LULUCF accounting rules have built further upon those 
defined under the Kyoto Protocol but have improved them to avoid undue 
crediting. Second, while flexibility was allowed between the LULUCF sec- 
tor and notably the non-ETS sector, a limitation was put on the quantity of 
credit allowed to be used for compliance purposes in the non-ETS sectors. 
This was set at 280 million tonnes for the EU over the ten-year period from 
2021–2030, or on average 28 million per year. This will ensure that there is 
still need for strong reductions in the non-ETS sectors. 
On the other hand, those Member States with a large agriculture sec- 
tor have relatively greater access to these LULUCF credits. This recognises 
that agriculture is expected to reduce its non-CO
2 
emissions less than other 
economic sectors by 2030 but, on other hand, it has more potential to take 
action to increase absorptions or reduce emissions in the LULUCF sectors. 
In effect, by this limited link, the non ETS sectors give further incentives to 
take action in the land sector, for instance to enhance the “sink” functions 
linked to agriculture. 
All Member States have access to this flexibility, but they are grouped 
into three categories. Member States with a historic share of agriculture 
emissions in the non-ETS sectors of more than 25% have potential access 
to LULUCF credits equivalent to 15% of historic agriculture emissions. 
Only four countries qualify for this degree of access: Ireland, Lithuania, 
Denmark and Latvia. Member States with the lowest share of agriculture 
emissions in the non-ETS sectors only have potential access to the equiva- 
lent of 3.75% of the agriculture emissions; and the middle category to 7.5% 
of agriculture emissions. For a detailed overview of this distribution, see 
Table 5.2. 
If used to its maximum extent, this flexibility represents the equivalent of 
1% of the annual emissions of the non-ETS sectors in 2005. Furthermore, 
these LULUCF credits cannot be traded between Member States in the ful- 
filment of their non-ETS sector’s obligations and can only be taken into 
account if a Member State would otherwise not be in compliance. These 
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TABLE 5.2 Distribution per Member State of maximum allowed LULUCF credits 
for potential use to comply with non-ETS targets 
 
 
Share of agriculture 
non-CO
2 
emissions 
in non- ETS 
Average annual limit 
of LULUCF credits 
for compliance in the 
Estimate on maximum 
limit of LULUCF 
credits that can be 
Average 
annual 
limit of 
sectors 2008– Non ETS as a % of used in the non-ETS LULUCF 
2012* annual 2008–2012 over the period from credits as a 
 agriculture emissions 2021–2030 in % of annual 
  million tonnes** 2005 non- 
   ETS emissions 
EU 16% 6% −280 1.0% 
IE 40% 15% −26.8 5.6% 
LT 28% 15% −6.5 5.0% 
DK 27% 15% −14.6 4.0% 
LV 25% 15% −3.1 3.8% 
RO 24% 7.5% −13.2 1.7% 
BG 21% 7.5% −4.1 1.5% 
FR 20% 7.5% −58.2 1.5% 
EE 20% 7.5% −0.9 1.7% 
FI 18% 7.5% −4.5 1.3% 
ES 18% 7.5% −29.1 1.3% 
SE 16% 7.5% −4.9 1.1% 
CY 16% 7.5% −0.6 1.3% 
EL 16% 7.5% −6.7 1.1% 
PT 16% 7.5% −5.2 1.0% 
NL 15% 7.5% −13.4 1.1% 
SI 15% 7.5% −1.3 1.1% 
PL 15% 7.5% −21.7 1.2% 
HU 14% 3.75% −2.1 0.5% 
SK 14% 3.75% −1.2 0.5% 
UK 13% 3.75% −17.8 0.4% 
HR 13% 3.75% −0.9 0.5% 
AT 13% 3.75% −2.5 0.4% 
BE 13% 3.75% −3.8 0.5% 
DE 13% 3.75% −22.3 0.5% 
CZ 11% 3.75% −2.6 0.4% 
IT 10% 3.75% −11.5 0.3% 
MT 8% 3.75% −0.03 0.3% 
LU 7% 3.75% −0.25 0.2% 
* Rounded to the nearest percentage 
** Calibrated to match 280 million tonnes 
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Conclusion: Differentiation of emissions reduction targets based on GDP 
per capita continues through to 2030, thereby considerably enhancing 
the convergence of emissions per person between the EU’s Member 
States. Additional flexibility is introduced from 2021 without compro- 
mising the delivery, the overall fairness or as the cost-effectiveness of the 
EU’s domestic target. 
conditions further limit the extent to which LULUCF credits may be used, 
thereby reinforcing the safeguards of ensuring sufficient action is taken in the 
non-ETS sectors to reduce emissions. 
 
5.3.7 Flexibility linked to earlier overachievement 
One final additional flexibility provision was introduced to recognise early action 
in limiting emissions for Member States with income levels in 2013 below 
the EU average. It applies only to Member States that overachieve their tar- 
gets in the period from 2013–2020, often generating considerable surpluses. The 
Regulation does not allow “carry over” of such surpluses to ensure the over- 
all environmental integrity of the scheme. Instead in order to recognise these 
efforts, a limited “safety reserve” was created of a maximum of 105 million tonnes 
of CO
2
-equivalent for the whole period from 2021–2030 to be distributed to 
those lower income Member States that do not achieve their 2026–2030 targets, 
proportional to their overachievement in the period from 2021–2030. 
Instead, “safety reserve” can, however, only be used if the non-ETS sectors 
across the EU as a whole meet the EU’s target for 2030.As this will be known 
only at the end of the period, it would be hazardous for any Member State 
to rely too much upon using previous overachievements (prior to 2020) in 
the period from 2021–2030. 
 
5.3.8 The 2030 targets as adopted 
The combined flexibilities described in this chapter reduce the extent to 
which certain Member States would need to depend on transfers from other 
Member States. Each Member State knows its 2030 target as well as the max- 
imum amount of EU ETS and LULUCF credit flexibilities it is allowed to 
access. Figure 5.9 summarises the finally allocated 2030 targets and the access 
each Member States has to the LULUCF and EU ETS flexibility (expressed 
as an annual percentage of annual emissions per annum). 
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ESR targets and maximum one-off ETS/non-ETS and land use flexibilities 
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FIGURE 5.9 Member States’ 2030 reduction targets in the non-ETS sectors 
as well as maximum amount of EU ETS flexiblity and LULUCF 
credit flexibility per Member State 
Source: European Commission: https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/effort/proposal_en 
 
 
Conclusion 
A comprehensive climate strategy for the EU as a whole required the incor- 
poration of fairness and the accommodation of distributive impacts between 
the Member States. This has been a complex task, both politically and tech- 
nically, for which the EU has been a pioneer, as no other countries have 
such legally binding targets in place. Fairness is itself not simple to ensure, 
yet it has been introduced through the differentiation of obligations, as well 
as with respect to the flexibilities allowed. As a result, 28 sovereign Member 
States could unanimously agree on one common climate policy, despite their 
different levels of economic development, different industrial strategies and 
different energy systems with varying degrees of dependence on fossil fuels. 
The “Burden Sharing” of the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period 
(2008–2012) was decided before the EU ratified the Protocol in 2002. For 
the 2020 targets it was the Effort Sharing Decision that continued this pro- 
cess, although materially different in that the scope excluded those sectors 
covered by the EU ETS. The latest phase of this fairness exercise is the 
Effort Sharing Regulation from 2021 to 2030, adding flexibilities driven by 
the need to take account of specific circumstances of Member States, as well 
as recognition of efforts in the land use sectors, while limiting the risks to 
environmental integrity. 
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At the same time, the overall level of ambition was increased substantially, 
in line with the contribution under the Paris Agreement, but still under- 
pinned by solid considerations of cost-efficiency. The sharing of obligations 
was informed and refined on the basis of economic modelling and factual 
analysis. One important prerequisite was the availability of clear, straightfor- 
ward factual information that the EU had already developed as part of its 
obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. 
The bottom-up nature of the Paris Agreement allows for significant dif- 
ferentiation, but significantly more ambition will be needed in the future. 
The EU’s example of differentiation could be informative for other big 
nations with a federal structure to develop internal policies in a similar man- 
ner. Equally, groups of nations could act together and differentiate their 
efforts, but this requires political trust and a common governance system to 
provide solid and comparable data, elements of which are provided for under 
the “rulebook” of the Paris Agreement as agreed at COP24 in Katowice. 
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Introduction 
Although energy policy has been at the core of the European project since 
the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and 
European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), both in the late 1950s, 
it was not until the amendments to the Treaty agreed in Lisbon in 2009 that 
a provision specifically on energy was included. Article 194 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union links the Union’s energy policy 
with the “need to preserve and improve the environment.” 
The Articles on the environment in the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union had been introduced much earlier, by the Single European 
Act in 1986. Although most measures relating to the environment are decided 
by the ordinary legislative procedure and qualified majority in the Council, 
Article 192, relating to the environment, also referred to decisions being 
taken unanimously on “measures significantly affecting a Member State’s 
choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its 
energy supply.” Unlike environmental measures, therefore, decisions related 
to the energy mix were singled out for decision by unanimity. 
From the start, climate change and energy policies were inextricably linked 
because of the importance of the use of fossil fuels. This coincided with the 
common concern as regards the EU’s dependence on imported energy. In 
2015, 88% of oil, 69% of gas and 64% of coal was imported, representing net 
fossil fuel dependency of 79%. By 2030, imports could even increase to 94% 
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for oil and 83% for gas. An integrated climate and energy policy could help 
reduce the EU’s over reliance on fossil fuels. 
The five-year mandate of the European Commission that started in 2015 
included amongst its ten political priorities, “a resilient Energy Union with 
a forward-looking climate change policy.” The aim of this priority was to 
strengthen the coherence between the energy and climate files, as well as 
to “mainstream” climate change into most other EU policies. This chapter 
focuses on how the policy toolbox has evolved towards making energy more 
secure, affordable and sustainable. 
 
6.1 Renewable energy 
 
6.1.1 A binding EU-wide target 
Along with its target for greenhouse gas emissions, the European Union set 
itself a target of 20% renewables in the energy mix by 2020. In 2007, the 
European Council also agreed that this 20% renewable energy target should 
be translated into binding renewable energy targets for each of the Member 
States, “taking account of different national starting points and potentials, 
including the existing level of renewable energies and energy mix.”1 
The Commission’s initial approach to address fairness was to estimate the 
technological potential of each Member State to define such national renew- 
able energy targets. However, this approach suffered from a lack of transparent 
data that the Member States could easily agree with. Therefore, fairness was 
implemented in another way. First, the “gap” was calculated between where 
the EU was at the time (8.7% renewable share in 2005) and its target of 20% 
in 2020. Half of this gap of 11.3% would be shared equally across all Member 
States (a flat rate of 5.75% was used), and the other half was shared amongst 
Member States on a GDP per capita basis. This implemented “fairness” insofar 
as every Member State had an element of the same flat-rate increase, seen by 
some as fair, combined with each country having a GDP per capita compo- 
nent that reflected its relative wealth, seen by others as fair. In this approach, 
richer Member States had to do more. 
Mindful that these renewable targets had not been determined in such 
a way as to ensure their cost-efficiency, the Renewable Energy Directive of 
2009 created cooperation mechanisms, whereby Member States would be 
able to reallocate overachievement by one in favour of an under-achievement 
by another – implicitly in exchange for payment. It was well understood that 
the marginal cost of achieving the last 1% towards the 20% goal would be 
considerably higher than the 1% increase from, say, 9% to 10%. To date, these 
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cooperation mechanisms have not been frequently used, but they remain 
available for the fulfilment of national targets through to 2020 and beyond. 
Some Member States are indeed overachieving and others under-achieving 
their 2020 targets, so the use of cooperation mechanisms is likely to increase 
(see Figure 6.1). 
The policy of translating the overall EU target into binding contribu- 
tions for each Member State worked well. In 2017, renewable energy had 
a 17.5% share of final energy consumption, which compares well with its 
target of 20% by 2020. Thanks to the significant over-delivery in a few 
Member States, the 20% target is likely to be achieved. In 2014, however, the 
European Council decided on an EU target for renewable energy of 27% for 
2030 and dropped the need for a binding renewable energy target for each 
Member State. As time progressed, the legislators decided in 2018 to increase 
the EU-wide target for renewable energy in 2030 to 32%, with a possible 
upward review by 2023.2 
The explanation for this change of approach is twofold. First, Member 
States were still free to set such binding national targets for themselves if they 
wished to. For 2020, the EU fixed an overall target for renewable energy and 
greenhouse gas reductions and gave each Member State individual legally 
binding targets in order to reach the overall EU renewable energy and cli- 
mate targets. In the 2030 perspective, Member States have been given greater 
freedom in how they meet their climate targets, wishing to reach them at 
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FIGURE 6.1 The development of renewable energy in the EU, 2005–2030 
Source: Eurostat and PRIMES model BAU projections as at 2016 
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the lowest cost possible. The political reality was also that there was a lack 
of sufficient support for national binding renewable targets. The delivery of 
the 2020 renewable energy targets by Member States had required significant 
financial incentives, agreed in the context of the EU budget negotiations, 
which led to debate and sometimes controversy. Today, however, this situ- 
ation has changed significantly insofar as the additional cost of renewable 
energy has fallen substantially, as illustrated in Figure 6.2. This cost reduction 
happened in large part through the significant expansion of the market, not 
least as a result of the existence of binding national targets for renewable 
energy. 
The other reason for the change in policy with regard to binding renew- 
able energy targets was that the renewables were increasingly affecting power 
generation markets and networks. The emergence of renewable electricity 
challenged the business model of fossil and nuclear generators and Member 
States needed to take a range of steps to integrate renewables, while main- 
taining the continuity of electricity supply. By 2014, renewable energy had 
become a significant player instead of an isolated future-oriented niche. The 
internal market was playing an increasing role in electricity markets, but not 
in renewable energy support schemes, that were designed within each Mem- 
ber State and tailored to national circumstances. The policy question shifted 
 
 
FIGURE 6.2 Global levelised cost of electricity and auction price trends from 
renewable energy sources, 2010–2020 
Source: IRENA Renewable Cost Database and Auctions Database 
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from questions about optimal support structures for renewable energy to 
questions relating to the organisation of the energy markets. The changed 
market situation led to the conclusion that Member States would anyway 
need to invest heavily in low-carbon technologies in order to meet their 
greenhouse gas reduction targets for 2030, and that binding renewable targets 
for each Member State were no longer a necessity in this context. 
 
6.1.2 Biofuels 
Biofuels have been a major part of the discussion on renewables as they were 
considered the lowest cost, large-scale “solution” in the short term to the 
transport sector’s ever-increasing emissions of greenhouse gases. The initial 
assumption was that the carbon in the plants or trees had been absorbed from 
the atmosphere, and burning the fuel was only putting carbon back into 
the atmosphere where it had come from. This is why the IPCC Guidelines 
report CO
2 
emissions from the combustion of biomass as zero in the energy 
sector. At the outset, therefore, biofuels were presumed to be good. It was 
rather quickly realised that there are many more aspects to consider beyond 
the energy sector, such as that cultivation may entail energy intensive fertilis- 
ers, or because land is scarce, may cause displacement effects on land use in 
Europe or elsewhere in the world. 
The European Union first introduced a blending target in 2003 with the 
aim to reach a 5.75% share of renewable energy (essentially biofuels) in the 
EU’s transport sector by 2010.3 As part of the EU’s 2020 objectives, the target 
was increased to 10% and it was made mandatory for each Member State.4 
For the first time, sustainability criteria were also introduced to respond to 
questions on the net benefits in terms of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
These criteria required biofuels not to be grown on land with a high carbon 
stock or high biodiversity, such as primary forestland. In addition, greenhouse 
gas savings compared to fossil fuel were required of at least 35% from 2009 
and 50% from 2017, taking into account emissions arising during their life 
cycle, for example cultivation of the raw materials, or “feedstock,” process- 
ing and transport. In 2015, new legislation was introduced to take account 
of emissions resulting from Indirect Land Use Change (ILUC) effects.5 The 
use of food- and feed-based biofuels was capped at 7%.6 In addition, biofuel 
production from new installations were required to ensure a greenhouse gas 
saving of at least 60% to comply with the sustainability requirements. 
The legislation agreed in 2018 incorporates a 14% sub-target for renew- 
able energy in transport but stipulates that not more than 7% can be real- 
ised through so-called first-generation biofuels produced by the agricultural 
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sector, such as from rapeseed.7 In addition, a greenhouse gas saving of 65% 
is required of sustainable biofuels from 2021. There are no longer any bind- 
ing targets specifically on Member States for renewable energy in transport, 
but the 14% target is a requirement Member States must impose on fuel 
suppliers. The emphasis is explicitly to increase the production of advanced 
biofuels from the recycling of waste material such as cooking oil and animal 
fat, or from cellulosic wood material. Furthermore, new technological break- 
throughs can be expected through the use of biofuels that are not land-based, 
such as algae. Several “multipliers” are foreseen as an additional incentive to 
the use of the most costly advanced biofuels, as well as for renewable electric- 
ity used by the rail and road sectors.8 Finally, a process has been agreed for 
the establishment of a certification process that is intended certify food-crop 
biofuels that are deemed to have a low “indirect land use change,” or displace- 
ment, effect. Food-crop biofuels that are deemed to have a “high indirect 
land-use change-risk” will be completely phased out by 2030. Palm oil, for 
example, is claimed to be such a high-risk feedstock. This certification process 
has begun and is being completed. Overall, the legislative framework seeks 
to ensure that biofuel use unequivocally contributes to emission reductions. 
EU biofuels policies have gradually led to more serious reflection on 
emissions beyond the traditional energy sector, including accounting and 
mitigating emissions in forestry, agriculture and for land use change in gen- 
eral. It must be admitted, however, that initially the EU rather rushed into 
biofuels policy without full consideration of all possible impacts, while the 
benefits for climate change were exaggerated at the outset. Even now, with all 
the environmental safeguards in place in Europe, some still dispute the added 
value of biofuels, arguing that they are energy intensive to produce, used 
in inefficient internal combustion engines and throw a lifeline to the fossil 
fuel-based products, with which biofuels are blended. From an air quality 
perspective, biofuels are of little benefit. From a climate change perspective, 
their production can be worse than fossil fuels if their production encourages 
deforestation through land-use displacement effects, not only within the EU 
but also, more importantly, in Asia, Latin America or Africa, as food and feed 
commodity markets are truly global. In addition, biofuels produced from 
food and feed feedstock could increase food prices. 
It is understandable that, in view of these doubts, legislators have increas- 
ingly concentrated promotion initiatives and provisions on fuels where there 
is greater consensus on their being beneficial for the environment. Few 
parliamentarians and few members of the public have the opportunity to 
become experts in this field; it is understandable that in light of such contro- 
versy, as has been seen in recent years, there has been a relocation of support 
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for biofuels onto a concentration of promotional efforts on what are clearly – 
and consensually – considered to be beneficial for the environment. In the 
end, it is now widely felt that subsidies, incentives and research should rather 
be used to promote alternative powertrain technologies, in particular electric 
technologies, for which sustainable renewable energy is increasingly available. 
Production of sustainable liquid fuels, including synthetic fuels from renew- 
able energy, is possible and is still being developed, but their production will 
be limited in scale. Such sustainable liquid fuels should rather be reserved for 
uses where technological alternatives are not yet available, such as in aviation. 
 
6.1.3 Biomass 
A particular aspect of renewable energy policy is the promotion of biomass 
as a fuel. In analogy with biofuels, the 2018 Renewable Energy Directive 
introduces sustainability criteria for the first time. This is necessary as the 
use of biomass gets a double incentive: under the renewable energy target as 
well as under the EU ETS where its use is deemed “emissions free.” However, 
probably the most important new element as far as biomass is concerned are 
the new accounting rules set under the Land Use, Land Use Change and 
Forestry (LULUCF) Regulation (see Chapter 8). In particular, sustainable 
forest management and afforestation make a positive contribution to climate 
change if done properly. 
There are doubts, however, relating to the sustainability of biomass for 
energy, especially when land use, agriculture and forestry emissions are taken 
into account.9 Clearly, there is a high risk of problems if biomass is sourced 
from a country that is not committed to account for its forestry emissions 
under the Paris Agreement’s greenhouse gas accounting rules. Therefore, the 
Renewable Energy Directive foresees that the import of biomass material 
must come from countries with LULUCF accounting in place. In the future, 
one can also expect satellite monitoring to play an increasing role in the 
overall accounting of this most important sector, not least at the international 
level. 
The future use of biomass needs to be considered in conjunction with 
newly emerging carbon capture and storage technologies as potential means 
of absorbing and storing carbon dioxide that would otherwise persist in the 
atmosphere. If Europe and other countries want to meet the temperature 
goals of the Paris Agreement for the second half of the century, these seques- 
tration and capture techniques and technologies must be nurtured from a 
much earlier stage to reach maturity in time. There are scenarios where 
carbon can be absorbed out of the atmosphere by biomass: after the use of 
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Conclusion: The EU’s renewable energy target of  20%  by  2020  is  
being delivered and an increase in ambition up to 32% by 2030 has 
been agreed. The expansion of the renewable energy market has led   
to significant cost reductions. From now on electricity market dynam- 
ics, including the carbon price, will be the driving force behind further 
investments in renewable energy. The use of biofuels and biomass are 
subject to strict sustainability criteria. 
biomass as a combustion fuel, the carbon is separated or captured through 
the appropriate technology, and finally stored underground. This so-called 
“BECCS” technology, which stands for Bio-Energy with Carbon Capture 
and Storage, has the potential to produce “negative” carbon dioxide emis- 
sions in combination with the new LULUCF management and accounting 
techniques. The IPCC refers to this type of technology in its recent reports, 
such as its 1.5°C report of 2018, without giving it an endorsement. However, 
it does have the theoretical potential for the bio-economy to make a worth- 
while contribution to the stabilisation of climate change globally. 
 
 
 
6.2 Electricity market integration and the Market 
Design Initiative 
The substantial increase in the share of electricity generated from renewable 
energy sources together with the gradual opening of the electricity market 
required a fundamental review of the rules managing the EU energy mar- 
ket. In November 2016, the European Commission therefore released a set 
of proposals, referred to as the Market Design Initiative,10 which is another 
major opportunity to facilitate the ongoing sustainable energy transition. 
 
6.2.1 The challenge of integrating renewable energy 
Both wind and solar energy are variable sources of energy. Wind availability 
tends to be uncorrelated with demand and is prone to unpredictable fluctua- 
tions in its intensity, requiring intervention by the electricity system operators. 
While solar energy is more predictable, the sunrise and sunset effects require 
significant adjustment across the network, other types of generation having to 
come on line to replace it in order to satisfy demand. These adjustments have 
had impacts on conventional generation assets, most of which were built to 
operate at relatively constant level throughout the day, without fast ramping 
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capabilities. There can also be relatively long periods with very little or a great 
deal of wind and sun. In such cases, other sources of energy are needed to 
replace missing generation, or conversely, during periods when renewable 
energy is abundant, conventional assets may be standing idle. 
In addition, the zero marginal cost of variable renewable energy has led to 
very low, sometimes even negative, wholesale market prices. In combination with 
the subsidies for renewable energy, the wholesale market revenues of power com- 
panies are significantly reduced. In these circumstances, the economic viability of 
new investments is adversely affected, putting at risk the resilience of the electric- 
ity system as a whole. To maintain investment in capacity needed to meet peak 
demand at times when renewable energy is limited due to weather conditions, 
Member States resorted to so-called capacity mechanisms that have served to 
fragment European electricity markets. 
One of the “remedies” introduced in 2009 to enable renewable electricity 
to compete in recent years has been “priority dispatch,” where Transmissions 
System Operators had an obligation to first take the renewable energy that 
was available, if necessary at the expense of conventional fuels. However, due 
to these deliberate market interventions, electricity markets and investments 
were distorted. Consequently, in the recent reform of electricity markets, the 
notion of “priority dispatch” for renewable energy was discontinued. Instead, 
it was decided that all wholesale market participants should face the same 
responsibilities in terms of grid balancing in order to ensure the better inte- 
gration of renewable energy supply, demand response and storage solutions, 
as well as reserve capacity waiting on stand-by in the case of unplanned 
events. The emphasis is now on regional cooperation, the more efficient 
use of interconnectors and the procurement of reserve needs. So rather than 
concentrating solely on increasing the share of renewable energy, policy now 
takes a wider view in order to ensure that the electricity supply system as a 
whole remains strong and resilient. 
 
6.2.2 The combined effects of electricity market 
reform and carbon pricing 
A well-functioning electricity market, in combination with a well-functioning 
EU ETS, can give sufficient price signals for the long-term investments consist- 
ent with Europe’s decarbonisation goals.11 As carbon prices have returned to 
their pre-2010 levels and technology costs fall, there will be a gradual shift from 
conventional sources to renewable sources as well as a shift from coal to gas. 
This combination of carbon and electricity markets becomes the driver 
for the energy transition in the power generation sector. The auction prices 
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of recent renewable energy tenders for photovoltaics, onshore and even off- 
shore wind suggest that this transition is achievable, especially if carbon prices 
continue to recover. In order for consumers to be incentivised to save energy, 
the Commission proposed to phase out retail price regulation, still present 
in a number of Member States. Social tariffs will still be allowed, subject to 
certain requirements and price regulation in emergencies is still permitted. 
Energy poverty will be measured at the national level and its root causes 
addressed, such as through targeted energy efficiency measures. Fairness is not 
only about managing the cost of energy for those who cannot afford it, but it 
is also about expecting those who can afford energy to pay a price that takes 
externalities – such as its effects on the environment – into account. 
Finally, subject to strict conditions, it is still possible for Member States to 
introduce capacity mechanisms to address security of energy supply, subject 
to all other market design improvements having been implemented. How- 
ever, a maximum threshold of 550 grams CO
2
/KWh that a generation plant 
can emit is set in order to be able to receive payments from national capacity 
mechanisms. This threshold excludes conventional coal-fired generation and 
for this reason has been heavily criticised by certain Member States. However, 
the main aim is to avoid support being given to investments in highly emitting 
generation assets that are inconsistent with the EU’s long-term decarbonisa- 
tion policy. This could otherwise very likely lead to having a number of costly 
“stranded-assets” in the power system because of early retirement due to their 
incompatibility with overriding goals. To date, at least eleven Member States 
have introduced and had a variety of capacity mechanisms approved by the 
European Commission. These are generally technology neutral12 and mostly 
ensure gas and coal power stations are available in the event of shortages of 
electricity supply. 
 
6.2.3 Strengthened role for consumers 
Recognising the importance of energy choices made by citizens, the oppor- 
tunities for consumer choice and engagement with energy retail markets has 
been increased. Information provided to consumers, such as on electricity 
bills, will be improved and the possibility offered to participate in energy 
markets directly or through companies that represent them, such as “aggrega- 
tors.” Moving from one energy supplier to another will be facilitated, creat- 
ing more price competition at the retail level. Every customer can request 
a smart meter to better manage energy consumption and benefit from a 
dynamic price contract if they want one. The installation of smart meters is 
also important for promoting the participation of consumers as generators 
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Conclusion: In combination with a reinforced EU ETS, the energy market 
reforms encourage clean-energy investments, fuel switching and grid 
stability. Distortions needed to be removed from electricity markets so 
that renewable energy, energy efficiency measures, demand response, 
as well as energy storage are all incentivised. 
of electricity for their own consumption, or for selling, storing or offering 
to change consumption patterns as part of a demand-response programme, 
receiving remuneration either directly or through aggregators. All of these 
measures will contribute to energy security and enhance energy efficiency, 
while potentially enabling consumers to save money. 
 
 
6.3 Energy efficiency 
 
6.3.1 Energy dependence, the import bill and 
barriers to energy efficiency 
Concerns persist around the EU’s dependence on imported energy. Best, of 
course, would be not to need so much energy: it is often said that the most 
efficient and cleanest energy is energy that is not consumed. Energy effi- 
ciency results in less energy being used and lower energy bills for consumers. 
However, despite significant technological progress in the field of energy 
efficiency and its societal benefits, the level of investment in energy efficiency 
in Europe is still below its economic and technological potential.13 
Energy efficient investments with a payback time of four or five years 
are often not undertaken in both the private and public sectors. Market and 
behavioural barriers such as imperfect information, split incentives or the 
distrust of the energy-efficiency business model with its upfront costs hin- 
der consumer uptake of energy efficiency measures, notwithstanding lower 
energy bills and other societal benefits. Governments and public sector actors 
may be reluctant to undertake energy efficiency programmes due to the 
pressing need to consolidate public finances. Individual consumers may lack 
access to attractive financing terms, they may be reluctant because of the 
possibility of moving house or they may incur the inconvenience of building 
work being done. There are still many hurdles to jump between knowing 
what can be done and actually doing it: as in so many other areas of life, 
the choice between short-term convenience and long-term reward does not 
always favour the longer-term gains. 
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FIGURE 6.3 Ambition level of EU’s 2030 energy efficiency target of 32.5% compared to primary energy consumption and 
“business-as-usual” forecasts 
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There are, therefore, solid arguments for government intervention and 
regulation to make things happen. The European Union has advocated 
the “Energy efficiency first” principle and agreed for 2030 an energy effi- 
ciency improvement target of 32.5% at the EU-level. This target is defined 
as a 32.5% reduction of gross primary energy consumption compared to the 
1887 million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe) level that was expected for 2030 
under a “business-as-usual” projection made in 2007.14 The more recent pro- 
jection done in 2016 estimates the primary energy consumption of the EU at 
much lower level of 1436 Mtoe. Hence, a 32.5% energy efficiency improve- 
ment seems feasible and maintains the consistency with the EU’s climate and 
renewable energy objectives. 
 
6.3.2 The EU’s approach to energy efficiency 
targets and policies 
The EU overall target on energy efficiency has not been translated into 
legally binding targets for Member States but will be realised through the 
newly established governance system. There were several reasons for this. 
First, Member States were already obliged to limit their greenhouse gas emis- 
sions and improving energy efficiency would help to meet this target. In 
addition, from a macroeconomic standpoint, improving energy efficiency is 
very strong candidate measure. What is needed above all, however, are com- 
mon policies rather than targets, especially as the appliances and vehicles that 
used energy were so often manufactured in (or exported to) other Member 
States, and individual governments were unable to unilaterally regulate prod- 
uct standards in the context of Europe’s internal market. 
The EU has made substantial progress towards its energy efficiency objec- 
tives, but it is not on track to meet its energy efficiency target for 2020. 
While energy savings have helped offset the impact of increases in economic 
activity, in recent years they have not been enough to offset the increase in 
energy consumption. Although it was never specifically agreed whether the 
EU’s 2020 energy efficiency target should be defined in final or primary 
energy consumption terms,15 the European Commission measures progress 
against both definitions. Final energy consumption in the EU fell by 5.9%, 
from 1193 Million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe) in 2005 to 1122 Mtoe in 
2017. This is still 3.3% above the 2020 final energy consumption target of 
1086 Mtoe. Primary energy consumption in the EU dropped by 9.2%, from 
1720 Mtoe in 2005 to 1561 Mtoe in 2017. This is 5.3% above the 2020 
target of 1483 Mtoe. Primary energy consumption decreased on average by 
0.8% per year between 2005 and 2017, but it has been rising again since 
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2015.A year-by-year increase of 0.9 % was recorded in 2017.16 Further action 
is therefore clearly required at all levels of governance: European, national, 
regional and municipal. 
At the European level, the approach has been to pursue the following 
four policies. First, to set performance standards for newly traded goods for 
both environmental and internal market reasons. Second, to set performance 
standards for new buildings for environmental reasons and create demand 
for better-performing building materials. Third, to provide information to 
consumers on the energy performance of all buildings, the labelling of new 
appliances and the fuel consumption/CO
2 
performance of cars; and finally, 
to create obligations for energy distribution companies to save energy, for 
larger companies to undertake regular energy audits and for Member States 
to submit plans and develop national strategies. 
This approach was implemented through the Ecodesign Directive,17 the 
Energy Labelling Directive,18 the Energy Performance of Buildings Direc- 
tive19 and the Energy Efficiency Directive.20 
 
6.3.3 Regulating the energy use and labelling 
of products and devices 
The “Ecodesign Directive” sets common performance standards, from an 
environmental perspective, of energy-consuming goods sold in the European 
Union. Many different categories of electrical and electronic equipment are 
covered, including heating equipment. The rationale for this legislation is, of 
course, to save energy and reduce emissions but also to avoid differences in 
national laws that would obstruct intra-EU trade. The Commission estimates 
that the Ecodesign Directive contributes around half of the energy savings 
target for 2020.21 
The Ecodesign Working Plan for 2016–2019, now being deployed, 
includes a list of new product groups such as building automation and 
control systems, electric kettles, lifts, refrigerated containers, hand dryers, 
high-pressure cleaners or photovoltaic systems. Further new actions include 
setting the minimum energy efficiency requirements for air heating and 
cooling products and a measure to strengthen verification tolerances that 
relate to the compliance checks performed by Member States.22 
Since 1992, there is also an Energy Labelling Directive. The energy label 
is a tool to assist consumers when purchasing household appliances, such 
as, washing machines and dishwashers. The eight categories “A” to “G” 
(more recently “A+++” to “D”) show to what extent the product is eco- 
nomical and environmentally friendly. The Directive intends to offer critical 
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information to consumers on the energy use of products, enabling a more 
informed choice, lower energy bills and ultimately fewer CO
2 
emissions. 
 
6.3.4 Addressing the energy efficiency of buildings 
across the EU 
The Energy Performance of Buildings Directive is another important 
piece of legislation. Residential and commercial buildings are large users 
of energy and buildings account for some 40% of energy consumption 
in the EU. Under this Directive, Member States must establish and apply 
minimum energy performance requirements for new and existing build- 
ings, ensure the certification of these energy performance requirements 
and ensure the regular inspection of boilers and air-conditioning systems 
in buildings. Moreover, the Directive requires Member States to ensure 
that by 2021 all new buildings will effectively become “nearly zero-energy 
buildings.” 
The 2018 revision of the Directive aims to increase building renovation 
rates and foster the delivery of smart building technologies. It puts stronger 
emphasis on Member States’ renovation strategies aiming to decarbonise 
building stocks by 2050, including new provisions to promote building auto- 
mation in conjunction with digital technologies. Importantly, it also requests 
measures to allow for the installation of charging points for electric vehicles, 
anticipating the need to decarbonise transport. 
The proposed measures will generate a considerable investment effort 
amounting to some €80 to €120 billion in 2030. The Smart Finance for 
Smart Buildings Initiative23 accompanies the Directive. It consists, for exam- 
ple, of support for the aggregation of dispersed small-scale investments and a 
de-risking pillar that aims to reduce perceived risks by investors.24 The initia- 
tive builds on the previous Private Finance for Energy Efficiency Instrument, 
which is already operational in nine Member States, and is implemented in 
cooperation with the European Investment Bank. 
 
6.3.5 The Energy Efficiency Directive 
Finally, the Energy Efficiency Directive was reinforced in 201825 and sets an 
energy efficiency target for the EU of 32.5% in 2030, along with a potential 
upward revision by 2023. It includes a wide range of policy measures, includ- 
ing provisions relating to residential energy efficiency, smart meters, home 
energy management, energy audits in the commercial sector, retrofitting of 
public buildings, district heating and demand response. 
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Conclusion: By 2030, energy efficiency will be improved by 32.5% in 
relation to a pre-determined baseline. Several measures aim to save 
energy but also to bring important benefits in terms of security of 
energy supply, improvement in the EU’s trade balance and reduction of 
greenhouse gases. 
According to Article 7 of the Directive, Member States have to intro- 
duce legislation that obliges energy distributors and suppliers to achieve 
savings of on average 1.5% a year of energy sales to final consumers 
from 2014 and 2030 or introduce alternative measures with the same 
effect. This is innovative, as it will make energy suppliers de facto sup- 
pliers of energy efficient services and products. This is also significant 
as nearly half of the energy savings from the Directive are expected to 
come from this Article alone.26 
 
 
 
6.4 Strengthened governance of the Energy Union 
The 2014 European Council conclusions also call for a reliable and transpar- 
ent governance system for the Energy Union to ensure that the EU meets its 
climate and energy policy targets. All levels of government, whether Euro- 
pean, regional, national or local should contribute to this task, and the main 
tool to coordinate policies will be an integrated climate and energy plan to 
be prepared by each Member State. 
The Governance of the Energy Union Regulation27 builds upon and 
integrates the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (MMR) for greenhouse 
gases and existing requirements for planning, reporting and monitoring in 
the climate and energy fields. It will reduce the administrative burden for 
Member States and the EU to comply with the reporting obligations under 
the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. The Regulation also sets an out- 
look for longer-term climate and energy action until 2050. 
 
6.4.1 The EU’s Monitoring Mechanism Regulation 
The EU’s Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (MMR)28 determines the 
EU’s internal reporting rules on greenhouse gas emissions. It is based on 
internationally agreed obligations under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
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Protocol. The Monitoring Mechanism Regulation was the first policy 
decision to be adopted at EU level on climate action in the early 1990s 
and has been considerably developed since then. It will continue to 
apply until 2021 when it will be incorporated into the Governance 
Regulation. 
The Monitoring Mechanism Regulation enables the EU to have 
accurate annual information on greenhouse gas emissions and climate 
action. Member States are requested to report on past emissions from all 
economic sectors, projections of how emissions are expected to develop 
in the future, policies and measures to cut greenhouse gas emissions, 
climate adaptation measures, low-carbon development strategies, finan- 
cial and technical support to developing countries, as well as Member 
States’ use of revenues from the auctioning of EU Emissions Trading Sys- 
tem allowances. By making this information widely and publicly avail- 
able, it serves as a transparent basis for further research work and policy 
development. 
 
6.4.2 Integrated climate and energy plans – the novelty 
of the Energy Union 
Climate and energy policies are interlinked. Energy efficiency and renewable 
energy policies are key to promoting the achievement of greenhouse gas 
emissions reduction targets. They are of equal importance in the transition 
towards a more competitive, secure and sustainable energy system. 
Integrated national energy and climate plans are at the core of the Energy 
Union Governance system. Member States will have to adopt such plans for 
the first time by December 2019 for the years 2021–30.29 The plans and their 
reviews are to be synchronised with the Paris Agreement’s five-year review 
cycles and associated global stock takes. 
These integrated national energy and climate plans will lay out projec- 
tions and objectives for the five dimensions of the Energy Union,30 together 
with the policies and measures intended to achieve them. These plans will 
be comprehensive and should include transport, environmental, research and 
competitiveness aspects as well as removals through sinks. The draft plans 
will provide the EU and other Member States with an early indication on 
whether national efforts will be sufficiently ambitious to meet the Energy 
Union objectives, in particular the EU 2030 climate and energy targets. 
Templates have been agreed both to assist the Member States and to make 
the plans comparable between them. 
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Conclusion: Member States are required to prepare comprehensive and 
integrated energy and climate plans. These plans will include projections 
and provide the basis for the monitoring of progress towards meeting 
2030 targets and the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement. 
Furthermore, the Commission may make recommendations to Member 
States. These recommendations are modelled on and complementary to those of 
the European Semester, which focuses on macroeconomic and structural reforms 
whereas the Governance Regulation addresses energy and climate specific policy 
issues. Recommendations made in the context of Article 194 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union will be non-binding, but Article 9(3) of 
the Regulation stipulates that, 
 
Each Member State shall take due account of any recommendations 
from the Commission in its integrated national energy and climate 
plan. If the Member State concerned does not address a recommenda- 
tion or a substantial part thereof, that Member State shall provide and 
make public its reasons. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
Climate and energy policies are inextricably linked, and over time, a more 
integrated approach has emerged across Europe. That is the best guarantee 
for a successful low-carbon energy transition, building less and less on fossil 
fuels and more on energy efficiency and renewable energy. This also helps 
to address the very high dependence of Europe on the import of coal, oil 
and gas. 
Economic modelling has demonstrated that internalising environmen- 
tal externalities is of primary importance. Equally, overcoming the bar- 
riers to improving energy efficiency and enabling dispersed renewable 
energy sources is critical to compete with large fossil fuel incumbents. 
Grid resilience in an electricity system with increasing amounts of vari- 
able renewable energy needs to be enhanced, as does the development of 
new technologies such as energy storage or rapidly spreading digitalisa- 
tion across the energy sector. 
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Measures taken at the European level still leave plenty of scope for 
national and municipal measures through tax incentives (e.g., zero-energy 
houses being subject to lower property taxes) and subsidies (e.g., for better 
housing insulation), energy audits for private households, or the installation 
or upgrading of district heating systems. The concept of national integrated 
plans developed with regional and municipal authorities, as well as other 
stakeholders, is designed to help align policies and initiatives at all levels of 
governance. 
Climate and energy policies have been made to work better together 
over time, such as with the introduction of the Market Stability Reserve 
into the EU Emissions Trading System, which improves its complementarity 
and compatibility with energy efficiency and renewable energy policies. The 
Market Design Initiative improves the overall system integrity, giving even 
small renewable energy producers the right to produce their own electric- 
ity and sell into the grid while taking account of the need for grid stability. 
Energy efficiency improvements in a whole range of household appliances 
will save consumers money, thereby attenuating fuel poverty. Fairness has 
been addressed both in the establishment of the 2020 renewable energy tar- 
gets using the criteria of GDP per capita, but fairness is also addressed more 
widely by leaving Member States to develop the energy and climate plans at 
the national level that are adapted to their specific circumstances. 
The multiple policy initiatives that the EU has collectively been adopting, 
either through joint action or through measures at national or local levels, 
have so far been effective in producing a coherent outcome, both in terms 
of energy and climate. Figure 6.4 highlights the extent to which the ongo- 
ing energy transition has led to a fundamental structural change in the EU’s 
power generation: significantly less coal and lignite and considerably more 
renewable energy.Without such a coherent change in Europe’s energy land- 
scape, the EU’s climate targets would never have been reached. 
One conclusion emerges clearly from the analysis in this chapter: the 
EU succeeded in curbing the consumption of fossil fuels and is clearly now 
experiencing a gradual low-carbon transformation of its energy system. It is 
also clear that the EU has the potential to go much further. Along the way, 
there will be setbacks,“rebound” effects of energy efficiency improvements 
and geopolitical challenges that affect energy security. The governance sys- 
tem provides for a regular adjustment to these developments through the 
reviews of integrated, national climate and energy plans. That will allow 
the EU to realise the climate ambition that it subscribed to in the Paris 
Agreement. 
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FIGURE 6.4 EU-28 Gross electricity generation by fuel, 1990–2016 (Twh) 
Source: Eurostat (May 2018) 
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of 9 September 2015 amending Directive 98/70/EC relating to the quality 
of petrol and diesel fuels and amending Directive 2009/28/EC on the pro- 
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6 Seven percent was the estimated installed capacity of EU biofuel production at 
the time. 
7 Directive (EU) 2018/2001/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable 
sources (recast); Official Journal L328, pp. 82–209 of 21.12.2018. 
8 Advanced biofuels (and biogas) made from a limited number of non-ILUC feed- 
stocks shall constitute at least 0.2% of the blended fuel in 2022, increasing to at 
least 3.5% by 2030. 
9 Searchinger, D. et al. (2018). “Europe’s Renewable Energy Directive Poised to 
Harm Global Forests”. www.nature.com/articles/s41467-018-06175-4.pdf. 
10 Electricity Market Design: The revised legislation not yet published in Official 
Journal, but see: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-6870_en.htm. 
11 SWD (2016)410 final, Impact Assessment accompanying the Market Design Ini- 
tiative proposals. 
12 The ECJ however recently found that the UK capacity mechanism was not neu- 
tral and risked discrimination against demand-side response solutions. 
13 Energy Efficiency Financial Institutions Group (EEFIG) Final Report, Febru- 
ary 2015. (see https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/Final%20 
Report%20EEFIG%20v%209.1%2024022015%20clean%20FINAL%20sent.pdf) 
and COMMISSION/DG ECFIN, Note to the Economic Policy Committee 
Energy and Climate Change Working Group (19.4.2016): Investment in Energy 
Efficiency by Households. 
14 Compared to a “business-as-usual” projection from a base year in 2005 (initially 
carried out in 2007), assuming continuous economic growth and no additional 
energy-efficiency policies above and beyond those in place in 2005. 
15 Primary energy consumption measures the total energy demand of a country. It 
covers consumption of the energy sector itself, losses during transformation (for 
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Introduction 
Transport is proving to be one of the hardest sectors to decarbonise. Today 
transport accounts for 21.5% of the European Union’s greenhouse gas emis- 
sions,1 increasing to more than one-quarter when aviation and maritime 
emissions are taken into account.2 In Chapter 1, it was indicated that since 
1990, emissions from all sectors have been reduced, with the exception of 
transport, where emissions have significantly increased, by 28% between 1990 
and 2017 based on preliminary estimations by the European Environment 
Agency. The decoupling of emissions from economic growth, which is very 
apparent for the economy as a whole, has not happened in the road transport 
sector, and still less for aviation, which has more than doubled its emissions 
since 1990. 
Transport is embedded into our way of life and the backbone of our 
economy, and there are no signs of mobility demand falling. On the con- 
trary, as standards of living improve, people tend to travel further and 
more frequently than ever. Economists have known for a long time that 
the income elasticity of transport demand is higher than one.Yet we will 
not be able to deliver on the goals of the Paris Agreement if society is 
unable to develop sustainable transport with much lower emissions of 
greenhouse gases. That is why much stronger policy intervention seems 
unavoidable. 
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7.1 The EU’s overall policy towards internalisation 
of external costs 
In 1995, the Commission published a Green Paper, “Towards Fair and Effi- 
cient Pricing in Transport: Policy options for internalising the external costs 
of transport in the European Union.”3 It argued that the most obvious way 
forward is to make prices for transport cover the costs of all the “externalities” 
caused by transport. Such externalities include all adverse effects on health 
and the environment, congestion and the costs of accidents that are not borne 
directly by the transport user. The thrust was to make cost internalisation “an 
essential component of a multi-faceted transport strategy.” 
However, the emissions from transport continued to increase instead of 
fall, and the Commission realised that another level of ambition was nec- 
essary (see Figure 7.1). In 2011, the Commission proposed a reduction of 
transport emissions by 60% by 20504 and reconfirmed this in 2016 in its 
Low-emission Mobility Strategy.5 There are multiple main elements of the 
strategy, including seeking higher efficiency of the transport system, low- 
emission alternative energy for transport and low- to zero-emission vehicles. 
Highlighted are the use of advanced biofuels, hydrogen and renewable syn- 
thetic fuels, removing obstacles to the electrification of transport, modal shift 
and smart pricing. A variety of actors have important roles to play, not least 
cities and local authorities. 
The complex reality is that today we have an extensive mix of instru- 
ments at EU level. Several relate to transport pricing, such as the regulation 
of airport charges, infrastructure charging for rail, port charges for shipping, 
minimum excise duties on road transport fuels and road pricing for Heavy 
DutyVehicles. Other instruments focus on infrastructure, such as the Alterna- 
tive Fuel Infrastructure Directive and EU funding programmes, such as the 
Connecting Europe Facility, make considerable efforts to scale-up invest- 
ments in the infrastructure needed for low-emission transport. While these 
instruments are far from sufficient, when taken together they do make a 
positive difference. 
The real test of success, however, is whether emissions and environ- 
mental impacts from transport go down in absolute rather than relative 
terms. So far, this has not happened in a sustained way. Policies inevitably 
require time to show results, and changes for the better may be underway. 
This chapter cannot be comprehensive but reviews a number of key poli- 
cies where the EU has been particularly active, such as on CO
2 
standards 
for road vehicles and on international modes of transport, namely aviation 
and shipping. 
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FIGURE 7.1 Evolution of EU greenhouse gas emissions from transport, 1990–2017 
Source European Environment Agency (EEA): TERM Briefing, 20186 
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7.2 Emissions from road transport 
Road transport represents approximately three quarters of the emissions from 
transport, which is roughly one-fifth of total greenhouse gas emissions in 
the EU.7 Obviously, that is a primary target for climate action. In addition, 
air quality is also a major concern to citizens, as the transport sector emits 
roughly half of the EU’s NO
x 
emissions,  and road transport has been at the 
8,9 
heart of the so-called “dieselgate” scandal around the illegal use of “defeat 
devices.” 
Member States have the primary responsibility for reducing road transport 
emissions. Despite the fact that no binding target has been set for transport, 
it constitutes the most important part of the mandatory target of each Mem- 
ber State under the Effort Sharing Regulation.10 Interesting to note is that 
the power sector falls under the harmonised EU ETS; hence, the electricity 
consumed by trains, trams or electric vehicles is indirectly covered by this 
system. If the share of electric propulsion grows in the future, as is expected, 
regulation will shift from the level of Member States to the EU level under 
the EU ETS. 
Fuel taxation is obviously an important incentive towards an efficient use 
of energy in cars, vans and lorries, in particular in comparison to other parts 
of the world. However, the EU only regulates the minimum levels of excise 
duties of mineral oil products. Product standards for transport fuels or on bio- 
fuel sustainability are also relevant for cars, vans and lorries, but their benefits 
have so far been very modest. 
 
7.2.1 Regulating CO2 emissions from cars and vans 
Following agreement on the Kyoto Protocol, a Voluntary Agreement with 
car manufacturers was concluded in 1998. It would reduce the average emis- 
sions of new passenger cars to 140 grammes of CO
2 
per kilometre (gCO
2
/ 
km) by 2008/2009.11 This Voluntary Agreement failed, and as of 2009, emis- 
sions standards have been set in binding legislation.12 All new passenger cars 
registered in the EU in 2015 and 2021 shall emit on average not more than 
130 and 95 gCO
2
/km respectively. In 2019, new targets were adopted for 
2025 and 2030, which are respectively 15% and 37.5% lower than the 2021 
target. 
Car manufacturers have been meeting their 2015 obligations by the due 
date and the average emissions level of a new car sold in 2016 was 118.1 
gCO
2
/km. However, in 2017, average emissions increased year-to-year, to 
118.5 gCO
2
/km for the first time. 
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2 
As shown inTable 7.1, the standards set will require emissions to be reduced 
further towards 2030, which will require intensive technological changes to 
the car of tomorrow. In addition to the CO
2 
standards for manufacturers, 
an informed choice by the consumer needs to be facilitated. A mandatory 
label already indicates a car’s fuel consumption and CO
2  
emissions   in the 
13 
showroom and in advertising material. Consumers stand to benefit from con- 
tinued reduction in fuel consumption as a result of the CO
2 
Regulation. For 
example, on average the 2021 CO
2 
standard equates to approximately 4.1 
litres/100 km for petrol and 3.6 litres/100 km for diesel. These savings help 
the consumer finance the higher upfront cost of a low-carbon car. 
EU legislation with binding CO
2 
targets is also in place for light com- 
mercial vehicles (vans).14 CO emissions from new vans are limited to a fleet 
average of 175 gCO
2
/km by 2017 and 147 gCO
2
/km by 2020. These targets 
represent reductions of 3% and 19% respectively, compared with the 2012 
average of 180g CO
2
/km. This corresponds to an average fuel consumption 
of 5.5 litre/100 km for diesel-fuelled vans by 2020. The new targets adopted 
in 2019 will require average van emissions in 2025 and 2030 to be 15%, 
respectively, 31% lower than the 2020 target. 
A number of elements facilitate compliance with the legislation. The 95 
gCO
2
/km target in 2021 for cars allows for the use of so-called “super cred- 
its,” which incentivise cars with emissions below 50 gCO
2
/km, such as elec- 
tric or plug-in hybrid cars. Such low-emitting cars will be counted as two 
vehicles in 2020, 1.67 in 2021, 1.33 in 2022 and as one vehicle from 2023 
onwards. This should encourage the deployment of new technologies that 
 
 
TABLE 7.1 CO
2 
targets and average emissions for cars and vans (gCO
2
/km, NEDC) 
 
Cars Vans 
1995 186  
2000 172.2  
2007 158.7  
2012 132.2 180.2 
2015 119.5 – Target: 130 168.3 
2016 118.1 163.7 
2017 118.5 156.1 – Target: 175 
2020 - Target: 147 
2021 Target: 95 - 
2025 Target: 80.8 (approx.) Target: 125 (approx.) 
2030 Target: 59.4 (approx.) Target: 101.4 (approx.) 
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could help realise future reductions. The contribution of these super credits 
however cannot contribute more than 7.5g gCO
2
/km for each car manu- 
facturer between 2020 and 2022. A similar facilitative element include eco- 
innovations, providing manufacturers a bonus of maximum seven gCO
2
/km 
for CO
2 
reductions through the application of innovative technologies not 
directly related to the engine performance. 
Technological neutrality is a key principle, which leaves the choice of 
technologies to car manufacturers. The legislation defines for each car manu- 
facturer a precise CO
2 
target, differentiated according to the average mass of 
the fleet of passenger cars produced by the manufacturer. Therefore, heavier 
cars can emit slightly more than lighter cars, but the average of all new cars 
sold for each manufacturer must meet the set overall target. Historically, as is 
the case today, car manufacturers have chosen different technological routes, 
innovating with a variety of technologies. For example, as diesel engines tend 
to be more fuel-efficient, many of them switched to this technology in the 
1990s. However, this increase in the share of diesel vehicles led to increasing 
problems with air quality, in particular in urban areas. 
The CO
2 
standards are based on the type-approval process; hence, they can 
only be as good as the values coming from the underlying test procedure. In 
recent years, there has been evidence of growing discrepancies between test 
cycle results and emissions in real driving conditions. There is also increasing 
media and regulatory interest around the use of “defeat devices” for air pol- 
lutants, or engine management systems, that car manufacturer were hiding 
in their cars. In view of restoring consumer confidence, test procedures have 
been strengthened both in terms of governance and measurement controls. 
The performance of the vehicles is now measured according to a new 
regulatory test procedure carried out in laboratories. The type approval leg- 
islation of 2017 introduces the World Harmonised Light Vehicles Test Pro- 
cedure (WLTP), developed in the context of the United Nations Economic 
Committee for Europe (UNECE). This replaces the old procedure known 
as NEDC (standing for New European Driving Cycle) which had been 
designed in the 1980s. The new procedure is more representative of real 
world driving in different conditions and reduces the risk of a creative use of 
the flexibilities that earlier legislation permitted. 
In addition, a new market surveillance mechanism will improve the reli- 
ability and trustworthiness of the system.15 Real world fuel consumption 
data will be collected and made public thanks to a standardised “on-board 
fuel consumption monitoring device” that will have to be installed in all new 
vehicles from 2021 on. Moreover, any significant deviations found during the 
verification of vehicle emissions in-service with the emissions determined 
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in type-approval will be taken into account in the calculation of the aver- 
age specific emissions of a manufacturer. The verification will also have to 
investigate the presence of any strategies that would artificially improve the 
performance of a vehicle during the type approval procedure. 
Furthermore, penalties are part of the overall compliance provisions and 
remain strict. If a manufacturer’s average emissions exceed its specific emis- 
sions target, the manufacturer will have to pay an excess-emissions premium 
equal to €95 for each gCO
2
/km above its target and for each new vehicle 
registered in that year. 
A final element of the new legislation for the period after 2020 will be a 
new type of incentives for zero- and low emissions vehicles. Questions were 
raised about the risk of losing the EU’s competitive advantage in the manufac- 
turing of cars and vans due to insufficient innovation in low-emission auto- 
motive technologies. Past CO
2 
standards helped EU manufacturers to have a 
first mover competitive advantage at global level. However, other countries 
have progressively implemented their own fuel standards. Major non-EU car 
markets (e.g., China, California and other US States) have considered or are 
introducing ambitious policies, in particular to address air pollution. 
It is notable that despite these “unilateral” policies developing indepen- 
dently from each other, today 75% of global car sales are subject to CO
2 
or 
energy efficiency legislation. The stringency of these policies is increasing 
over time and converging (Table 7.1). In the US, the Californian “Zero 
Emission Vehicle” (ZEV) standards to support the market deployment of 
battery electric, plug-in hybrid, and fuel cell vehicles have been adopted 
by nine other States, and almost one third of new cars sales in the US take 
place in these ten States.16 In China, new mandatory “new energy vehicle” 
(NEV) requirements covering battery electric, plug-in hybrid and fuel cell 
vehicles apply to car manufacturers from 2019,17 applicable to all manufac- 
turers with an annual production or import volume of 30,000 or more cars. 
The new EU legislation to be adopted in 2019 once again includes a 
crediting system to speed up the uptake of zero- and low-emission vehicles 
(ZEV and LEV), which are defined as having CO
2 
emissions between zero 
and 50 g/km.A manufacturer’s specific CO
2 
emissions target will be adjusted 
in case the share of zero- and low-emission vehicles in its fleet exceeds the 
benchmarks of 15% in 2025 and 35% (for cars) or 30% (for vans) in 2030. 
If a manufacturer exceeds the set benchmark by one percentage point, he 
will benefit from a 1% less stringent CO
2 
target. This is allowed up to 5% 
of the target. For calculating that share, account is taken of the emissions of 
the zero- and low-emission vehicles, meaning that zero-emission vehicles are 
counted more than those with higher emissions. 
146 Damien Meadows, et al. 
 
Conclusion: Passenger cars and vans are subject to CO2 emissions per- 
formance standards, which are being significantly tightened towards 
2030. The approach is technologically neutral: no mandates, or targets, 
are set for specific types of propulsion technology, such as for electric 
cars, but strong incentives are nevertheless foreseen. The test-cycle and 
the enforcement mechanisms have been strengthened significantly in 
the light of the increasing divergence between test and real-world emis- 
sions as well as the “diesel-gate” scandal. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 7.2 Average emission standards for new passenger cars (US and Canada 
values are for light duty vehicles) 
Source: ICCT 
 
The new crediting system should provide a strong and credible signal for 
the deployment of the cleanest and most efficient vehicles, while still allow- 
ing for the further improvement of the efficiency of the conventional internal 
combustion engines. This should yield high benefits for consumers, competi- 
tiveness and the environment. By not introducing technology specific quotas 
or mandates, the new legislation remains technology neutral and more cost- 
effective, allowing manufacturers to decide which technologies they wish to 
use to meet their specific emissions target. 
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7.2.2 Emissions from heavy-duty vehicles (HDV) 
such as lorries and buses 
As for passenger cars and vans, the emissions from heavy-duty vehicles, which 
represent a quarter of road transport emissions, continue to rise. In the period 
1990–2015, they increased by around 19%18 and another 10% increase is 
expected between 2010 and 2030.19 Until recently, no specific CO policy 
was developed for HDVs. The claim made by road haulage companies was 
that they already do everything to keep down the fuel consumption of their 
fleet, as this is a substantial part of their overall operating costs. 
However, demand for freight transport follows economic growth. It is 
therefore not surprising that emissions keep increasing if no mitigation 
measures are undertaken. Moreover, a number of market barriers have lim- 
ited the adoption of emission reduction measures. Few transport companies 
have objective data to evaluate the fuel efficiency of new HDV before 
purchasing them. Split incentives exist between the owners of the vehicles 
such as leasing companies and the operators who would benefit from lower 
operating fuel costs. Furthermore, HDVs are not as standardised as passen- 
ger cars and vans, which makes the monitoring of the fleet emissions more 
complex. 
To help overcome these barriers the knowledge of the actual CO
2 
emis- 
sions and fuel consumption of new HDVs needs to be improved. The Com- 
mission, in close collaboration with stakeholders, developed a simulation 
software, the Vehicle Energy Consumption Calculation Tool (VECTO),20 to 
calculate fuel consumption and CO
2 
emissions of new HDVs in a compa- 
rable manner across all manufacturers for different vehicle types. Under the 
type-approval framework, a so-called “certification” regulation was adopted 
in 2017 amongst different vehicles21 to define the methodology each manu- 
facturer has to use for calculating the CO
2 
emissions and fuel consumption 
of new HDVs with the use of VECTO. 
These efforts also allow the monitoring and reporting of the CO
2 
emis- 
sion and fuel consumption of the sector as a whole and the data will be pub- 
licly available as of 2020, based on data for 2019. Equally, the certification of 
HDVs will be of great importance for Member States who want to differenti- 
ate their road charging schemes according to the CO
2 
performance, as would 
be possible through amendment of the “Eurovignette Directive” in 2017,22 
which also allows for a widening of the system to encompass all vehicles. 
This groundwork made it possible for the Commission to take the next 
step and propose the first EU CO
2 
emission standards for HDVs in May 2018, 
adopted in 2019 by the European Parliament and the Council. 
148 Damien Meadows, et al. 
 
The specific CO
2 
emissions of the EU fleet of new HDVs will have to be 
reduced by 15% in 2025 and 30% in 2030 compared to the emissions in the 
reference period, which is between 1 July 2019 and 30 June 2020. As a first 
step, these emission standards cover the largest vehicles accounting for 70% of 
the total CO
2 
emissions from heavy-duty vehicles. 
For manufacturers failing to comply with their specific emission targets, 
the level of penalties are set at € 4,250 per gramme of CO
2 
per tonne kilo- 
metre (gCO
2
/tkm) in 2025 and € 6,800 per gCO
2
/tkm in 2030. 
The new legislation also includes a crediting system to incentivise the 
uptake of zero- and low-emission trucks. There are currently hardly any such 
vehicles on the road. The incentive scheme aims at stimulating investment 
in all segments of the fleets, including the smaller trucks used for regional 
delivery purposes that are most likely to be electrified first. 
To reward early action, a super-credits scheme applies from 2019 until 
2024. The credits gained can be used to comply with the target in 2025. 
A multiplier of two applies for zero-emission vehicles and a multiplier 
between one and two applies for low-emission vehicles, depending on their 
CO
2 
emissions. An overall cap of 3% is set on the use of super-credits 
23 
in order to preserve the environmental integrity of the system. From 2025 
onwards, the super-credits system is replaced by a “bonus-only” benchmark- 
based crediting system, with a benchmark set at 2%. The 2030 benchmark 
level will have to be set in the context of the 2022 review. 
This means that the average specific CO
2 
emissions of a manufacturer are 
adjusted downwards if the share of zero-emission vehicles in its entire fleet 
of new HDVs exceeds the 2% benchmark. The CO
2 
emissions decrease is 
capped at a maximum of 3%. 
The legislation also contains flexibilities to ensure a cost-effective imple- 
mentation of the standards. In particular, a “banking and borrowing” mecha- 
nism will allow manufacturers to balance under-achievement in one year by 
an overachievement in another year. 
In order to incentivise early emission reductions, credits can be acquired 
already from 2019 to 2024. The emission credits acquired in the period from 
2019 to 2024 can be used to comply with the 2025 target. From 2025 to 
2029, borrowing is possible, but the credits borrowed must be cleared at the 
latest in 2029. 
Several elements reinforce the effectiveness and the robustness of the 
legislation, such as verification of CO
2 
emissions of vehicles in service and 
measures to ensure that the certification procedure yields results that are rep- 
resentative of real-world CO
2 
emissions. 
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Conclusion: As of 2019, heavy-duty vehicles (HDVs) will be subject to 
certification before being put on the market. A CO
2 
emissions standard 
has been set for 2025 and 2030 for larger lorries. Legislation will enable 
Member States to differentiate their road charging schemes according 
to the CO
2 
performance of HDVs, which they can also extend to pas- 
senger cars. 
Finally, an extensive review is foreseen in 2022. This review will cover, inter 
alia, the 2030 target and possible targets for 2035 and 2040, with the inclusion 
of other types of heavy-duty vehicles, in particular buses, coaches and trailers. 
 
 
7.3 Emissions from international aviation 
and shipping 
Aviation and shipping’s combined climate impacts already make up around 
10% of Europe’s contribution to climate change, and they will grow to more 
than one third by 2050 unless significant measures are put in place. 
The Kyoto Protocol foresees that Annex I Parties24 should pursue limita- 
tion or reduction of international aviation and shipping emissions, working 
through the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and Interna- 
tional Maritime Organisation (IMO) respectively. The Paris Agreement did 
not give a new mandate to either ICAO or the IMO, but it is explicit that it 
covers all sources of emissions. 
The EU and its Member States have constantly been at the forefront 
of pressing for progress in ICAO and IMO and continue to rely on them 
delivering action. However, taking account of scientific evidence and the 
disappointing contributions by ICAO and IMO to date, many argue that 
unilateral measures should also be taken. The EU has included aviation emis- 
sions in setting the level of ambition of its 2020 and 2030 targets.25 
 
7.3.1 Aviation emissions and EU policy action 
Annual global CO
2 
emissions from aviation have increased from 435 mil- 
lion tonnes in 1990 to over 900 million tonnes by 2018. ICAO, in its 2016 
Environment Report, suggested that without additional policy measures, 
international civil aviation’s CO
2 
emissions could multiply five-fold by 2050, 
compared to their level in 2005. Although there are many uncertainties 
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around such illustrative modelling, we can be confident that there will be 
some technological and air traffic management improvements during this 
period. Nevertheless, ICAO itself acknowledges that considerable policy 
intervention will be needed to stabilise and then reduce the sector’s CO
2 
emissions. Let it not be forgotten that aviation also has impacts on the climate 
through releases of nitrogen oxides, water vapour and particles. The IPCC 
has estimated that the total climate impact of aviation is currently two to four 
times higher than the effect of its carbon dioxide emissions.26 
To date, the majority of aviation activity has been between developed 
countries. In the coming decades, the aviation industry expects the major- 
ity of emissions growth to coming from flight routes to, from and between 
developing countries. The global differences in aviation emissions are one 
reason why the UNFCCC’s issue of Common but Differentiated Respon- 
sibilities (CBDR) has been central to discussions. This is illustrated by Fig- 
ure 7.3, showing the distribution of aviation emissions between four key 
regions. The US is responsible for more than five times the jet fuel use of the 
average global citizen, while China and India per capita used only 10% and 
2.4% respectively as much jet fuel as the US. 
Addressing the greenhouse gas emissions from aviation requires coherent 
policy action for international and domestic flights. International flights are 
covered by the mandate of the Convention on International Civil Aviation28 
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FIGURE 7.3 Average annual per capita jet fuel use in litres, 2016. 
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and action with respect to them is expected through ICAO. Domestic 
flights represent approximately 40% of global aviation emissions, amount- 
ing to around 400 million tonnes per year. Under the bottom-up approach 
of the Paris Agreement, developed country Parties should continue under- 
taking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets, while developing 
country Parties are encouraged to move over time towards economy-wide 
emission reduction or limitation targets in the light of different national 
circumstances.29 
As of 2012, the EU covers emissions from all flights between European air- 
ports under its EU ETS. The legislation applies to all aircraft operators active in 
the EU market equally, and today some 500 airlines are covered. This inclusion 
has resulted in cumulative surrendering of around over 100 million allowances 
from within the EU ETS’ absolute cap on emissions and around 15 million 
international credits issued under the Kyoto Protocol, with respect to avia- 
tion’s CO
2 
emissions by the end of 2018. The EU has postponed coverage of 
flights to and from third countries for 11 years in order to give time for ICAO 
Contracting States to agree on and deliver an effective global market-based 
mechanism that ICAO has been seeking to put into place since 2013. 
The EU decided to include aviation emissions in its emissions trading 
system because it was deemed to be the most realistic and cost-effective 
approach. Considerable investments are under way in research and develop- 
ment of aviation technology and fuels, and many improvements have already 
been put in place in terms of engine maintenance, winglets, navigation and 
logistics. Given the significant growth of the sector, however, much more is 
needed, and a carbon price is expected to encourage further improvements. 
The EU sees market-based measures as an essential part of a comprehensive 
and cost-effective approach, including for aviation. 
Following the extension of the EU ETS to international aviation, airlines 
based in the US brought litigation to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The 
ECJ however confirmed that the EU ETS law is compatible with international 
law, with the EU/US Open Skies Agreement and the Chicago Convention. 
The ECJ reaffirmed that States have the sovereign right to determine the con- 
ditions for admission to or departure from their territory and require all airlines 
to comply. The ECJ also confirmed that the EU ETS has no extraterritorial 
effect because no obligations are imposed in the territory of any other state, as 
inclusion within the EU ETS only arises when aircraft land or take off from 
an airport in a Member State. However, despite this Court ruling, many third 
country airlines continued to claim that the EU ETS was “extraterritorial.” 
Non-discriminatory application of the law is essential. Few business sec- 
tors are as international as aviation, and non-discrimination between aircraft 
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operators on flight routes is crucial. Having different treatment for aircraft 
operators of different nationalities would distort competition between those 
operating on the same routes, so the EU ETS applies to airlines operating 
in the European market without distinction as to nationality. More than 100 
commercial airlines based outside the EU conduct flights within the Euro- 
pean Economic Area; these airlines all comply with the EU ETS. A number 
of airlines including Aeroflot, Saudi-Arabian Airlines and Air India paid sig- 
nificant fines for their intra-EEA emissions, at the rate of €100/tonne, before 
accepting to comply with the EU law. 
A practical complement to emissions trading is passenger charges, which 
are in place in a number of countries including the US, India, Germany and 
the UK. Passenger charges do not apply directly to airlines, so the opportu- 
nity for airlines to oppose them is more limited. On the other hand, emissions 
trading is more effective in terms of giving incentives for efficiency because 
it rewards more efficient aircraft, flight efficiency and the use of high load 
factors. In addition, EU ETS allocations to airlines have been given out for 
free based on an efficiency-related benchmark, which rewards airlines that 
are more efficient. 
Fuel taxes are also an option, although States have only generally applied 
this to domestic aviation and to business aviation. Airlines have generally 
been exempted from taxes such as VAT when they fly internationally, as well 
as from fuel taxes that, for example, apply to road transport. While it is not 
true that the 1944 Chicago Convention prevents the taxation of fuel sup- 
plied to aircraft, it is an enduring myth and there has thus far been insufficient 
political will to make significant changes to this tax exemption. 
The EU always made clear that an agreement adopted at global level is 
by far its preferred outcome. The EU ETS has explicitly foreseen in terms 
of scope to take into account any future agreement. In case of failure, the 
EU has maintained the underlying full EU ETS coverage to all arriving and 
departing flights. The earliest date at which this could occur under the cur- 
rent legislation is 2024. By that time, ICAO should have delivered evidence 
that its global instrument can deliver results as promised. Removing aviation 
from the EU ETS would be a politically fraught exercise, also in the context 
of the Paris Agreement, unless other measures taken at the international level 
prove to be as effective. 
 
7.3.2 Development of CORSIA within ICAO 
ICAO’s global market-based measure, which will be introduced voluntar- 
ily with effect from 2021, is called “CORSIA,” which stands for “Carbon 
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Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation.” ICAO imple- 
ments CORSIA through the adoption of a specific “Standards and Recom- 
mended Practices” (SARPs) that add Annexes to the Chicago Convention, 
along with implementing provisions and guidelines. With effect from 2027, 
CORSIA is meant to be mandatory for most countries. 
A basic principle of the CORSIA scheme is that offsetting obligations 
should apply to all civil aircraft flying between two states that after 2021 
have volunteered to be covered or, from 2027, to all flights between states.30 
CORSIA should last until 2035 and may be extended. A review of its opera- 
tion will take place every three years. The offsetting covers only CO
2 
emis- 
sions above the level of international civil aviation’s CO
2 
emissions in 2020, 
31 
unlike the EU ETS, which covers all CO
2 
emissions from flights covered by 
the intra-EEA scope. 
The following issues are of particular importance to the operation of 
CORSIA: 
 
7.3.2.1 Equal treatment on flight routes 
As noted previously in respect of the EU ETS, non-discriminatory applica- 
tion on flight routes is fundamental for a market-based measure to work. 
The 2016 Assembly Resolution emphasised that the ICAO scheme must 
“apply to all aircraft operators on the same routes between States with a view 
to minimising market distortion.”32 The experience with the EU ETS has 
shown how important enforcement is and in this area, the ICAO SARPS 
and draft implementing rules provide that states should not be able to enforce 
the scheme on any airline based in another country except if “mutual agree- 
ment” is given.33 This is not encouraging in terms of avoiding distortions of 
competition. “Mutual agreement” is, by definition, bilateral and should not 
be a feature of a system that claims to be global and multilateral. This bilateral 
instead of multilateral approach towards enforcement will undoubtedly put 
the non-discriminatory approach at risk. 
 
7.3.2.2 Governance arrangements and avoidance 
of “double counting” 
At the heart of equivalence are robust and comparable Monitoring, Report- 
ing and Verification (MRV) provisions, adopted by the ICAO Council in 
June 2018. The MRV obligations are meant to apply to the operators based in 
ICAO Member States that undertake international flights. Reporting should 
apply in respect of emissions from 1 January 2019 and runs to the end of 2020. 
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This MRV exercise alone will be valuable as a comprehensive data- 
gathering exercise that is needed to establish the baseline of emissions that 
will serve as the starting point to measure emissions growth of international 
aviation from 2020. This continuing monitoring obligation will serve as the 
basis for calculating the growth in subsequent years to determine the liability 
that will be distributed amongst participating operators. This unprecedented 
sectoral MRV exercise with global application will provide a much more 
detailed picture of the respective contributions to CO
2 
emissions from inter- 
national civil aviation, on the basis of which future policy decisions can be 
taken. For this reason alone, CORSIA is a worthwhile exercise, whatever its 
other weaknesses. 
Under the Paris Agreement, practically all countries are now making 
commitments to reduce emissions. A new market for international credits 
should come mainly from Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, which should be 
operationalised in a way that rewards action going beyond national commit- 
ments and “business as usual.” Ensuring the absence of double counting of 
reductions represented by eligible offsets under CORSIA is fundamental to 
the environmental integrity of the global market-based mechanism, for even 
inadvertent double counting would be as much of a blow to credibility as the 
circulation of counterfeit bank notes in an economy. 
The EU, as the most steadfast supporter of multilateralism, has already 
made clear that it will implement the ICAO scheme through an amendment 
to the EU ETS. For this to happen, however, more clarity is needed about the 
eligible offsets, the oversight arrangements and finally about when and how 
other countries put in place their national provisions.34 
 
7.3.2.3 Meaningful offsets 
One area where ICAO could usefully build on experience of the EU ETS is 
in relation to international credits. As explained in Chapter 4, standards were 
needed to ensure that credits used within the EU ETS represented real emis- 
sion reductions. It seems obvious that ICAO must ensure a clear legal basis to 
set environmental quality standards for credits.35 
In the absence of such a legal basis, CORSIA is likely to accept sev- 
eral offsetting programmes, notwithstanding that there are already more than 
7000 Clean Development Mechanism projects,36 and there is no shortage 
of credits that could be issued. Recent research by the Stockholm Envi- 
ronment Institute37 indicates that the supply potential from registered and 
implemented Clean Development Mechanism projects alone amounts to 
4.7 billion tonnes. This volume could quickly come to market should a 
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2 
price signal emerge. This amount is well in excess of the expected offsetting 
need for the growth of international civil aviation through to 2035, estimated 
to be less than three billion tonnes of CO .38 If supply exceeds demand there 
will be no scarcity and hence no meaningful price. It can be anticipated that 
most Clean Development Mechanism credits could be supplied at a price 
below €1 per tonne. 
Europe has therefore argued that offsets eligible under CORSIA should 
be restricted to projects initiated from 2016 onwards. The year 2016 is the 
year of the ICAO Assembly Resolution relating to CORSIA and the entry 
into force of the Paris Agreement. Addressing the quality and quantity of the 
credits is critical to any meaningful environmental added value to CORSIA. 
This is still not resolved at the time of writing. 
 
7.3.2.4 Reconciling “common but differentiated 
responsibilities” 
There are very large differences between the levels of aviation emissions of 
countries. ICAO’s aspirational goal of “carbon-neutral growth from 2020”39 
is a collective goal. It relies on the efforts of all states and airlines. Developing 
countries have consistently argued that reduction targets should take into 
account the fact that richer nations are responsible for the bulk of climate 
change to date and therefore should contribute greater reductions. This is a 
prominent theme in the reservations tabled by Argentina, Brazil, China, India, 
Saudi Arabia and Venezuela to the 2016 ICAO Assembly Resolution A39/3 
relating to CORSIA.40 This long list of reservations suggests that this matter 
is not closed. 
 
7.3.2.5 Avoiding further delays to action 
According to early studies commissioned by some airlines, an “open emis- 
sions trading scheme, fully linked to global carbon markets” would meet the 
requirements of the aviation industry.41 The approach of airlines changed 
over time and their focus has more recently been on using ICAO’s global 
scheme to replace the EU ETS.42 There would be a chance of succeeding 
in this if ICAO were to deliver a meaningful, environmentally effective 
market-based measure. However, the timeline for this has been put back. 
The 2013 Assembly resolution43 referred to “mechanisms for the imple- 
mentation of the scheme from 2020,” so as to “strive to achieve a collective 
medium term global aspirational goal of keeping the global net carbon 
emissions from international aviation from 2020 at the same level.” By the 
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Conclusion: The EU ETS includes aviation between European airports on 
a non-discriminatory basis. ICAO has developed a global market-based 
instrument, “CORSIA,” which should offset only CO2 emissions from 
international aviation that exceed their level in 2020. The scheme will 
start on a voluntary basis in 2021 and is meant to become mandatory 
for most airlines by 2027. 
time of the 2016 ICAO Assembly, the idea was adapted so that CORSIA 
should take effect in 2021 on an expressly voluntary basis, while routes 
between all major international aviation states would be covered between 
2027 and 2035.44 
Given the ability for states to oppose and/or file differences to the COR- 
SIA “Standards and Recommended Practices,” states will only actually par- 
ticipate if they agree to do so. ICAO has little ability to remedy in the case 
of non-compliance, and it will take time before all bilateral arrangements 
are aligned. Given the reservations that have been expressed to CORSIA,45 
considerable challenges are yet to be overcome. 
This is in stark contrast to the reality that growing emissions from interna- 
tional civil aviation are far from being consistent with the temperature goals 
of the Paris Agreement. The liberalisation of the EU’s single aviation market 
and the success of low-cost airlines has expanded the market and aviation 
emissions under the EU ETS are projected to increase continuously until 
2030.46 Similarly, in developing countries, aviation’s emissions have been ris- 
ing very rapidly as the sector expands to meet the enormous demand of the 
emerging economies. The EU agreed to extend the current intra-EEA scope 
for another six years until 2023.47 
Carbon pricing remains a key element of the policy measures required 
first to slow the growth and then reduce the emissions from aviation. The 
EU continues to believe in the effectiveness of aviation’s inclusion in the EU 
ETS until the added value of CORSIA has been proven. Despite ICAO’s 
preference for a single uniform global measure applied by states to airlines 
based in those states, national and regional measures may be the outcome 
of a weak or ineffective CORSIA. Governments will have no other option 
than to apply other measures to aviation, such as passenger taxes, sustainable 
alternative fuel mandates and possibly taxes on tickets or fuel, if they are to 
have any hope of bringing aviation’s emissions into line with the temperature 
goals of the Paris Agreement. 
 
 
Transport emissions 157 
 
7.4 Emissions from shipping 
Annual global CO
2 
emissions from shipping exceed 940 million tonnes. By 
2050, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) estimates that these 
could grow by between 50% and 250%, depending on economic and energy 
developments. The CO
2 
is accompanied by emissions of black carbon that 
are considered to have significant climate impacts, in particular in the Arc- 
tic, where they dull the reflective properties of ice, thereby increasing heat 
absorption by ice, accelerating its melting. International journeys cover 
the majority of these emissions, with only 10–15% attributed to national 
“domestic” shipping. 
The EU’s CO
2 
emissions from domestic shipping emissions have, by 2016, 
been reduced by 33.1% below 1990 levels,48 but international shipping emis- 
sions “related” to the EU, i.e., from ships calling to EEA ports from third 
countries and ships sailing between two or more EU Member States, have 
continued to increase and are currently around 32.5% above 1990 levels. 
Many technologies exist to retrofit and to build ships that are more effi- 
cient. Operational measures can reduce emissions and fuel costs, especially 
slow steaming. However, there are continuing market barriers that have lim- 
ited the uptake of these emission reduction possibilities.49 
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FIGURE 7.4 Domestic and international shipping emissions 1990–2016 (MtCO2-eq) 
Source: European Environment Agency (EEA) 
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In recognition of the need for economy-wide action, in 2013 the Euro- 
pean Commission adopted a strategy for progressively integrating maritime 
emissions into the EU’s climate policy.50 Today the emissions of large ships 
using European ports are being monitored, reported and verified (MRV).51 
It has become a robust system that is a prerequisite for further action, and it 
already helps reduce costs by increasing information and transparency on fuel 
use. It also highlights the potential for more cost-effective emission reduc- 
tions, including market-based measures in the future. 
The EU measure also facilitated the adoption of high quality MRV 
standards within IMO. In 2016, the IMO’s Marine Environment Protection 
Committee (MEPC) adopted amendments to the MARPOL Convention 
for a global data collection system for fuel consumption of ships.52 The col- 
lection of fuel consumption data should start on 1 January 2019. It has a 
similar technical scope as the EU’s MRV for shipping (with the same 5000 
gross tonnage threshold), requires the same actors to report annually for 
their ships and introduces a document to demonstrate compliance. In early 
2019, the Commission started the formal process to amend the EU MRV 
in order to take account of the new IMO data collection system. 
In 2018, the IMO agreed for the first time a strategy for the reduction of 
greenhouse gases from ships.53 It comprises both a long-term target to peak 
greenhouse gas emissions from international shipping as soon as possible and 
to reduce the total annual greenhouse emissions “by at least 50% by 2050 
compared to 2008 whilst pursuing efforts towards phasing them out.”There 
is also a commitment to improve the energy intensity of international ship- 
ping and a long list of “candidate measures” that will be further considered 
within the IMO.While the overall ambition of this resolution is encouraging, 
the reality is that agreement on any of these potential measures will be dif- 
ficult. Discussions in the IMO have to reconcile the diverging principles of 
non-discrimination and common but differentiated responsibilities. 
In the 2018 review of the EU ETS Directive, the Commission was asked 
to keep progress in the IMO towards an ambitious emission reduction objec- 
tive “under regular review,” as well as accompanying measures to ensure that 
the sector duly contributes to efforts needed to achieve the objectives agreed 
to under the Paris Agreement. Under existing rules, EU Member States can 
opt to include the transport sector (or parts thereof) within the EU ETS. 
However, no Member State has yet chosen to implement this option uni- 
laterally, even if the EU MRV rules would considerably facilitate this, for 
example for short-sea shipping. 
Similar to international aviation, international shipping generally benefits 
from tax exemption on its fuel, and no VAT applies to passenger traffic. The 
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Conclusion: The EU’s system of Monitoring, Reporting  and  Verifica- 
tion of CO2   emissions for large ships has significantly contributed to   
the development of a global system by the IMO. In 2018, the IMO 
adopted a target to reduce the emissions from international shipping  
by at least 50% in 2050 compared to 2008. 
fact that ships have a capacity to stock a great quantity of fuel significantly 
limits any potential action to limit greenhouse gas emissions based on fuel 
sales. 
The IMO has nevertheless been helpful in several areas. The introduction 
of the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) in 2013 is having a positive 
effect. More than 2,700 new ocean-going ships have been certified and the 
standards are becoming more stringent every five years. This does not trigger 
any absolute reduction of the total emissions from international shipping but 
improves the technology ships use. 
Another area of work of the IMO relates to fuel and its sulphur content 
in particular, under Annex VI of the MARPOL Convention.54 While these 
measures are taken in order to improve air quality, the consequential increase 
in fuel prices does create an increased incentive to use less fuel and conse- 
quently emit less CO
2
. 
The EU supports the IMO with regard to technology transfer and capac- 
ity building and makes a substantial contribution through its funding of the 
Global MTTC Network (GMN).55 The aim of this Network of Maritime 
Technologies Cooperation Centres (MTCCs) is to help beneficiary coun- 
tries limit and reduce greenhouse gas emissions from their shipping sectors 
through technical assistance and capacity building. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The transport sector faces a huge challenge to stabilise and then reduce its 
emissions of greenhouse gases. There are many useful developments across 
the different modes, but overall the results have been disappointing, certainly 
compared to the progress made in “stationary sources” in sectors such as 
power generation or manufacturing. 
Member States are the primary level of intervention to reduce the green- 
house gas emissions of road transport. Indeed, these represent the most 
important part of their mandatory target for 2030 under the Effort Sharing 
Regulation. They have important tools at their disposal such as taxation or 
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urban planning. This chapter only reviews a few EU measures that may be 
critical to help them deliver on their commitment. 
In the road sector, the EU has been going through an important learning 
phase and is now equipped with strong tools that deliver reductions. For cars, 
it turned out that the voluntary approach to CO
2 
performance standards was 
disappointing and that mandatory legislation created the right context for 
companies to innovate and to reduce the emissions per car. However, the 
“diesel-gate” scandal emphasised that solid surveillance mechanisms are also 
required, and these are now in place. This does not diminish the task of the 
Member States to bring down emissions through adapting their infrastruc- 
ture, not least in readiness for the imminent arrival of many more electric 
vehicles. Equally, it does not underplay the critical importance of the creation 
of additional incentives directed towards the consumers, even if only tempo- 
rary, so as to accelerate the necessary changes. 
On lorries, buses and ships, EU action to define standards had to wait for 
the elaboration of a much more complete and solid database. The first step, 
therefore, consisted of generating the detailed information that is undoubt- 
edly going to be the breeding ground for more action. For HDVs, EU stand- 
ards have now been agreed for the first time for both 2025 and 2030. For 
shipping, the EU was successful in having a detailed and transparent MRV 
system put in place, as well as a data collection system adopted by the IMO. 
Equally, the EU continues to maintain pressure for the reduction of emissions 
in line with the IMO’s long-term goal of at least halving shipping emissions 
by 2050 compared to 2008. 
Contrary to the gradual steps forward in other sectors, the aviation sector 
has been slowing down the EU and has prevented the uptake of meaning- 
ful measures. The global offsetting instrument CORSIA had promise at the 
start but has been gradually undermined in its design by a lack of real com- 
mitment by states and by weak leadership from ICAO. Emissions from avia- 
tion are rising rapidly and are undermining the delivery of the goals of the 
Paris Agreement. The time for more tangible regional and national action is 
returning, as public opinion is increasingly upset about the apparent negli- 
gence of the aviation sector. This perception may help put pressure on ICAO 
to take climate change as seriously as it should. 
Technology will undoubtedly play an important role in bringing down 
emissions. One of the recurring themes is that electricity has the potential 
to be a significant game-changer in all modes, for cars and even aviation 
and shipping. That is good news, as we know how to decarbonise electric- 
ity. Equally, hydrogen may find its way to ships, lorries and even planes, and 
fortunately we know how to produce this energy carrier in a green and 
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sustainable manner. The EU ETS Innovation Fund could play an impor- 
tant role for deploying these technologies. Together with more pronounced 
modal shifts, these uses can deliver a critical contribution to the very urgently 
needed decarbonisation of the transport sector. 
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AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY 
IN THE EU’S 2030 CLIMATE 
TARGET 
Artur Runge-Metzger and Peter Wehrheim 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The Paris Agreement, adopted in December 2015, defined the commitment 
of limiting global average temperature to well below 2 °C compared to pre- 
industrial levels and of pursuing efforts towards 1.5 °C. It also stated that 
reaching this target requires “a balance between anthropogenic emissions by 
sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of the 
century.” Moreover, it requests Parties to take action to conserve and enhance, 
as appropriate, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases, including those in 
forests.1 
The European Union committed itself to the target of reducing green- 
house gas emissions by at least 40% by 2030 compared to 1990. This target 
is economy-wide, and agriculture and forestry will have to play their part. 
Both sectors not only generate emissions but also have, unlike most other 
productive sectors, the potential to capture and remove carbon dioxide from 
the atmosphere. This is not only important in view of reaching the EU target 
but also pivotal on a global scale as together agriculture and forestry account 
for about 20–25% of global emissions, mainly through tropical deforestation.2 
In 2017, the EU adopted legislation to enhance net carbon sequestration 
from agricultural land and forestry inside the EU. This chapter sets out how 
these sectors are included within the EU’s commitment for 2030, taking into 
account the complexity of the associated greenhouse gas cycles. Similarly, it 
indicates how the future Common Agricultural Policy can support the EU’s 
climate and energy objectives.3 
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8.1 Agriculture, soils and forestry in different 
pillars of the EU policy 
Greenhouse gas cycles related to agriculture and forestry covering both non- 
CO
2 
and CO
2 
emissions are more complex than those in many other sectors 
(see Figure 8.1). The two main non-CO
2 
greenhouse gases from agriculture 
are nitrous oxide (N
2
O) from the use of nitrogen fertilisers and methane 
(CH
4
) produced by cows and sheep when digesting their feed. In 2015, these 
accounted for more than half of total non-CO
2 
emissions in the EU, repre- 
senting approximately 10% of the EU’s total emissions. 
These emissions are not subject to a specific sub-target for agriculture, 
neither at EU nor at Member State levels. Together with the greenhouse 
gas emissions from households, transport and waste, they constitute the sec- 
tors covered by a binding target each Member State has to respect under 
the Effort Sharing Regulation in view of delivering a collective reduction 
of 30% by 2030 compared to 2005. This Regulation takes into account the 
specific situation of Member States, such as Ireland, Latvia and Denmark that 
have large shares of non-CO
2 
emissions from agriculture. 
In addition to reducing emissions of non-CO
2  
greenhouse gases, agri- 
culture and forestry have the potential to help the climate problem by 
absorbing CO
2 
into agricultural soils and forests (left side in Figure 8.1). 
The uptake – or removal – of CO
2 
is reversible. When trees are cut down 
or grassland is ploughed up to create arable land, the carbon stored in the 
trees or soil is released into the atmosphere where it contributes to the 
greenhouse effect. To assess the contribution of land use and forestry to cli- 
mate protection, it is critical to know how the balance between emissions 
and removals from agriculture and forestry evolves over time. If more CO
2 
is stored in trees and less CO
2 
escapes from agricultural land due to better 
soil protection, the contribution to climate protection increases. Moreover, 
agriculture and forestry, if properly managed, can produce sustainable raw 
materials for industry, the energy and transport sectors allowing them to 
replace the use of fossil fuels. 
The measurement and reporting of the emissions and removals from 
agricultural land and forestry needed to be improved before they could be 
included in climate mitigation commitments. The complexity does not 
merely stem from the fact that there are both emissions and removals and that 
vast areas of land and very different land use systems have to be covered. It is 
also a challenge to measure the fluxes of carbon in and out of natural sinks 
and to identify which parts of these fluxes are anthropogenic, i.e., the result 
of human actions and decisions, such as the decision whether to use land for 
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Conclusion: Greenhouse  emissions  from  agriculture  and  forestry  
are significant. They represent both emissions and removals of CO
2
, 
and on balance they increasingly help Europe to cope with climate 
change. 
settlements, agriculture or forests, or to drain peat or wetlands. Safeguards are 
necessary to ensure that net emissions are reduced as a result of sustainable 
land use management. 
To address these challenges based on best available knowledge, the 
International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) provided relevant recom- 
mendations4 for the so-called “Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry” 
(LULUCF) sector. 
In Europe, the main LULUCF categories are cropland and grassland, 
wetlands, managed forestland, settlements and other lands. Figure 8.2 shows 
reported emissions and removals for these land use categories across the 28 
Member States of the European Union. It shows the net positive contribu- 
tion of Europe’s forests and lands to the overall climate problem in the EU. 
The gross removal of carbon by forests over the past two decades was much 
higher than the emissions from, for example, changes in land use from forest 
to settlements or the emissions from arable land. 
However, under the approach taken under the Kyoto Protocol, what mat- 
ters in view of meeting targets is not the absolute quantities of removals or 
emissions from forests and land.5 What matters are the changes in removals 
and emissions compared to a particular reference year. In order to identify 
these additional changes, the inclusion of LULUCF into national commit- 
ments are calculated against well-defined benchmarks or reference years and 
these are developed in the accounting rules. 
Consequently, Figure 8.2 also shows the estimates of accounted removals 
for the LULUCF in the EU. The two shaded rectangles below the X-axis 
in Figure 8.2 show the accounted amounts of removals for the 15 Member 
States of the EU prior to 2004, during the Kyoto Protocol’s first commit- 
ment period from 2008–2012 (left rectangle) and for the 28 Member States 
during the second commitment period from 2013–2016 (right rectangle). 
The accounted removals became larger in absolute terms in the second com- 
mitment period due to changes in accounting rules and due to the EU’s 
enlargement. 
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Conclusion: The implementation of the Kyoto Protocol created the first 
EU’s accounting rules for LULUCF. Managed forests represent a consid- 
erable removal category and diminish the EU’s overall net contribution 
to greenhouse gas emissions. 
8.2 The Kyoto Protocol and agriculture and land use 
In 2012, the EU made a first step towards incorporating removals and emis- 
sions from LULUCF into its climate policy.6 Accounting rules for green- 
house gas emissions and removals in the forest and agriculture sectors were 
established. However, this sector was still not included in the EU’s domestic 
climate commitment from 2013 to 2020. 
As a result, EU Member States improved their monitoring capacity 
with respect to agricultural land, not least on cropland and grazing land 
management. The “LULUCF Information Action” reports generated 
important information, for instance by identifying the most important 
“hot-spots” of emissions and removals and hence the most promising mit- 
igation actions in the Member States. For the years 2013–16, LULUCF 
generated a surplus of removals over emissions of 100 to 120 million 
tonnes of CO
2
-equivalent per annum with a slightly declining trend (see 
Figure 8.3). The main driver behind the trend is a slight decrease in the 
accounted sink from forests. 
Figure 8.4 shows significant variation between Member States and indi- 
cates that the amount of removals realised through managed forests is siz- 
able.7 The accounting rules for managed forests include a provision that 
limits the use of removals from this category up to 3.5% of the Member 
States’ total emissions in 1990. It also shows that results for the category of 
afforestation are always positive (generating accounted removals), while the 
results for deforestation are always negative (generating accounted emis- 
sions). Cropland sometimes creates accounted emissions (e.g., for Ger- 
many) and sometimes removals (e.g., for Portugal or United Kingdom). 
Some of these variations are caused by different benchmarks but are also 
driven by different soil types and different management practices in the 
Member States. 
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8.3 The LULUCF regulatory framework 
for 2021–2030 
With the ratification of the Paris Agreement, the EU adopted a new 2030 
target in which the LULUCF sector was included for the first time. This 
sector is not supposed to generate net emissions and should enhance sinks 
in the long term. To reach this objective, a new Regulation establishes an 
important new commitment for LULUCF for each Member State: the sum 
of emissions and removals from all land use categories must not result in net 
emissions, referred to as the so-called “no debit rule.”9 
In addition, removals are encouraged as a cost-effective option. If, after the 
use of existing flexibilities, for example trade of LULUCF “credits” between 
Member States (see Chapter 5), a Member State would still have emissions 
from LULUCF, they would have to be balanced by additional emission 
reductions in the other sectors covered by the Effort Sharing Regulation. If, 
on the contrary, a Member State generates a net removal under its LULUCF 
sector, it can use part of it to meet its national target under the Effort Sharing 
Regulation. However, for the EU as a whole the use of net removals that can 
be used for other sectors not covered by the EU ETS is limited to 280 mil- 
lion tonnes of CO
2
-equivalent over the ten-year period from 2021–2030, or 
on average 28 million per year. This will ensure that there is still need for 
strong reductions in the sectors covered by the Effort Sharing Regulation. 
The exact amount of the limit for each Member State is determined accord- 
ing to its share of agricultural non-CO
2 
emissions. 
The LULUCF Regulation also specifies the main accounting rules for 
2021–2030: 
 
• Cropland and grassland: changes in emissions and removals in a given 
year are compared to the emissions/removals in an historical base-period 
(2005–2009), thus following the so-called “net-net” approach. The new 
reference period is more recent and should facilitate the identification 
of changes in emissions and/or removals that are the result of different 
management practices on agricultural land. 
• Deforested and afforested land: total emissions and removals for each 
of the years in the period (“gross-net” approach). Afforested/deforested 
land normally stays in this land use category for 20 years. 
• Managed forestland: accounting happens in comparison to projections 
of available biomass and harvest, the so-called “Forest Reference Levels.” 
These Forest Reference Levels will take, for example, age class charac- 
teristics of the forests fully into account. 
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In addition, other provisions in the LULUCF Regulation ensure that the 
accounting of emissions and removals is fair and balanced and that adequate 
incentives for additional mitigation action are given: 
 
• Forestland flexibility: Member States have some flexibility up to a speci- 
fied level to increase their harvest beyond the level included in the Forest 
Reference Level without generating emissions. The use of this flexibil- 
ity, however, is associated with safeguards: (1) LULUCF sector at EU- 
level must still meet the “no debit rule”; and (2) the forest sector in the 
Member State utilising the flexibility must, overall, generate removals. 
• Harvested wood products: the legislation acknowledges the benefits of 
material substitution, i.e., the benefits of substituting fossil-based materi- 
als or materials production, for example construction material like steel 
or cement, with timber products. Emissions associated with long-lived 
wood products are distributed over time. For instance, emissions for har- 
vested biomass converted into construction wood is given a half-life 
value of 25 years. For biomass used for the production of bioenergy, 
100% of the emissions enter the accounts in the year of harvest. 
• General provisions on accounting: given the complexities of monitor- 
ing emissions and removals from LULUCF, Member States are obliged 
to comply with best practice principles of accounting with regard to 
accuracy, completeness, consistency, comparability and transparency. 
• Natural disturbances: exceptions are granted in events of natural disasters 
that are not man-made. For instance, if there is significant deforestation 
because of storms or due to forest fires, the associated emissions are 
exempt from accounting. 
• Member States have to comply by 2027 and again in 2032. This will allow 
the calculation of the Union’s total emissions and removals for each land 
use category compared to the average value in the period from 2000–2009. 
 
Overall, the new Regulation develops the LULUCF sector as a new self- 
standing third pillar of EU climate policy, alongside the EU ETS and the 
Effort Sharing Regulation. It puts the focus on identifying changes in remov- 
als and emissions from land that are human induced, i.e., the result of different 
types of land management. The new accounting rules are built on a science- 
based approach, robust and close a number of loopholes that were present 
in the previous legislation.10 The new LULUCF Regulation implements a 
major commitment of the Paris Agreement, as it incentivises conservation, 
restoration and expansion of forest and soil carbon sinks in view of reaching 
carbon neutrality by the mid-century. 
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Conclusion: The EU’s 2030 target includes  the  LULUCF  (Land  Use, Land 
Use Change and Forestry) sector and represents  an  emerging  new 
third pillar in EU climate policy, in addition to the EU ETS and the Effort 
Sharing Regulation. This sector will not generate net emissions but 
enhance carbon sequestration and sinks in view of contributing to 
carbon neutrality by mid-century. 
Nevertheless, a reliable accounting system and methodology has some chal- 
lenges.11 For instance, the capacity of forests to absorb carbon is cyclical and 
depends on the age of the trees. The carbon storage will therefore increase or 
decrease depending on natural growth and harvest cycles under sustainable 
forest management. Setting a forest reference level should reflect this basic fact. 
The accounting system explicitly encourages the harvesting of trees at maturity, 
followed by replanting with young trees that will absorb the carbon. 
Another major issue is the avoidance of double counting of emissions 
from biomass used as bioenergy. The EU’s Emissions Trading System does 
not account for these emissions, nor does the Effort Sharing Regulation 
when biomass is used for heating by households. The new LULUCF 
Regulation now takes account of these emissions, as long as these origi- 
nate from EU forests, insofar as the harvest rate is above forest reference 
levels. The Paris Agreement foresees equivalent rules for accounting for 
emissions related to biomass imported from outside the EU. 
 
 
 
8.4 The enabling environment for climate action 
in forestry and agriculture 
As outlined previously, agriculture can make a significant contribution to 
climate mitigation. It can reduce non-CO
2 
emissions, for example in the 
livestock sector or in fertilisers and fuels use, and it can make an additional 
contribution by increasing carbon storage and sequestration. Consequently, 
the list of “climate smart” measures available to agriculture and forestry is 
much longer than in many other sectors: 
 
• Introduction of leguminous crops on arable land; 
• Reduced use of fertiliser, fuel and electricity, e.g., through use of nitro- 
gen balances and precision farming; 
• Better manure storage and spreading closer to the ground; 
• Enhanced use of feed and livestock breeding and herd management; 
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2 
• Improving the carbon content in agricultural soils by reducing tillage to 
the minimum, maintenance of permanent soil cover and enhancement 
of soil organic matter through mulch (conservation agriculture); 
• Avoiding ploughing-up of grassland; 
• Changing farming practices on former wetlands and peatlands that are 
rich in organic matter, the cultivation of which causes almost 100 Mil- 
lion tonnes of CO
2 
emissions a year, i.e., almost equivalent to the entire 
net emission removals from LULUCF across the EU;12 
• Combining agricultural use and trees. For example, in France, walnut 
trees are sometimes cultivated between fields; research in Ireland shows 
that planting of 200 poplar trees per hectare in a silvo-pasture system 
will almost treble the annual sequestration of carbon on the farm on a 
per-hectare basis;13 
• Afforestation, in particular on marginal lands; 
• Improving the use intensity of forests: where more trees grow or where 
trees grow faster, more carbon is stored on average; 
• Using previously unused biomass (e.g., plant growth on roadsides but 
also manure, farm residues, food waste) for bio-energy production. 
 
Many of these options also improve agricultural productivity, while at the 
same time contributing to the protection of biodiversity. Measures to increase 
the content of organic matter in intensively farmed soils can also help safe- 
guard their long-term productivity.At the same time, such measures normally 
also reduce soil erosion and increase the presence of microorganisms. 
Globally, natural climate solutions could provide some 37% of the cost- 
effective CO
2 
mitigation needed through to 2030 in order to hold global 
warming below 2°C. One third of these would cost less than €10 per tonne 
of CO -equivalent.14 However, trade-offs with other environmental objec- 
tives, for example if afforestation does not respect biodiversity, and with food, 
security objectives may occur. Therefore, a coherent approach taking into 
account broader sustainability considerations is necessary. 
Most rural development programmes co-financed through the EU’s cur- 
rent Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) already demonstrate “climate-smart” 
land management practices. The Commission proposal for the CAP in the 
period from 2021 to 2027 further reinforces climate objectives and measures. 
The proposal includes a new “green architecture” that will increase the climate 
ambition.15 Through a more strategic and results-based approach, the Member 
States will have the flexibility to support farmers and foresters with a more 
targeted agricultural policy than today. Pilots for “carbon credit schemes” that 
would incentivise agricultural emission reductions and increases in carbon 
sinks could be designed and tested by individual Member States. 
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Conclusion: The forestry and agriculture sectors have considerable cli- 
mate action potential. Many “best practices,” proven through public 
support, could become part of the future Common Agricultural Policy, 
as they are both cost-effective and enhance productivity. 
In addition to the Common Agricultural Policy, other EU funds support 
climate action related to agriculture, land use and forestry: 
 
• The EU’s Horizon 2020 programme supports a number of climate action 
projects related to agriculture and forestry under its “Societal Challenge 2: 
Food security and climate change.”A specific budget of €10 billion from the 
new research programme “Horizon Europe” will be set aside for research 
and innovation in food, agriculture, rural development and the bio-economy. 
• The EU’s environment and climate instrument, LIFE, supports the agri- 
culture and forestry sectors for example for maintaining or increasing 
biodiversity, improving air and water quality, as well as climate change 
mitigation and adaptation. LIFE projects are important for developing 
and testing new methods and knowledge related to climate-smart agri- 
culture and land use. The LIFE programme is a “field laboratory,” test- 
ing practical examples that can be rolled out at larger scale in other EU 
policies, such as the CAP, or national policies if tested successfully. 
 
 
8.5 Forward looking climate policies in view of 2050 
Looking beyond 2030, further reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and 
increasing removals will become more challenging in the EU, especially 
where farmers and foresters experience hotter summers and scarcer water 
resources. While other sectors in the EU will substantially decarbonise by 
2050, agricultural emissions may not reduce to the same extent and by then 
they may well constitute one third of total EU emissions. In the second half 
of the century, when global and EU emissions will have to reduce to net zero 
and below, the agriculture, forestry and land use sectors will be key to balanc- 
ing the remaining emissions with sufficient removals. 
In order to stay below 1.5°C, some authors consider that a cumulative quan- 
tity of 500 megatons of CO
2
, equivalent to 115 years of the EU’s 2015 green- 
house gas emissions, will have to be captured from the atmosphere by 2100.16 
One of the technologies suggested is Bioenergy Carbon Capture and Storage 
(BECCS). In scenarios consistent with keeping the average global temperature 
increase to below 2°C, the amount of BECCS could be as high as 3.3 mega- 
tons a year. However, this could require the use of 25–46% of permanently 
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Conclusion: By the mid-century, the LULUCF sectors will play a crucial role 
as carbon sinks to offset other unavoidable emissions. Robust monitoring 
and accounting systems and new policy instruments are a pre-condition to 
allow for the creation of adequate incentives to farmers and forest owners. 
cultivated arable land.17 All other natural climate solutions like the restoration 
of wetlands, reforestation, avoided forestland conversion and improved forest 
management will therefore have to play an equally important role.18 
At the same time, as the global population rises, the demand for agricul- 
tural products will increase, and so will the demand for agricultural and for- 
estry raw materials to substitute fossil fuels as feedstock. With limited arable 
land available, this will only be possible with very significant improvements in 
agricultural and forest productivity, which must also be sustainable. 
Consequently, after 2030 agriculture and forestry will have to play an 
increasingly prominent role in EU climate policy. A more systematic moni- 
toring of the dynamics of land use and land use changes will allow a better 
understanding of its drivers. Specific attention should go to potential indirect 
land use changes that modifications in global supply and demand of agricul- 
tural and forestry products could induce. In this respect, the EU’s Copernicus 
satellite Earth observation programme can play a key role. It can provide the 
necessary geo-referenced data, especially if combined with other data sources 
like representative soil surveys and LULUCF inventory data. 
Better modelling integrating agriculture, forestry and land use should progress 
considerably in the coming years. This should highlight the potential opportuni- 
ties of the bio-economy in offering new productive linkages between agriculture 
and forestry on the one hand and industrial and energy sectors on the other. This 
will likely lead to the further evolution of LULUCF reporting and accounting in 
the coming decade, which will gradually allow for its complete integration into 
EU climate policy. 
Finally, new policy instruments need to be developed in the coming ten 
years that will reward farmers and foresters for climate-smart agriculture, 
carbon farming and forestry and other natural climate solutions. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The agriculture and forestry sectors represent a growing area of attention for cli- 
mate policy in Europe and around the world. The reason is that they are not only 
emitting greenhouse gas emissions but can also become an important source of 
removals of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Recent research highlights that 
emissions and removals from forests also play a key role in the overall pledges the 
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signatories to the Paris climate Agreement came forward with in 2015. Globally, a 
quarter of the planned emission reductions by 2030 will come from the land use 
sector, mainly through the reduction of deforestation in developing countries.19 
As there are still many uncertain elements about the fluxes of CO
2 
the 
land use sector generates, much attention has been paid to how to better 
monitor and account for these emissions. One can expect that new technolo- 
gies such as Earth monitoring and space observation will become a useful 
support to the statistical efforts that have so far been undertaken. 
The EU started to account for these emissions as part of its implementa- 
tion of the Kyoto Protocol. As these rules are about to expire, the recently 
adopted LULUCF Regulation will apply from 2021. At the same time, this 
new sector has been brought into the overall EU target of an “at least 40%” 
greenhouse gas reduction by 2030. Gradually a new third pillar is emerging 
alongside the EU Emissions Trading System and Effort Sharing Regulation. 
It is now high time to develop appropriate policies to improve the uptake 
of carbon into Europe’s soils and forests. The challenge for realising a car- 
bon neutral Europe by 2050 will require a substantial removal capacity to 
neutralise emissions that are unavoidable in other sectors of the economy. 
All available analysis indicates that with current and expected new technolo- 
gies, it will be extremely difficult to reduce the emissions by more than 80 
to 90% compared to 1990, hence the need to foster the capabilities of the 
agriculture and forestry sectors. Local and national authorities, encouraged 
by European funds such as those linked to the Common Agricultural Policy, 
should encourage much more action in this area. 
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Introduction 
The idea of mainstreaming climate action into other policies gained traction in 
the EU in the years running up to the Paris Agreement of 2015. It is increasingly 
recognised that mainstreaming climate change considerations into a wide range 
of policies is unavoidable if we want to cope with the huge challenge ahead. 
There is an important opportunity in extending and reviewing environ- 
mental legislation to incorporate climate concerns. This applies in particular 
to the emissions of methane and black carbon that is included in EU regula- 
tions on industrial emissions. These substances, together with fluorinated 
gases, have a significantly stronger global warming effect than carbon dioxide. 
There is also the question about how to adapt the EU to the effects of climate 
change following from the “well below 2°C” scenario as adopted by the Paris 
Agreement. Member States urgently need to prepare for a ramping up of 
infrastructure investment responding to climate impacts. Finally, an impor- 
tant part of the mainstreaming relates to the EU’s multiannual budget and to 
private finance. This is not only necessary to fund the transition required to 
meet the global temperature goals of the Paris Agreement but also to fund 
the adaptation that will be needed. 
 
9.1 Phasing down the use of fluorinated gases 
International agreements often trigger the initiation of EU policy develop- 
ment. In the case of the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the 
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Ozone Layer and the Montreal Protocol, international agreements led to the 
taking the first EU actions and initiatives. Similarly, methane emissions are 
addressed in the international context, including in cooperation with the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe’s (UNECE) Convention 
on Long Range and Transboundary Air Pollution, the Climate and Clean 
Air Coalition and the Global Methane Initiative. These examples illustrate 
the interrelations, once again, between the compatibility of EU actions with 
international processes that can act as a catalyst, or at the very least as a frame- 
work, for European action. 
 
9.1.1 Addressing the hole in the ozone layer 
internationally 
The Montreal Protocol on ozone-depleting substances was adopted in 1987 
to counter the effects of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and then hydrochloro- 
fluorocarbons (HCFCs) on the world’s ozone layer. Following the phase-out 
of CFCs and HCFCs, hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) became the alternative of 
choice for use in the refrigeration, air-conditioning and heat-pump sectors as 
well as being used as the extrusion agent in foams and aerosols. 
These fluorinated gases, also known as “F-gases,” are very powerful green- 
house gases. Their potential warming effect on the atmosphere can be up to 
23,000 times higher than carbon dioxide’s. Since 2006, the EU has prohibited 
certain uses of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and other fluorinated greenhouse 
gases, given the availability of alternative substances. It put in place strict rules 
to prevent leakage of the gases from products and to ensure appropriate treat- 
ment at the end of their life.1 In Europe, as elsewhere in the world, HFCs 
helped solve the problem of protecting the ozone layer but, given their high 
greenhouse gas potency, made the climate problem worse. 
The EU was very active in remedying this situation, domestically and 
internationally. In 2016, in Kigali, the Parties to the Montreal Protocol agreed 
to a global phase-down of the production and consumption of HFCs. This 
Kigali Amendment entered into force in January 2019. It represents a “top- 
down” approach of target setting that will be facilitated by a Multilateral 
Fund ensuring developing country compliance. 
There are three separate schedules to “phase-down,” or reduce the pro- 
duction of, HFCs: 
 
• Developed countries: from a 2011–2013 baseline, a reduction of 85% by 
2036; 
• Developing countries (other than those specified in the 3rd schedule): from 
a 2020–2022 baseline, with a 2024 freeze, a reduction of 80% by 2045; 
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Conclusion: There will be 0.4°C less global warming by the end of the 
century thanks to the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol. It 
phases-down the use of HFCs and will avoid more than 80 billion tonnes 
of CO
2
-equivalent in greenhouse gas emissions. It corrects the unin- 
tended consequences of phasing out ozone-depleting CFCs and global 
warming HCFCs. 
• Developing countries (Bahrain, India, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates): from a 2024–2026 
baseline, with a 2028 freeze, a reduction of 85% by 2047. 
 
By 2050, this phase-down will avoid over 73 billion tonnes CO
2
-equivalent, 
and at least a further 10 billion tonnes CO
2
-equivalent of HFC23 by- 
production will be destroyed.According to the United Nations Environment 
Programme, this will avoid up to 0.4°C of global warming this century. It is 
expected to cost, in terms of the necessary replenishments of the Multilateral 
Fund, between $6–10 billion over the same period. 
With implementation of the Kigali amendment, the “remedy” for global 
warming HFCs that initially replaced ozone-depleting substances (CFCs and 
HCFCs) is agreed. The phasing-out over time is to enable developing coun- 
tries in particular to adapt gradually and reduce the costs of compliance. It 
has taken time to acknowledge unintended consequences of action to address 
the ozone hole and to address them, but while time is often needed to adapt, 
the result is more robust. 
 
 
9.1.2 EU legislation implementing the Montreal Protocol 
and the Kigali Amendment 
The EU started regulating HFCs from 2006. The main refrigerant used in 
mobile air conditioning, HFC134a, has a global warming impact 1,300 times 
higher than CO
2. T
o pre-empt an expected sharp increase in these emissions, the 
2006 EU Mobile Air Conditioning (MAC) Directive2 required all new types of 
passenger cars sold from 2011 to use cooling agents with a greenhouse warming 
potential of less than 150 times that of CO
2
. From 2018, all new passenger cars 
have to use these less climate potent refrigerants in their air conditioning systems. 
The EU Directive on handling of end-of-life vehicles3 has required the collec- 
tion and proper disposal of scrapped mobile air conditioners. 
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Perfluorocarbons (PFCs) released from primary aluminium production 
are covered by the EU’s Emissions Trading System from 2013 onwards. 
The small number of producers in the semiconductor industry that emit 
PFCs made a voluntary agreement to reduce their absolute PFC emissions 
by 10% in 2010 compared to 1995, and they made a 41% reduction over 
this period.4 
With the help of all the previously mentioned measures, European emis- 
sions of “F-gases” have stopped increasing and have stabilised at levels of 
110–120 million tonnes of CO
2
-equivalent. This is still, however, a level 
inconsistent with a 40% greenhouse gas reduction foreseen for 2030. In 2014, 
therefore, a new F-gas Regulation5 was adopted to phase-down the total 
amount of HFCs that can be sold in the EU from 2015 to one-fifth of today’s 
sales by 2030. This will cut emissions at marginal costs per tonne roughly 
equal to the overall marginal costs needed to reduce the EU´s greenhouse gas 
emissions by 40%. By 2030, the Regulation is expected to reduce the EU’s 
F-gas emissions by around 70 million tonnes of CO
2
-equivalent, in other 
words, two-thirds below today’s levels (see Figure 9.1). 
 
 
140 
 
120 
 
100 
 
80 
 
60 
 
40 
 
20 
 
0 
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
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Conclusion: The EU has put in place legislation to phase-down the use   
of fluorinated gases and to incentivise the deployment of alternatives 
with much lower global warming potential, such as CO2 itself. This has 
been crucial in view of the more widespread use of air-conditioning, in 
light-duty passenger vehicles for example. 
This measure is a very important piece of legislation that stimulates inno- 
vation and boosts European companies’ leadership in the sector. Data from 
2015, 2016 and 2017, the first three years of the phase-down,6 show the tar- 
get being achieved. In addition, the Commission has published a number of 
reports addressing specific issues. These include barriers caused by standards 
allowing low global warming potential alternatives to HFCs to come to the 
market,7 availability of qualified personnel to ensure the effective installation 
and servicing of equipment,8 the efficacy of the quota allocation system9 and 
alternatives to HFCs for use in multipack centralised refrigeration systems.10 
 
 
9.2 Short-lived climate forcers: methane 
and black carbon 
Short-lived climate forcers are pollutants that stay in the atmosphere for a lim- 
ited number of years while having a significant impact on the climate because 
of their high global warming potential.Apart from fluorinated gases, the most 
important short-lived climate forcer is methane. Another is black carbon, or 
soot, caused by the incomplete combustion of fossil fuels or biomass. 
Methane is a greenhouse gas covered specifically by the Kyoto Protocol but 
black carbon is not, yet it has a global warming effect by absorbing sunlight and 
reducing the albedo effect of ice and snow. The EU’s nationally determined 
contribution under the Paris Agreement applies as a metric for greenhouse gas 
emissions a global warming potential on a 100-year timescale, in accordance 
with the IPCC’s Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories. The 
EU’s climate legislation for 2020 and for 2030 is based on the use of these val- 
ues. Over a 100-year period, methane has a greenhouse gas warming potential 
25 times higher than carbon dioxide. 
The major sources for methane in the EU are agriculture, followed by 
waste management and energy. Methane emissions from agriculture arise in 
particular from livestock, caused by enteric fermentation in cattle and sheep, 
as well as during the management of animal manure. Methane emissions from 
the waste sector are caused by waste decomposition in landfill sites and from 
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wastewater treatment. Energy sources of methane result from both leakage 
from fossil fuel extraction and production, as well as leakage from the pipe- 
line transportation of gas.11 
Data on methane (CH
4
) emissions, for example from leakage of the oil and 
gas sector in the EU, are based on national reports that are reviewed by inter- 
national experts and (partially) rely on data from industry. The Commission 
 
 
800 
 
700 
 
600 
 
 
500 
 
 
400 
 
 
300 
 
 
200 
Other 
Fuel combustion 
Fugitive emissions from fuels 
Wastewater treatment and discharge 
Solid waste disposal 
Livestock - manure management 
Livestock - enteric fermentation 
 
100 
 
0 
 
300 
 
250 
 
200 
 
 
 
150 
 
 
 
100 
 
Livestock - enteric fermentation 
Livestock - manure management 
Solid waste disposal 
Wastewater treatment and discharge 
Fugitive emissions from fuels 
Fuel combustion 
Other 
 
50 
 
0 
 
FIGURE 9.2 Methane emissions in the EU, 1990–2016 (MtCO2eq) 
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supports the development of independent CH
4 
measurement tools through 
the EU’s R&D programme “Horizon 2020.”This includes the use of satellite 
data to understand the scale and variation of emissions from different sources 
better. This is expected to be operational in 2022. 
As explained in Chapter 5, methane emissions from all sources in the EU 
are covered by the Effort Sharing Regulation.With current legislation in place, 
methane emissions are expected to decrease in the future (see Figure 9.3). Look- 
ing at agriculture, methane emissions from livestock are driven by demand for 
animal products (dairy as well as meat) and productivity changes. Despite the 
increase in animal numbers, methane emissions from agriculture are expected 
to remain stable at a level of some 250 million tonnes of CO
2
-equivalent. This 
is mainly the result of the expected increase in the use of anaerobic digestion 
to recover heat and electricity. Several Member States have incentives in place 
to foster this technology as part of their national strategies to meet the agreed 
national targets for renewable energy in the EU in 2020. The Commission is 
also examining the possibility of funding options to reduce methane emissions 
in agriculture as part of the Common Agricultural Policy. 
In the energy sector, methane emissions are expected to decline over 
time from around 90 million tonnes of CO
2
-equivalent in 2005 to less than 
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FIGURE 9.3 The expected development of EU methane emission with current 
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50 million tonnes in 2030. This decline is mainly due to the expected reduc- 
tion in the production of coal and, to a smaller extent, reduced oil and gas 
consumption. Methane leakage from gas consumption is not expected to 
decline much since gas consumption is foreseen to go down only marginally 
and demand is expected to shift in the EU to countries with higher leakage 
rates, thus partially compensating for the beneficial effect of the reduction in 
consumption. 
In the wastewater sector, methane emissions are expected to remain more 
or less constant through to 2050 at a level of around 40 million tonnes of 
CO
2
-equivalent. The emissions from the waste sector as a whole are foreseen 
to decline significantly, following the implementation of the Landfill Direc- 
tive.12 The Landfill Directive requires the volume of biodegradable waste that 
is sent to landfill to be reduced by 65% in 2018. Several Member States, 
such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands have even 
banned the landfilling of biodegradable waste. Methane emissions from the 
waste sector fell by 35% between 1990 and 2010, mainly because of the 
Landfill Directive. 
Methane is not only a greenhouse gas but also a major ozone precursor 
to background ozone concentrations. Following adoption of the National 
Emission Ceilings Directive13 that sets limits for air pollutants, the Commis- 
sion published its First Clean Air Outlook.14 Member States have to submit 
their National Air Pollution Control Programmes by 1 April 2019. 
Black carbon particles enter the atmosphere around the world from 
sources including the burning of household firewood, other biomass and 
coal. Other sources are exhaust fumes from road vehicles, agricultural and 
industrial machinery and power plants. Sooty particles also form when oil 
and is burnt or flared-off in oil fields. They also form during forest fires. 
The World Health Organisation has reported that black carbon causes health 
problems including heart, circulatory and respiratory diseases, as well as pre- 
mature deaths. Temperatures in the Arctic are rising more than twice as rap- 
idly as global average temperatures. Approximately 20 to 25% of warming in 
the Arctic today is caused by black carbon. The sooty particles fall onto snow 
and ice, absorb sunlight and reduce the reflecting properties of the snow- 
covered surface. The black carbon particles are themselves heated by the sun, 
resulting in melting of snow and ice. 
Regarding black carbon emissions, the Ecodesign Directive regulates the 
energy efficiency of a large number of products including space-heating 
appliances and stoves. These requirements will reduce black carbon emissions 
from households and smaller combustion sources in the EU by 25% in 2020 
and 75% in 2050.15 In addition, the National Emission Ceilings Directive 
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Conclusion: EU environmental legislation contributes to climate action. 
The National Emissions Ceilings Directive regulates methane, fine par- 
ticulates and black carbon from large installations. The Ecodesign Direc- 
tive incorporates the efficiency of space-heating appliances and stoves, 
thereby reducing their emissions of black carbon. 
requires the reduction of the emissions of small particles (PM2.5) in the EU 
by 49% by 2030 compared to 2005. It sets country specific national ceilings 
for reducing these emissions. The Directive also requires the prioritisation of 
the reduction of black carbon emissions in these reduction efforts.16 
 
 
9.3 Adaptation to climate change 
The Paris Agreement aims at limiting climate change to “well below 2°C.” 
This implies that to some extent climate change is going to affect our soci- 
eties. Research17 suggests that even if all fossil fuel emissions had stopped 
in 2017, by 2100 we could still experience an average surface temperature 
warming of 1.3° C. This will require a revision of many “traditional” policies 
such as in the fields of infrastructure, insurance or dealing with exceptional 
circumstances such as forest fires or floods that are likely to happen more 
frequently. 
 
9.3.1 Adaptation and the Paris Agreement 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines adapta- 
tion as an “adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or 
expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits 
beneficial opportunities.”According to the latest IPCC Assessment Report,18 
climate change has already caused significant changes in natural systems across 
the world. The fact that the Arctic is warming more than twice as fast as the 
rest of the planet accelerates the melting of ice and exacerbates sea-level 
rise. Climate extremes, such as heavy precipitation, heat waves, droughts and 
floods, are increasing in frequency and significance. The IPCC has concluded 
that it is likely that droughts have been more intense and longer, in particular 
in southern Europe and West Africa, because of changes in climate.19 
Anticipating the adverse effects of climate change and taking appropri- 
ate action to prevent or minimise damage caused by rising average global 
temperature requires a variety of measures. These include using scarce water 
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resources more efficiently, adapting building codes to future climatic condi- 
tions and extreme weather events, building flood defences such as raising the 
levels of dykes, developing drought-tolerant crops, choosing tree species and 
forestry practices less vulnerable to temperature and precipitation change, 
storms and fires, and setting aside land corridors to help species migrate. 
The ability of society to respond depends on the level of development, the 
adaptive capacity and the resources available. Less developed countries and 
marginalised people are especially vulnerable. 
The Paris Agreement recognises the importance of adaptation through the 
establishment of a “global goal on adaptation of enhancing adaptive capacity, 
strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability.”20 The Paris Agreement 
introduces obligations for adaptation planning and the implementation of 
actions. Adaptation action is also included within the regular stock takes that 
will assess collective progress and increase national and regional ambition 
over time. 
 
9.3.2 The EU Adaptation Strategy 
While impacts vary across the EU, all Member States are vulnerable. Euro- 
pean land temperatures were the highest on record during the last decade.21 
Precipitation patterns are changing, generally making wet regions wetter 
and dry regions dryer, particularly in summer; climate-related extremes such 
as heat waves and heavy precipitation are increasing in frequency in many 
regions. Mediterranean Member States in particular are likely to face severe 
challenges such as heat extremes, water scarcity and forest fires. The total 
economic losses caused by weather and other climate-related extremes in 
Europe for the period from 1980–2016 amounted to over €436 billion.22 
Europe, like other parts of the world, needs to design and implement 
policies and measures to deal with climate impacts and their economic, envi- 
ronmental and social costs.Well-planned, early adaptation action saves money 
and lives later, by prioritising coherent and flexible approaches. Adaptation 
strategies are necessary at different levels of governance, such as European, 
national, regional authorities and municipalities, taking into account the 
respective roles of different actors. 
The EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change23 sets out a framework 
and mechanisms for taking the EU’s preparedness for current and future cli- 
mate impacts to a new level. Complementing the activities of Member States, 
the strategy promotes greater coordination, planning and information shar- 
ing and calls for incorporation of adaptation considerations in all relevant EU 
policies. It also ensures that the EU funds are used towards adaptation efforts. 
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As of April 2018, 25 Member States have adopted national strategies on 
adaptation. The most commonly identified vulnerable sectors across Europe 
are (1) agriculture and forestry, (2) environment, ecosystems and biodiversity, 
(3) health (plant, animal and human) and (4) water resources and manage- 
ment. The Joint Research Centre, the European Commission’s in-house sci- 
ence and knowledge service, is modelling climate change impacts in Europe 
under different climate change scenarios, as well as exploring adaptation 
options in specific sectors. 
The main area of European-level involvement in adaptation is funding. 
Since 2014, financial resources have been mobilised for climate adaptation 
through the LIFE programme.24 LIFE funding can be used for adaptation 
activities in vulnerable areas in Europe, for activities that for example sup- 
port the implementation of adaptation plans and strategies, comply with the 
requirements of the Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy or promote 
the use of nature-based solutions and green infrastructure as innovative adap- 
tation solutions. 
Between 2014 and 2020, EU structural and investment funds, including 
the European regional development funds, cohesion funds and the European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development intends to contribute €13.9 bil- 
lion in direct adaptation funding.25 
 
9.3.3 Adaptation at the level of towns and cities 
In 2015, the “Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy” was launched to 
support the implementation of the EU’s 40% greenhouse gas reduction com- 
mitment by 2030 and to follow a joint approach to tackling climate change 
mitigation and adaptation.26 Over 1000 cities have committed to adaptation 
planning and action. The Covenant gives visibility to cities’ commitments 
and actions, facilitates the exchange of experiences and provides technical 
support. Across the EU, around 40% of cities of more than 150,000 inhabit- 
ants are estimated to have adopted adaptation plans to protect their citizens 
from climate impacts. 
Climate-ADAPT,27 the web-based Climate Adaptation Platform, focuses 
on disseminating information on adaptation. It helps users access and share 
information on current and future vulnerability of regions and sectors, on 
national/transnational adaptation strategies, case studies and potential options, 
as well as on tools that support adaptation planning. The Climate-ADAPT 
database currently contains more than 1500 resources on countries adap- 
tation policies and actions, including ecosystem/biodiversity-based adapta- 
tion strategies. The information provides a useful source of information and 
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resources for decision-makers, and the platform could potentially inform 
similar initiatives in other regions of the world. 
 
9.3.4 Incorporating adaptation into EU water policy, 
disaster risk reduction and CEN/CENELEC 
The EU’s Adaptation Strategy emphasises the importance of mainstreaming 
adaptation into other policy areas, such as water and disaster risk reduction 
(DRR). 
The EU has inserted adaptation to climate change into its water policy, 
such as the Water Framework and Floods Directives. Several parts of Europe 
are already experiencing violent flash floods, with costly consequences in 
terms of human life and financial impacts. Between 2001 and 2010, flood 
damage cost nearly €5 billion each year, and by 2050, that figure could 
increase five-fold. In 2015, Member States finalised their Flood Risk Man- 
agement Plans, which also address climate change. 
The EU Adaptation Strategy calls for implementation of adaptation poli- 
cies in the context of DRR. Climate change is a risk-multiplier and needs 
to be fully integrated into the full disaster cycle (prevention, preparedness, 
response and recovery). 
Ensuring the resilience of infrastructure to current and projected cli- 
mate impacts is critical for the sustainability of Europe’s economy. In 2016, a 
“Guide for addressing climate change adaptation in standards” was adopted 
by the European Committee for Standardization (CEN) and the European 
Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC).28 The guide 
is intended to help standard developers address the consequences and impli- 
cations of climate change. It includes a checklist to help establish whether 
climate change adaptation is relevant to a particular standardisation activity 
and a decision tree to help identify which actions should be taken. The next 
steps include the revision and development of the identified standards aiming 
to improve the resilience of European infrastructure in three priority sectors 
to the adverse effects of climate change – transport infrastructure, energy 
infrastructure and the construction of buildings. 
Working towards enhancing the adaptation capacity of European infra- 
structures, the European Financing Institutions Working Group on Adap- 
tation to Climate Change published a report to help practitioners and 
beneficiaries ensure that climate change risks and vulnerabilities are properly 
assessed and integrated into project planning and design.29 Guidelines were 
published on mainstreaming climate change – mitigation and adaptation – in 
major projects in the EU at all stages of the project cycle.30 
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Conclusion: The Paris Agreement recognises that climate change is 
already happening, and that adaptation action is required. The EU has 
developed information sharing, ensures that long-term investments are 
more climate resilient and supports adaptation needs internationally, 
especially in the Small Island Developing States and Least Developed 
Countries. 
9.3.5 International dimension to climate change 
adaptation 
Helping countries adapt to climate change is not only about fairness: it is 
also in the EU’s own interest to help build adaptation capacity elsewhere. 
Poor adaptation in other countries may disrupt transport infrastructures, 
lower their agricultural yields and force people to migrate. Climate change 
impacts – such as extreme weather events, changes in precipitation patterns, 
droughts and desertification – can have direct and indirect security impacts 
and interact with other features of the social, economic and political land- 
scape, with potentially destabilising effects that need to be addressed. They 
can be a threat multiplier that exacerbates the risk of conflict and displace- 
ment of people. 
 
 
 
9.4 Mainstreaming climate into the EU budget and 
developing sustainable finance 
A critical area for climate mainstreaming is finance. The 2011 “Low-carbon 
roadmap to 2050” already indicated that the total investment needs of the 
EU would require a major increase in public and private investment.31 Simi- 
larly, in its 2018 long-term strategy communication towards a climate-neutral 
Europe by 2050, the Commission confirms that additional investments of 
€175 to €290 billion a year will be necessary.32 It is clear that the availability 
of sustainable finance is a crucial pre-condition for the success of the low- 
carbon transition. 
 
9.4.1 EU public funds 
With regard to public finance, the EU budget should play a major role because 
climate action is, alongside better protection and management of external 
borders, defence and security, a public good that generates a clear European 
added value.33 Therefore, the EU took the responsibility of mainstreaming 
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the climate dimension into its budget. Until 2020, a goal of 20% was decided 
for climate related spending in order to encourage the consideration of cli- 
mate in the design and implementation of all EU spending programmes.34 
At the same time, the mainstreaming commitments were further trans- 
lated into similar goals for the European Fund for Sustainable Development 
(28%), the European Investment Bank (25%), the European Fund for Strate- 
gic Investment 2 (40%) and several Multilateral Development Banks, ranging 
from 28% to 40% climate relevance, with stricter tracking methods. 
According to the EU’s budget implementation review, more efforts are 
clearly necessary, even if to date the 20% target is close to being achieved.35 
It is set to deliver slightly more than €200 billion. The 20% mainstream- 
ing target helped to bring the climate dimension into the discussions with 
all stakeholders on programme design and implementation, not least at the 
Member State level. 
The European Court of Auditors’ performance audit on climate spending 
in the 2014–2020 EU budget36 treats the 20% climate objective as the core of 
mainstreaming and as a financial objective in itself. In May 2018, the Com- 
mission proposed that this mainstreaming of climate within the EU budget be 
continued and even be increased to 25% (or €320 billion) in the next Multian- 
nual Financial Framework proposal for 2021–2027.37 The means of achieving 
this target have already been included in all of the Commission’s programme 
proposals for 2021–2027, for example the Common Agricultural Policy up to 
€146 billion,38 the European Regional Development Fund up to €68 billion39 
and the research programme Horizon Europe up to €33 billion.40 
A key priority is financial support for the development of low-carbon 
technologies and business models that will be necessary for reaching the 
long-term climate goals. Innovation offers a strategic opportunity for increas- 
ing the EU’s competitiveness in relation to the rest of the world. A low- 
carbon economy will reduce the EU’s dependence on fossil fuel imports and 
redirect value creation to happening from within the European economy. At 
the same time, European industry can take advantage of the low-carbon tran- 
sition in Europe and become a leading technology provider, in particular in 
fast-growing Asian markets.41 The EU has the ambition to become a leading 
global provider for low-carbon technologies. 
The EU supports low-carbon technologies at all levels of their development 
from research to market uptake. As mentioned, the new research programme 
“Horizon Europe”42 should spend 35 % of its budget on climate action across 
industry, energy, transport and the bio-economy. However, it is an additional 
challenge to bring innovative low-carbon technologies such as carbon capture 
and storage or hydrogen to the market because in many cases the regulatory 
environment is not yet adapted for those technologies. The current level of the 
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carbon price does often not allow new technologies to become profitable in the 
short- or medium-term and the necessary infrastructure is often still lacking. 
The EU has been able to gather experience of providing public support to 
large-scale demonstration of pre-commercial technologies through revenues 
from the EU Emissions Trading System. The financial support needs to be 
targeted towards the project’s cash-flow needs and should offer a perspective 
to become competitive over the project’s lifetime. The new Innovation Fund 
introduced by the latest legislative amendment to the EU ETS is likely to 
provide at least €10 billion of support from the revenues of the EU Emissions 
Trading System over the period from 2020–2030. This fund will enable flag- 
ship demonstration projects across renewable energy, carbon capture use and 
transport, energy storage and energy-intensive industries. 
The EU’s regional and infrastructure funds, which should spend at least 30% 
on climate action,43 should support the rollout of low-carbon technologies that 
are ready for the market. In addition, funding programmes such as renewable 
energy auctions by Member States, as well as the Modernisation Fund, which 
is also financed from the revenues of the EU Emissions Trading System, should 
further support the low-carbon transition across all regions of the EU. 
The financial support in the earlier stages of development – through 
Horizon Europe and the Innovation Fund – should be provided primarily 
by grants with a view to cover the inherently higher risks. Later, as technolo- 
gies come closer to market readiness, it will be more effective to use financial 
instruments such as loans with a public guarantee under the InvestEU pro- 
gramme,44 with a view to realise a higher leverage of public funds and draw 
in an increasing share of private funding. 
The regional funds and the Modernisation Fund have an additional role to 
play because the transition to a low-carbon economy will inevitably lead to 
the reduction of certain economic activities. In 2015, there were, for example, 
237,000 direct jobs in coal and lignite mining and power plants – the major- 
ity of them in just a few regions. By 2030, it is estimated that around 160,000 
of these may be lost.45 The transformation of those regions should not be left 
to Member States alone but be supported at the European level because a 
timely exit from fossil fuels will reduce emissions for the benefit of all EU 
citizens. The regional funds are a well-tested policy instrument for these pur- 
poses. The Modernisation Fund can provide additional support for a timely 
and just transition, for example through subsidies for reskilling of employees. 
With regard to the bio-economy, at least 40% of the EU’s budget for the 
Common Agricultural Policy should be related to climate action.46 Farmers 
should comply with a basic set of standards concerning climate and envi- 
ronment. In addition, Member States can set up several types of incentive 
schemes to reward agricultural practices that are beneficial for the climate, 
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for example payments for the maintenance of and the conversion to organic 
land or for other types of interventions such as agroecology, conservation 
agriculture and integrated production. 
 
9.4.2 EU’s international financial support 
The 20% mainstreaming goal also applies to the EU’s development coop- 
eration policies spanning all sectors, with a particular focus on adaptation, 
building resilience, disaster risk reduction and renewable energy. In the area 
of adaptation, the EU’s flagship initiative is the Global Climate Change Alli- 
ance (GCCA+) that currently supports 49 projects in 38 countries and is 
one of the world’s largest climate initiatives. It has invested €285 million from 
2008–2013 and has an expected commitment of around €420 million for 
2014–2020. The initiative builds on two pillars: policy dialogue and technical 
and financial support for implementation of national climate change adapta- 
tion and mitigation policies. It will continue helping vulnerable countries, 
mainly Small Island Developing States and Least Developed Countries. 
The EU and its Member States are collectively the largest contributors 
in the world when it comes to bilateral assistance for climate change. The 
climate finance contribution of the EU and its Member States amounted to 
more than €20 billion in 2017 for both mitigation and adaptation activities. 
Mainstreaming climate considerations is even more important when it 
comes to the enormous amount of private funds that are being invested on a 
daily basis. That makes the concept of sustainable finance key to the delivery 
of the targets. Sustainable finance is the provision of finance to investments tak- 
ing into account environmental, social and governance considerations. It aims 
to support economic growth while reducing pressures on the environment, 
addressing greenhouse gas emissions, tackling pollution and minimising waste, 
as well as improving efficiency in the use of natural resources. Projects financed 
need to take both climate mitigation and climate resilience into account. 
 
9.4.3 Sustainable finance 
The need for sustainable finance has gained traction following the adoption 
and entry into force of the Paris Agreement and specifically its Article 2(1) 
(c), which calls for “making financial flows consistent with a pathway towards 
low greenhouse gas emissions and climate resilient development.” 
The European Union strongly supports this ambition. In line with its 
September 2016 Communication on “Capital Markets Union – Accelerat- 
ing Reform,”47 the Commission established a High-Level Expert Group on 
Sustainable Finance48 to advise on developing a comprehensive EU strategy 
196 Christian Holzleitner, et al. 
 
 
Conclusion: The EU’s budget from 2014–2020 foresees that 20% of 
expenditure should be climate-related. The Commission has proposed 
to increase this to 25% for the budget 2021–2027. The Commission       
is actively promoting sustainable private finance as a tool to shape 
medium- and long-term investment in the low-carbon economy. 
on sustainable finance. This High-Level Expert Group provided recommen- 
dations and published its final report in January 2018. As a follow-up to these 
recommendations in March 2018, the Commission adopted an Action Plan 
on sustainable finance49 that aims to: 
 
1 Re-orient capital flows towards sustainable investment, in order to 
achieve sustainable and inclusive growth; 
2 Manage financial risks stemming from climate change, environmental 
degradation and social issues; 
3 Foster transparency and long-termism in financial and economic activity. 
 
The Commission has subsequently acted on this Action Plan and in May 2018 
adopted a series of related legislative proposals on a framework to facilitate 
sustainable investment,50 disclosures relating to sustainable investments and 
sustainability risks51 and on low-carbon benchmarks and positive carbon 
impact benchmarks.52 
 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter dealt with only a few policy areas of Europe’s efforts to main- 
stream climate change into other policies and the budget of the European 
Union. Environmental policies to address the ozone hole have been high- 
lighted, as have methane emissions from a variety of economic sectors, adap- 
tation, EU spending programmes and the development of sustainable finance. 
Over time, climate policy is likely to become more and more multifac- 
eted. Gradually climate change will become a substantial part of the EU’s 
standard policies such as on agriculture and trade, along with what has been 
achieved so far on energy, transport, research, industry and several other areas. 
Broad transformational change is afoot but still has a long way to go. 
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10 
TEN PERSONAL REFLECTIONS 
ON THE DIFFICULT JOURNEY 
TOWARDS CLIMATE 
NEUTRALITY 
Jos Delbeke 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
This concluding chapter offers some more personal reflections on the chal- 
lenges after 2030 and, more specifically, with the goal of climate-neutrality 
in mind. It is not intended to be exhaustive. The thoughts originate from 
personal involvement in European climate policy making over the last two 
and a half decades. They reflect a strong belief that much more ambitious 
policies are urgently required. The science has convincingly shown that the 
dramatic and most costly impacts of climate change can still be avoided if 
ambitious action is taken quickly.While much greater political will is needed, 
the EU has already demonstrated that ambitious policies and measures can be 
adopted even within the EU’s complex decision-making context. The fol- 
lowing pages suggest ideas for continuing this journey in the coming years. 
This chapter is not referenced as previous chapters have been but assumes 
that the previous chapters have been read. Many of the facts and acronyms 
referred to have been explained earlier in the book, and so this chapter is 
deliberately written to be more discursive and less explanatory. 
 
10.1 Societal megatrends and the climate challenge 
Societal megatrends represent the context for the formulation of a compre- 
hensive policy vision on how to reach climate-neutrality within a perspective 
of 2050. Some of these megatrends will make it easier to reach the goals of 
the Paris Agreement, but others will make it much more challenging. 
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The most worrying megatrend is undoubtedly the one related to demog- 
raphy. The global population continues to increase, although at a slower pace, 
and is heading towards 10 billion by the middle of this century. While in 
recent decades a large proportion of the world’s population has been lifted 
out of poverty, billions now aspire to enjoy standards of living comparable 
to those in the richer parts of the world. This will unavoidably lead to a sig- 
nificant upward pressure on greenhouse gas emissions, whereas the climate 
science implies that these must be reduced to an annual average below two 
tonnes of CO
2
eq per person. Given that per capita emissions in Europe are 
today in the region of seven tonnes per person and in the US 15 tonnes, there 
is clearly a huge challenge if the goals of the Paris Agreement are to be met. 
The EU’s share of the global population will fall to below 5% and so will 
its share of greenhouse gas emissions. That means the world cannot depend 
on Europe’s efforts to reduce its emissions, important though they may be. 
Europe’s contribution to global solutions will rather be in terms of climate- 
related policy learning, innovation, technological development and deploy- 
ment, as well as its contribution to climate finance. At the same time as its 
share of the population is declining, it is likely that migration towards Europe 
will increase because of climate change. In particular, the increasing severity 
of droughts and desertification in regions such as Africa will create harsher 
living conditions for the people living there, who will look for other, better 
places to live. 
Another megatrend is the emergence of new digital technologies, includ- 
ing artificial intelligence. The world is an increasingly connected place and 
digitalisation is radically changing the ways societies organise themselves. 
While there are many opportunities for improvement, new global connec- 
tivity coupled with demographic pressures are contributing to more unstable 
political environments. Migration is contributing to the emergence of more 
nationalistic and populist political tendencies. Instead of developing poli- 
cies – including climate policies – that would reduce these pressures, this has 
paradoxically led to the opposite, where countries turn inwards, looking to 
stem immigration, question the value of overseas development aid and pro- 
mote more nationalistic economic policies. 
On top of this, there is growing geopolitical tension generally, to which 
climate change is adding a new dimension. In addition to the pressures to 
the east and south of Europe, there is a new one looming in the north. The 
disappearance of the Arctic summer ice makes new economic exploitation 
and navigation routes possible, in an area where territorial disputes have liter- 
ally been frozen until now. The rapid warming of the Arctic is changing this 
centuries-old reality and is leading to territorial claims and tensions that are 
likely to exacerbate in the coming decades. 
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Conclusion: The megatrends related to demography, technology and 
geopolitics will all shape policies leading towards climate neutrality.  
They offer both challenges and opportunities. Crucial, however, is that 
all countries act urgently to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions in 
differentiated ways that reflect their capabilities but all combining their 
efforts towards a global transition away from fossil fuels towards more 
sustainable solutions. 
These megatrends are in addition to the one resulting from the fossil 
fuel-based economic model that underlies the rising concentration of green- 
house gases in the atmosphere. This climate megatrend calls for urgent policy 
responses that will need to be sustained for decades. The Paris Agreement 
of 2015 created a fresh basis for globally coordinated efforts by all countries, 
whether highly developed and post-industrial, rapidly industrialising and 
emerging or struggling with poverty and the effects of climate change. The 
universal agreement on the ambitious goal of limiting the global temperature 
increase to no more than 2°C was accompanied by the reconfirmation that 
the fight against climate change is a “common but differentiated responsibil- 
ity,” and that all countries have to contribute according to their “respective 
capabilities.” Usefully, the Paris Agreement has moved beyond the outdated 
dichotomy between “developed” and “developing” countries, as these are 
over-simplistic categorisations that no longer correspond to the realities of 
the 21st century. 
 
 
10.2 The urgent need for the implementation 
of policy plans (NDCs) 
The IPCC has shown the extent to which the climate change we are cur- 
rently experiencing is due to the greenhouse gas emissions originating from 
the developed countries that industrialised earlier on the basis of fossil fuels 
such as coal, oil and gas. However, the science is also clear that over the 
coming decades the newly emerging economies will be the main source 
of greenhouse gas emissions. Within the emissions budget that a maximum 
warming of 2°C would allow, at least two-thirds has already been consumed. 
In recognition of this fact, developed countries have generally accepted that 
they must reduce their emissions much earlier and more substantially com- 
pared to the emerging economies. At the same time, it is clear that emerging 
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economies must also start reducing their emissions very soon; otherwise, the 
2°C target will never be within reach. 
This leads to the observation that the implementation of the plans submit- 
ted as part of the ratification process to the Paris Agreement, the so-called 
“Nationally Determined Contributions,” should now be at the core of future 
discussions. The European experience shows that implementation is hard 
work.A raft of policies and measures need to be introduced and implemented 
in order to have an effect on emissions, and these necessarily have an impact 
on the daily lives of companies and citizens. It is imperative, however, that 
promises are fulfilled. This also applies for countries showing reluctance to 
engage, such as the US. Climate policies and measures have to make a dif- 
ference, which means forcing change to happen faster than would have hap- 
pened anyway. 
A common drive towards the implementation of the Paris Agreement will 
increasingly allow for mutual learning. The EU experience to date may be 
a useful source of learning for other UNFCCC Parties. The EU has already 
shown that collaboration across national borders can reduce short-term eco- 
nomic costs. Equally, cross-border collaboration can facilitate the transition 
process as it allows for dealing with distributional issues, in particular for 
regions that have to make more fundamental transitions. Making a “just tran- 
sition” away from a coal-based energy sector, for example, needs funding 
mechanisms that others might contribute towards but which is to everyone’s 
benefit in terms of climate change. 
In the coming years, before the ambition review planned by the Paris 
Agreement for 2023, policy implementation should receive stronger atten- 
tion by all stakeholders, much more than discussions about tightening existing 
targets. It is too often assumed that setting ambitious targets is a guarantee for 
action on the ground. On the contrary, meaningful ambitious targets are ones 
that build on practical implementation experience. The new transparency 
provisions of the Paris Agreement, as agreed in Katowice at COP24, are a 
most useful new tool in this respect. Transparency will allow comparisons to 
be made on progress, or the lack of it, and lessons can be learned and shared. 
Europe should expect to learn increasingly from others, not least about the 
new low-carbon technologies that are being developed and deployed across 
the globe. 
The EU should continue to focus a considerable share of the climate 
finance it provides to assist third countries in the urgent task of policy design 
and implementation. This task is of capital importance, and policy atten- 
tion globally should now move in this direction. In addition, the UNFCCC 
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Conclusion: The absolute priority for the coming years is to see the full 
implementation by all countries of the policy plans they submitted as 
part of the ratification of the Paris Agreement. A review of the targets  
in 2023 is only meaningful if based on the experience – and results – of 
practical policy implementation. 
Secretariat should increasingly focus on following up on implementation 
more than on annual negotiations. It should be considered whether to reduce 
the annual frequency of expensive Conferences of the Parties (COPs), as 
questions are increasingly asked about the necessity of this frequency. At a 
minimum, it could be envisaged to have alternating “implementation” and 
“negotiation” COPs. 
 
 
10.3 The need for a carbon price combined 
with local policies 
The Paris Agreement delivered a global decision on the climate ambition 
level but left the more challenging task of developing policies to the Parties. 
It is unfortunate that it was not possible to agree at least on a limited number 
of strategic common policies. 
Based on the European experience, the principle of putting a price on 
carbon would have been a strong candidate for such a common policy. 
Carbon pricing offers considerable flexibility to economic operators and 
hence is a system that realises emission reductions at lower costs. This is not 
denying the fact that many more policies and measures are required to deal 
with specific market barriers, but a price on carbon is basic and essential, as 
it sends a clear signal to all individuals and companies that greenhouse gas 
emissions no longer can be released into the atmosphere without any cost. 
The atmosphere is not a convenient, free dumping ground for waste gases. 
Moreover, an explicit price on carbon serves as a useful benchmark against 
which other policies can be measured.What is important is that all the tools 
used by governments should be coherent and pull in the same direction. 
There are several ways to put an explicit price on carbon. Most coun- 
tries that have introduced carbon pricing have established “cap-and-trade” 
schemes. Economists tend to prefer carbon taxes, although real-life policy 
experience shows that introducing taxes is even more difficult politically than 
introducing “cap-and-trade” systems. One key element that emerges from 
the experience of the EU’s Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is that it is 
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of capital importance to address the distributional impacts in favour of lower- 
income Member States or regions, just as it is essential to address the con- 
cerns about competitiveness by emission-intensive and trade-exposed sectors. 
Addressing these elements in the EU helped overcome political or economic 
reticence and helped to establish a common carbon price for all companies 
covered by the system, whichever of the 31 participating countries compa- 
nies are based in. The EU ETS covers only the emissions from large fixed 
industrial installations, but over time, more sectors such as road transport 
could be progressively included. 
Today, several countries and regions that have established carbon-pricing 
systems are talking to each other about possible cooperation on a bilateral 
or regional basis. Informal talks have been held between the EU, Canada, 
California, China and New Zealand, and it is already clear that preserving 
industry’s competitiveness is a concern for all. Many economists, such as the 
2019 Nobel Prize Winner for Economics William D. Nordhaus, advocate for 
the formation of “carbon clubs” where national systems are linked to one 
another. The EU and Switzerland have decided to formally link their emis- 
sions trading systems. The more countries join carbon-pricing systems, the 
less need there will be for policies to address concerns about competitive- 
ness or “carbon leakage.” Today, some 52 national, regional and local carbon 
pricing systems exist, covering some 20% of global emissions. The latter per- 
centage will significantly increase once China has rolled out its nationwide 
system as of 2020. These running systems could, over time, become the core 
of a kind of “carbon club” that would be open for others to join. 
Cooperation between cap-and-trade systems is clearly the most prom- 
ising route for establishing an international carbon market. As part of the 
discussions around Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, a fresh debate is tak- 
ing place on how to complement these cap-and-trade systems with offset 
schemes. A strong argument in favour of international offsets is that they 
offer an incentive for emission reductions that are cheaper but also faster to 
achieve. Offsets systems, however, will always require solid proof that they are 
environmentally sound, managed in a transparent manner and are subject to 
strong compliance checks. 
The Kyoto Protocol created international offset mechanisms, such as the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the Joint Implementation (JI) 
projects. These offset mechanisms took off in a promising way and flourished 
as the EU opened its Emissions Trading System to these credits. As already 
explained in Chapter 4, the experience was a disappointing one, as the CDM 
Executive Board failed to impose a sufficiently strong governance system. 
Too many credits of doubtful environmental credibility were generated. The 
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Conclusion: Putting a price on carbon is fundamental. Regional cooper- 
ation brings the prospect of global carbon pricing within reach. Carbon 
offsets can be an additional and temporary solution, provided a solid 
governance system can be established. However, governments should 
be cautious towards allowing the benefits of cheap abatement options 
go to actors outside their jurisdiction in the form of offset credits, leav- 
ing more expensive options to be paid for domestically. 
EU decided to stop the influx of these credits as they undermined its carbon 
market. As a result, the price of credits collapsed to less than €1 a tonne of 
CO
2 
equivalent and is likely to stay there as long as the question of robust 
governance remains unresolved. 
In the meantime, international civil aviation may be the first global eco- 
nomic sector to create an offset regime, known as CORSIA, but to date, neither 
ICAO nor the UNFCCC has been able to adequately answer the fundamental 
questions relating to transparency and governance that underpins environmen- 
tal integrity. It turns out, rather unsurprisingly, that the UN is not the right 
vehicle for organising markets. The best thing the UN bodies can contribute 
to, however, is creating the conditions for reliable monitoring, reporting and 
verification of emissions and ensuring that emissions are accounted for properly, 
avoiding any risk of double-counting. The mechanisms to ensure this between 
the UNFCCC and ICAO accounting systems are, unfortunately, far from 
robust enough. Quality control may well have to be delegated to trusted bodies 
that might develop “quality ratings” similar to those used in financial markets. 
Moreover, an offset regime cannot escape pertinent questions about distribu- 
tive impacts. The Paris Agreement requires comprehensive policy plans (NDCs) 
by all Parties. These plans relate to emission reductions achieved within the terri- 
torial limits of the country. It should therefore be clearly indicated which reduc- 
tions give rise to offsets that are sold to emitters outside the national jurisdiction 
and so should be deducted from the reductions claimed under the national plan 
to avoid double-counting of emissions reductions (as reductions will also be 
claimed by the purchaser of the credits). National governments and stakehold- 
ers will be increasingly insistent that cheap abatement possibilities should not 
be sold off for the benefit of economic operators in other jurisdictions, leaving 
more expensive abatement options to be paid for by national economic actors or 
national governments. Rather than see an outflow of cheap credits, countries will 
in all probability wish to facilitate their own long-term transition to a low-carbon 
economy, while also fulfilling their international commitments. 
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10.4 Towards a complete decarbonisation 
of the energy sector 
The EU is accelerating its annual emissions reduction from approximately 
0.5% in the 1990s to about 2% in the run-up to 2030. The energy sector has 
been at the heart of this effort, as it is in this sector in which the bulk of the 
fossil fuels are used. Efforts have therefore been concentrated on improving 
its efficiency and producing energy in less carbon-intensive ways. 
The relatively low-carbon content of energy production in the EU, in 
particular in comparison to other highly industrialised nations, is linked to 
the build-up of nuclear capacity in Europe since the 1970s. However, the 
popularity of this source of energy production went down spectacularly after 
the major accidents at Three Mile Island (US), Chernobyl (Ukraine) and 
Fukushima (Japan). Today, more than 150 nuclear installations are still in 
operation in Europe. These major accidents, combined with the unsolved 
radioactive waste problem, led to a perception that nuclear power is an 
energy dream that never fully fulfilled its promises. These problems, as well 
as the high cost of new nuclear power generation, creates a situation today in 
which Europe is unlikely to opt for nuclear power generation as a major way 
to reduce greenhouse gases in the decades to come. 
A major challenge for Europe is to strive for sufficient capacity in other 
new sources of low-carbon energy. The spectacular development of renew- 
able energy is without a doubt one of the most important peacetime policy- 
driven changes to the energy landscape of the last decades and maybe even of 
the last century. Given the substantive cost reductions of sun and wind energy 
in particular, policy intervention is now shifting from subsidies to public 
regulation and the question on how to cope with their variability. 
The drive towards reduced energy use combined with new low-carbon 
energy production will intensify in the future. Saving energy is a rational 
choice for the EU as it contributes almost €1 billion every day to energy 
imports. The drive towards more renewable energy is likely to be rein- 
forced through spectacular developments and cost reductions in storage and 
battery technology and through the considerable potential of digitalisation. 
For Europe, therefore, the first significant step towards climate neutrality is, 
without a doubt, climate-neutral energy production. 
Nevertheless, a major question about the other 68% non-renewable elec- 
tricity production in 2030 remains squarely on the table. Given the unlikely 
increase of new nuclear capacity, an unavoidable choice is the technology 
known as “Carbon Capture and Storage.” The use of lower-carbon fos- 
sil fuels such as natural gas could continue in the future, provided the car- 
bon emissions would be captured and then stored in the underground. This 
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Conclusion: By 2050, a climate-neutral energy system is  technologi- 
cally possible at the global level. Both the private and the public sectors 
should double their efforts. More renewables and the commercial viabil- 
ity of carbon capture and storage will be key. 
technology is well known but not tested on a sufficiently large commercial 
scale yet; this should become a high priority. Moreover, it is expensive and 
consumes energy, and some continue to raise questions about the safe storage 
of carbon dioxide underground. On the other hand, gas fired power genera- 
tion is flexible and allows for a good complement to the variable production 
of electricity through solar and wind. 
The rest of the world is unlikely to follow the EU’s energy experience, 
or at least will do so only partially. One can rather expect a huge interest in 
the new emerging economies in energy conservation and renewable energy 
technologies, and they may well concentrate their efforts in developing these 
options. However, their rapidly rising energy demand is likely to be satisfied 
by also adding a fair amount of nuclear capacity to the energy mix, notwith- 
standing the higher costs and the safety risks associated with nuclear technol- 
ogy. This will generate new questions about proliferation and waste handling. 
 
 
10.5 Low-carbon transport is urgently required 
Transport has not contributed sufficiently to reducing the EU’s emissions so 
far. This must change radically if the EU is serious about meeting its 2030 tar- 
gets, even more so if the goal is to attain carbon-neutrality by 2050. Economists 
would say that the real problem with transport is that the income elasticity of 
demand is higher than one. That means that the demand for transport services 
increases more than proportionally as people become richer. That does not 
bode well for the rapidly emerging economies, where transport demand has 
been rising rapidly and huge investments in infrastructure have barely been suf- 
ficient to avoid severe traffic congestion and air quality problems. 
The EU has been adopting ambitious CO
2 
standards for cars and lorries, and 
many new technologies are now on the brink of uptake by the market.A vari- 
ety of new technologies can be expected in the coming years, including on 
hydrogen and low-carbon fuels. However, the shift towards the electrification 
of transport is likely to be the most profound transformation over the coming 
decade, and this fits well with a power sector that is rapidly decarbonising. 
For both passengers and freight transport, much more additional action at 
national and local levels is needed to ensure that transport systems fit with the 
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Conclusion: The road transport sector is ready to introduce and scale up 
new low-carbon technologies. Transport policies still need a major over- 
haul at all levels of governance: improved traffic management, a review 
of national taxation regimes, addressing major deficiencies in local and 
city infrastructure and modernising the rail sector. In a world of rising 
mobility demand, we cannot afford for transport to wipe out hard-won 
emission reductions made in other sectors. 
growing public expectation of liveable, sustainable cities with substantially 
improved air quality. Public infrastructure is often in need of major overhauls, 
including the provision of walking and biking lanes or with respect to elec- 
tric charging infrastructure. A variety of local traffic management measures 
will also have to be considered, adapted to the local circumstances. 
Transport needs to be fluid and efficient. More generalised road pric- 
ing policies are becoming unavoidable, however difficult it may be to win 
public acceptance of these. The political discourse around road pricing has 
to move away from one that centres on fiscal charges towards a “pay-for- 
service” approach whereby paying the charge gives access to a faster and 
more efficient journey. For freight transport, the “Eurovignette” system has 
been gradually developed for heavy goods vehicles and over time needs to 
serve as the foundation for a more generalised system of road pricing that 
Member States can decide to also apply to passenger cars. 
New technologies are always somewhat more expensive and fiscal poli- 
cies can be geared towards speeding up the low-carbon transition. Europe is 
also endowed with a magnificently dense network of railway lines that need 
to be exploited more efficiently. Rail transport has tremendous potential as 
a supplier of low-carbon transport services but is disadvantaged by manage- 
ment systems that belong to another age. These issues are being addressed 
too slowly, giving rise to perverse relative prices for users between different 
transport modes, in particular the relative costs between rail and aviation 
services for distances below 1000 kilometres. 
Given the rapidly rising income levels in emerging economies and grow- 
ing urbanisation, very large investments in transport facilities and infrastruc- 
ture will be built in the coming decades. While many countries do not have 
the dense railway network that Europe has, other options than building high- 
ways or expanding domestic aviation have to be considered in the light of 
rapidly growing demand for mobility. There are alternatives, as the develop- 
ment of rail infrastructure in China demonstrates. 
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10.6 Emissions from aviation and maritime 
sectors grow out of control 
The real nightmare for transport is the seemingly unstoppable growth of 
emissions from the aviation and maritime sectors. The actions of ICAO and 
IMO, despite intensive pressure by the EU, are too piecemeal and misaligned 
with the environmental objectives of UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. 
The introduction of the CORSIA system to offset the growth of inter- 
national aviation’s emissions from 2020 is expressly voluntary until 2027, and 
the governance system underpinning its environmental integrity is extremely 
weak. The prospect of energy efficiency gains of aircraft, improvements in 
air traffic management and sustainable aviation fuels actually reducing emis- 
sions from aviation, in the light of strongly increasing demand, are – to put it 
politely – remote. More will have to be done. 
International shipping’s CO
2 
emissions may have peaked in 2008, but it is 
difficult to see international shipping halving its total greenhouse gas emis- 
sions by 2050, as is the IMO’s declared aim. The IMO is working on a long 
list of possible instruments and candidate measures, but there is no agreement 
yet on which of these might be implemented, nor any certainty on how 
stringent such measures will be. 
One must expect, therefore, that countries will listen to growing public 
concern about the sustainability of aviation and shipping and put in place 
further policy measures, irrespective of whatever global approaches are agreed 
in ICAO or the IMO. One example for aviation is passenger levies, such as 
they are already applied in a number of European countries.Why aviation is 
not subjected to Value Added Tax on the sale of tickets is surprising, to say the 
least.Air travel may be democratising, but most air passenger transport is used 
by wealthier segments of the population. 
Another option is the legislation on the EU ETS that already foresees the 
inclusion of both incoming and departing flights to and from the EU as of 
2024. The EU ETS could also be applied to international shipping if suf- 
ficient action is not taken in the IMO. Indeed, the EU is committed to assess 
the adequacy of actions taken in ICAO and the IMO in the context of future 
amendments to the EU ETS. Unless meaningful action is undertaken at the 
international level, which looks unlikely, then the EU will have no choice 
but to apply additional polices and measures to these international modes of 
transport. 
A major responsibility for doing more rests on the shoulders of ICAO and 
the IMO, United Nations agencies whose legitimacy is not just to defend the 
sectoral interests of the industries they represent, but who ought to defend 
the public interest. This will require them to reinvent themselves in the light 
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Conclusion: The aviation and maritime sectors do not pay for the exter- 
nal costs of their operations. On the contrary, they enjoy a most favour- 
able fiscal treatment compared to other modes of transport. National 
and regional authorities will be under increasing pressure to remedy this 
situation in the absence of sufficient action by the international bodies 
such as ICAO and IMO. 
of the environmental challenges faced. Motivated millennials and other seg- 
ments of the population are beginning to see aviation and shipping as con- 
tributing disproportionately to a problem that the younger generation will be 
left to suffer from – and pay for – the consequences. It should be no surprise 
that more people are seeking ways to avoid flying if possible. Cruise ships are 
increasingly seen as major sources of pollution and the epitome of unsustain- 
able travel for amusement. If buying locally sourced goods is seen both as 
better for the environment and protecting local jobs, the momentum behind 
such initiatives could grow at the same time as more protectionist trade poli- 
cies are advocated in some jurisdictions. 
 
 
 
10.7 The need for an enlightened industrial 
and trade policy 
Another major long-term challenge is the low-carbon production of indus- 
trial commodities such as cement, steel and non-ferrous products, chemi- 
cals, pulp and paper and glass. The production of these commodities is very 
carbon-intensive, while these products are, and will continue to be, needed 
in huge quantities, for example to build the sustainable infrastructure and the 
cities of the future. Over the past years, significant results have been achieved 
as regards energy savings, but in view of reaching climate neutrality, com- 
pletely new production processes will be required. For example, the blast fur- 
nace is a centuries-old process that emits very substantial amounts of carbon 
during steel production, even if gradual technological improvements have 
reduced the carbon emissions significantly. 
This comprehensive transformation process needs an enlightened indus- 
trial policy. The EU ETS provides both an incentive to reduce emissions 
and a reward – in the form of comparative advantage – for those companies 
who emit less. As a result, technological efforts have already been stepped up 
significantly. Research indicates that the number of patents for low-carbon 
technologies has been increased significantly since the creation of the EU 
ETS. Innovation policy by both the public and private sector must ensure 
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that the new generation of low-carbon technology leaves the laboratory 
sooner rather than later. The EU ETS Innovation Fund has been set up to 
facilitate this process and will have an envelope of more than EUR 10 billion 
to facilitate the transition towards the commercial uptake of promising new 
technologies. 
The transformation of the industrial tissue will require considerable 
investments and hence will need a solid finance system geared up to the task. 
Many interesting ideas are being raised to promote green finance. Equally 
important may be the macroeconomic support for low-carbon investment, 
for example through making the Euro area’s Stability and Growth Pact crite- 
ria more flexible for low-carbon investment. In addition, ways may be found 
to link cash lying in savings accounts to help finance productive low-carbon 
investments with more stable long-term returns. 
This new approach to innovation in industrial sectors needs to be com- 
plemented by an enlightened trade policy. One can assume that new technol- 
ogy in its early phases will be costly and that the free allocations under the 
EU ETS and the Innovation Fund will only be able to compensate for part 
of this additional cost. However, industrial goods are intensively traded inter- 
nationally. As a similar carbon constraint to the EU ETS, which is unlikely to 
be applicable to similar commodities produced in many other countries, it 
can be expected that discussions around trade corrections will intensify. Such 
discussions will need to be orderly and by far the best solution would be to 
organise these in the context of a reformed WTO. Alternatively and in the 
meantime, the EU could also consider the incorporation of climate policy 
implementation checks as part of its bilateral and regional trade agreements. 
So far, only recognition of the Paris Agreement is being explicitly mentioned, 
but there are no checks on whether the commitments made under the Paris 
Agreement are being implemented in practice. Such checks would be par- 
ticularly relevant for more intensively traded goods and commodities. 
These trade concerns would be much less acute in a world where all 
countries were moving towards the implementation of the Paris Agreement. 
Ideally, therefore, the implementation of the Paris Agreement will take place 
according to the so-called Nationally Determined Contributions. Businesses 
will then be making efforts that are more comparable as far as their implicit 
carbon costs are concerned. However, some countries will remain slow to 
act, or may even choose to “free-ride.” An alternative could therefore be the 
creation of carbon clubs, as already mentioned. 
One can also expect more competition on new low-carbon technologies. 
Asia has already taken a strong leadership position in sustainable technologies, 
such as batteries or high-speed trains. China has targeted several sectors in 
Ten personal reflections 213 
 
 
Conclusion: The low-carbon transformation requires a review of the 
research, innovation, finance and trade policies for intensively traded 
goods. A globally coordinated transformation, under the auspices of a 
reformed WTO for example, will allow for a much smoother implemen- 
tation of the Paris Agreement. 
which it deliberately seeks to develop leadership to contribute to the green- 
ing of its own domestic economy and to position itself in fast growing seg- 
ments of a new international market for low-carbon goods. 
 
 
10.8 The increasing importance of agriculture 
and forestry 
As emissions from fossil fuels use reduce over time, attention will necessarily 
shift to other greenhouse gases, such as methane, or to more active ways of 
absorbing carbon from the atmosphere. This brings agriculture and forestry 
to the forefront of attention. 
A major source of methane is meat production and in particular cattle 
and sheep rearing. Given the growing world population and in particular the 
growth of its middle classes, a switch in people’s diets is happening. A global 
generalisation of the high levels of meat consumption of wealthier parts of 
the world is worrisome and is just not compatible with the temperature goals 
of the Paris Agreement. 
Even if technology can help to some extent through improved farming 
methods, the major transformation will have to come from changing hab- 
its. The example of smoking has shown not only how important societal 
changes can be achieved but also how much time and effort this requires. In 
Europe, meat consumption has started to falter as a result of a new impetus 
to prefer vegetarian or vegan food. In other parts of the world, such as in 
Asia or Africa, the consumption of white meat is more established, and this 
habit should be maintained if possible.At the same time, more educated mid- 
dle classes everywhere need to be made much more aware of the beneficial 
impact of eating less red meat. 
The changing food consumption towards less meat should allow for less 
need of agricultural land. This could slow down and possibly halt the clearing 
of tropical forests, and existing land could be used for afforestation. Together 
with sustainable forestry, the carbon uptake could be much higher compared 
to what is currently the case. This may require new forms of remuneration; 
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Conclusion: Increased policy attention on the agriculture and forestry 
sectors is indispensable to reach climate neutrality. Food habits will have 
to change in favour of consuming much less red meat. Carbon sinks 
must be enhanced through maintaining tropical forests, increased affor- 
estation and sustainable forest management. 
in this context, the use of offsets is frequently mentioned. In addition, new 
technological developments can help to set up a solid governance system, as 
earth observation from space with better accuracy is becoming increasingly 
available. 
In a longer-term perspective, the use of bio-energy with carbon capture 
and storage (BECCS) is a promising new technology. In view of reaching 
climate neutrality, it would allow for negative emissions and compensate for 
those emissions that are impossible to avoid. More practical experience of 
these technologies is urgently needed. 
 
 
10.9 The critical importance of local authorities 
and citizens 
An ambitious implementation of the Nationally Determined Contributions 
submitted under the Paris Agreement is not a task the public sector can 
deliver on its own. The magnitude of the task requires collaboration between 
multiple proactive actors in all segments of society, such as businesses, inves- 
tors, bankers, consumers, citizens, transport users, cities and local authorities. 
The intention of making comprehensive policy plans is to ensure that all 
actors pull in the same direction, as well as to avoid short-term interests and 
disruption being used as an excuse for no action. 
Cities and local authorities will have a particularly important role in pol- 
icy making in the coming years, given the importance of the investment 
decisions they make and their influence. There is immense pressure on them 
to adapt local infrastructure to both reduce emissions, for example through 
energy efficient housing and transport, and to protect against the impacts of 
climate change. Increasingly, they will need to protect citizens against the 
negative effects of climate change such as storms or flash flooding. It is there- 
fore at the city and local level that perhaps the most important action needs 
to take place. In such a situation, it will be very important to share experi- 
ences between municipalities and local authorities, to make sure that policies 
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work together in a coherent manner. National and regional organisations can 
facilitate this knowledge sharing by careful monitoring and review of what 
works best. 
Much more action can also be expected from the private sector. Impor- 
tant initiatives are under way as shareholders increasingly ask questions 
about the carbon content of the portfolio of activities of their companies, 
and they are already raising their voice in general assemblies. Pension and 
sovereign wealth funds are starting to redirect their long-term investment 
portfolios according to sustainability criteria in order to safeguard profit- 
ability over time. Bankers are under pressure from their clients to offer 
green savings products that support low-carbon activities. The first regula- 
tory activities are under way in the European Union, but also in China, to 
provide greater information about the environmental impacts and potential 
liabilities of businesses, as well as to enhance the clarity and reliability of 
“green” investment products offered. 
Consumers also become increasingly aware of the environmental impacts 
of the products they use and how these are minimised. This ranges from 
vegetables or flowers transported from faraway places, compared to prod- 
ucts produced using shorter production chains closer to consumers. Public 
authorities have a particular responsibility to make transport more sustain- 
able, whether they find themselves close to the consumer, such as municipal 
and local authorities, or far away such as ICAO and IMO when it comes to 
international aviation or maritime activities. 
Fiscal provisions can be developed to create temporary favourable 
conditions for new promising technologies that are often more expen- 
sive in the early phases of their commercialisation, such as electric vehi- 
cles or heat pumps. Such incentives can help to switch a niche market 
into a mainstream activity and through this create scale effects that bring 
down unit costs. The example of solar panels and wind turbines is very 
encouraging in this regard. Public authorities also learned a useful lesson 
that such incentives can only be offered on a temporary basis and need 
to be monitored closely in order to avoid perverse effects. In many parts 
of Europe, incentives for renewable technology were maintained for too 
long and created a negative public reaction when the magnitude of the 
real costs became clear. 
Another major new field for action by local authorities is the creation 
of infrastructure required to facilitate the recycling and reuse of consumer 
products. Encouraging circular economic activities would allow for a sig- 
nificant reduction in the energy and carbon intensity of industrial goods. 
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Conclusion: Local authorities and citizens, as well as investors and com- 
panies, play a critical role in joint low-carbon action in the sectors of 
housing, transport, private consumption and public services related to 
the circular economy. 
This requires the setup of an entirely new infrastructure for the collection 
and sorting of waste, the creation of new jobs and the making of new invest- 
ments. These new activities need to be financed through levies consistent 
with the polluter-pays principle. 
 
 
10.10 The growing challenge of adaptation to 
climate change 
Even if we are to limit the global average temperature increase to well below 
2°C, this will unavoidably cause many effects of climate change, including some 
grave and dangerous effects. Today we have passed the 1°C mark, and the 
impacts of climate change have started becoming visible to everyone. It also 
becomes a painful reality for public authorities, mostly at the local level, who 
have to cope with more frequent flooding, forest fires, shortages of drinking 
water, severe storms and so on.A multitude of challenges falls on their shoulders. 
The new local policies related to the adaptation to climate change, com- 
bined with the policies to bringing down greenhouse gas emissions, are pro- 
foundly changing the tasks of local authorities and each of these new tasks 
need to be tailored to the specific local circumstances. As they can learn a 
lot from each other’s experiences, forums have been established where they 
can share and compare each other’s experiences, such as through the Global 
Covenant of Mayors initiative. 
National and regional authorities are already preparing for new challenges. 
Disaster risk reduction strategies are being developed at local, national and 
international levels. Infrastructure that is built to last several decades will increas- 
ingly need to be made to withstand extreme weather events and be made as 
“climate proof ” as possible. It is hardly conceivable to build new rail links or 
highways in areas that may be prone to frequent flooding, for example. At the 
same time, the private sector, and in particular the insurance sector, is already 
increasingly confronted with new realities. Insurance is a service involving the 
transfer of financial risks against payment. Insurers and re-insurers are increas- 
ingly warning that climate change will cause more extreme weather events, and 
premiums will have to rise to reflect the increasing risks. 
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Conclusion 
The journey towards climate neutrality is going to be long and difficult. 
The IPCC offered a sobering message in its 2018 report on how limited the 
emissions window has become to keep the 1.5°C objective within reach.We 
know the magnitude of the task ahead and the hurdles to be overcome. The 
world has already passed the mark of 1°C global warming. If we are to suc- 
ceed in avoiding dangerous climate change, with possible run-away climate 
change, a significant reinforcement of climate policies is urgently needed. It 
requires action by all countries, and the developed countries must be ready 
to deliver deep reductions. However, just as important is the extent to which 
emerging economies are able to limit and eventually reduce their emissions. 
Even if we know that the challenge is immense and daunting, we 
have nevertheless already learned some useful lessons. It is important to 
focus on the low-cost potentials to reduce emissions. However, in paral- 
lel, we need to prepare the future through innovation and the deploy- 
ment of new technologies. We need many technological breakthroughs, 
but even more so, we need a raft of social and institutional innovations. 
“Path dependency” is a brake on the speed of change in all aspects of life. 
Economies have prospered on energy from fossil fuels. Feeding an ever 
more populous planet is increasingly difficult.We have so many habits and 
ways of doing things left over from an era when the world was less popu- 
lated and less industrialised, in which climate change was unknown. Our 
understanding of climate change, and what needs to be done, is gradu- 
ally changing the nature of value creation in our economies. Change has 
already started. Fortunately, these will replace jobs in some sectors with 
other kinds of jobs and other skills. 
At the same time, we have to widen the scope of action. So far, we have 
concentrated action on the energy, transport and industrial sectors, since 
their use of fossil fuels are the main sources of greenhouse gas emissions. 
Even if a lot more needs to be done in these sectors, we already know that 
 
Conclusion: As climate change is already happening,  public  policies  
and infrastructures need to be “climate proofed.” Adaptation to climate 
change will have to be tailored to specific local realities, but an over-    
all increasing need for preparedness to counter climate-related risks is 
already inevitable. The less we do to reduce emissions of greenhouse 
gases, the more we will have to invest in adaptation. 
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many more sectors need to be involved, as the challenge is much wider 
and deeper. We have to extend efforts in the agriculture and land use 
sectors and look for carbon sinks in the soil and in trees. We also have to 
open up the promises of the “circular economy,” encourage the recycling 
of carbon emissions by their incorporation into synthetic fuels, for exam- 
ple, and ultimately develop permanent greenhouse gas storage solutions. 
Once we have found ways on how to do this at a much lower cost, we 
can actively roll out the dimension of the so-called “negative emissions.” 
We also know now, much more than before, that we have to adapt to the 
very diverse manifestations of the impacts of climate change. We know how 
expensive this might become, as higher storm surge and flood protections 
need to be built, and new urban infrastructure will be needed in response 
to higher summertime temperatures and so on. While the richer parts of 
the world will be better able to afford this, a disproportional impact on the 
lower-income parts of the world needs to receive special attention. In par- 
ticular, the way development assistance is organised and deployed will have 
to be revisited. 
Implementation of the agreed upon Paris Agreement commitments 
will require a fundamental rethinking of public policies that have some- 
times been set up for decades, if not centuries.We started this fundamental 
review of public policies incrementally, perhaps too timidly, but we have 
at least been able to learn some useful lessons in the meantime. There 
is no other alternative than to build further on this policy learning and 
to prepare for the next phases in a much more decisive and determined 
manner. In this respect, full attention needs to be paid to the social and 
geographic redistributional effects of these policies. All need to be carried 
along in finding solutions to one of the greatest challenges of our time. 
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